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ABSTRACT   
The aim of this thesis is to examine and compare the thought of Alexis de Tocqueville, John 
Stuart Mill and Thomas Carlyle on modern democracy.  Throughout their works, Tocqueville, 
Mill and Carlyle showed a profound engagement with the phenomenon of democracy in their 
era.  It was the crux around which their wider reflections on the period revolved.  Tocqueville, 
Mill and Carlyle located democracy’s causes deep in history.  They defined its contours 
broadly and contextualized it within ancient and modern notions of democracy.  Each 
approached democracy with a significant degree of scepticism and outlined its negative 
consequences for their contemporaries.  But, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle also offered 
solutions to the problems they saw in the modern democratic world, many of which were 
novel.  The present thesis suggests that in these areas there exists a profound similarity 
between the ideas of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  It has become commonplace to compare 
the thought of Tocqueville and Mill.  Equally, it has become just as commonplace to draw a 
sharp division between the ideas of Tocqueville and Mill, on the one hand, and Carlyle, on the 
other.  However, the similarities between their respective conceptions of democracy, its 
causes, problems and the solutions these men offered suggest that such a division could be 
arbitrary and, consequently, allow us to reassess the intellectual relationship of these three 
men.  
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INTRODUCTION   
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Thomas Carlyle (1795-
1881) lie at the root of modern British attempts to demarcate the contours of modern 
democracy.  Numerous contemporary thinkers were grappling with the emergence of 
democracy in Western Europe and the United States.  However, influential thinkers in the 
sphere of British political thought reflected far less deeply on the historical significance and 
ethical foundations of democracy prior to the intervention of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  
Formerly, the idea of democracy had been little more than a rallying cry – a banner behind 
which radicals of all shapes and sizes stood arrayed against a range of reactionary and 
conservative forces.  Democracy was a little more than a rhetorical device that was poorly 
defined.   
Traditionally, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle have been separated and understood through the 
prism of different political traditions.  To a large extent, this division is just.  On many political 
and social issues, they held opposing views.  Even Tocqueville and Mill, two figures that it has 
become commonplace to compare and, almost, unite intellectually, disagreed on many areas 
of political and social practice.  However, when considered in the light of the ideas each held 
about democracy this division seems, to a large extent, to be arbitrary.  These men shared a 
singular and highly similar understanding of democracy, its meaning, history and problems.  
Moreover, although they did not suggest similar measures about how to solve the difficulties 
presented by the onset of democracy, their ideas on this subject were often grounded on 
similar principles.  Fundamentally, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were united in their analysis 
of democracy and this marks them out and connects them together.   
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The novelty of these men was to place the idea of democracy in a richer ethical context.  In 
its broadest terms, the present thesis is an account of the efforts these men made to 
comprehend the birth of the modern democracy, its meaning and its consequences.  It is, 
therefore, an attempt to understand how they re-imagined democracy and gave it a fuller 
ethical identity, which incorporated diverse historical and contemporary strands of thought.   
This was particularly significant in the British context, where ideas about democracy were 
much less sophisticated than those that were circulating in continental European spheres.  
This thesis demonstrates the extent to which British thinkers benefitted from engagement 
with continental European ideas about democracy.  The impact of these ideas, as the choice 
of Mill and Carlyle shows, diffused throughout different British political traditions.  This has 
not been sufficiently recognized in the existing literature.  In comparing Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle, we can start to see ideas about democracy emerge that are characteristically modern 
and, more significantly for the purposes of the present thesis, we can also understand how 
continental European notions of democracy exerted an influence over the development of 
British conceptions of this idea.   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle each believed that the modern era was signally democratic.  The 
choice between democracy and some alternative system of politics and society was denied 
to Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle, not to mention their contemporaries.  The modern age into 
which their generation had been born was not isolated from the stream of history.  It was 
squarely placed, according to Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle, in the midst of a protean historical 
sequence at the end of which lay democracy.  In fact, these three men saw their era as the 
dénouement of this process.  The French Revolution had announced the triumph of 
democracy, but it was merely the final blow to an antiquated system of politics and society.   
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The emphasis that their works place on democracy’s advent is equalled only by their analysis 
of it as a phenomenon.  Democracy connoted a number of distinct institutions, ideas and 
means of interaction in the eyes of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  Principally, they divided it 
into two forms – the social and the political.  It is through this division that the analysis of 
democracy in their works proceeds.  Unsurprisingly, the separation of the political and social 
spheres of democracy that Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle engineered was also reflected in the 
criticisms they levelled at it.  For, democracy appeared to these men to be neither benign nor 
entirely desirable.  Although the censures Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle aimed at democratic 
politics and society were made with differing force or intent, they were largely targeted at 
similar objects.  Moreover, their respective criticisms of democracy expose just how 
ambivalent each was about its arrival.   
It is a testament to the energetic intellectualism of the minds of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle 
that they did not stop there in their reflections on the modern democratic world.  They 
historicized, qualified, and criticized democracy; finally, they philosophized on the solutions 
to the challenges presented by democracy.  That is not to say that Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle 
tried to found a systematic political philosophy.  They did not.  These men attempted to 
establish a political culture appropriate to the modern era.  This separated them from their 
fellow philosophers in the contemporary period.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were not 
interested in separating and eulogizing man the individual, social, or transcendental creature.  
In order to solve the problems presented by the modern democratic world, it was necessary 
to leverage each of these ontological components.  Only in so doing could a desirable political 
culture be created.   
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These are the themes that the present thesis addresses.  They form the basis of the points of 
comparison between Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  The first two chapters of this thesis 
examine the historicism of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  They were all historicist thinkers.  
Indeed, their understanding of the constraints placed on politics by historical change framed 
their respective political approaches.  It is this that lay at the foundation of their political 
thought.  The first of these chapters assesses the impact of the French Revolution on each 
man’s understanding of democracy: what did each think of it and what influence did it have 
in the contemporary world?  The second chapter outlines the wider historical trajectory each 
saw as leading to the present.  Together, these chapters will examine the course of the 
modern era and its historical relatives: the world was moving inexorably towards democracy.  
The conclusion of the second chapter also represents the end of the first section of this work, 
in which I have outlined how Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle accounted for the birth of the 
modern world.    
The second part of this thesis, which investigates the critical commentary Tocqueville, Mill 
and Carlyle aimed at democracy, commences with a discussion of how each conceived of 
democracy.  This is the subject of the third chapter.  What were democracy’s contours?  How 
was it related to, not to mention different from, previous notions of democracy?  This is 
followed, in chapters four and five, by a discussion of the criticisms Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle levelled at democracy.  These were many and varied, but connected and concrete.  
They were targeted at democracy’s social, political, not to mention psychological, 
consequences.   
The final section of this thesis – on the solutions Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle devised for the 
challenges posed by modern democracy – addresses the reforms that these men suggested 
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to the state and society, the importance of religion and, finally, the need for widespread 
education.  It is to these that the three men under discussion here looked to resolve the 
problems contained within the democratic present.  Such solutions were idiosyncratic: they 
did not place emphasis solely on the institutional structures that would be expected of 
conventional political theorists.  This is interesting for at least two reasons.  Firstly, it marks 
them out and connects them together at once; secondly, it shows that Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle recognized that institutional matrices were not enough to secure the modern world – 
a more comprehensive solution was required.   
Through their engagement with the history of democracy, its problems and their solutions, 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle developed a richer ethical understanding of democracy, which 
was characteristically different to the democratic ideas of other early nineteenth-century 
British political theorists.  The novelty of their ideas relied heavily on a diverse range of 
personal intellectual influences.  Chief amongst these were wider European currents of 
political thought, with which the three thinkers under consideration here were highly 
conversant.   
 
UNDERSTANDING TOCQUEVILLE, MILL AND CARLYLE   
In order to understand properly what Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle contributed to the 
democratic debate, it is important to have some understanding of the intellectual influences 
that weighed on them, because these necessarily affected their respective political outlooks.  
Evidently, this can only be a brief outline: it is a subject worthy of three or more independent 
treatises.  However, without an understanding of the broad contours of their thought, the 
discussion that follows below will be unsatisfying in the extreme.  What is more, their 
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respective backgrounds reveal striking similarities in terms of intellectual stimulation and life 
experience.  This can be explored best chronologically.   
Mill was ‘raised and educated’ in Iain Hampsher-Monk’s words, ‘to be the champion of the 
utilitarian philosophy worked out by his father and Jeremy Bentham.’1  Mill gave a fulsome 
and, at times, painful account of this in his Autobiography.  In large measure, his education 
was liberal enough.  He started to learn Greek at the age of three and Latin at eight.2  At the 
point where he began to study the latter, Mill had already read ‘a number of Greek prose 
authors’, among whom he recalled ‘the whole of Herodotus, and of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia 
and Memorials of Socrates; some of the lives of the philosophers by Diogenes Laertius; part 
of Lucian, and Isocrates’ Ad Demonicum and Ad Nicoclem.’  Mill added to this estimable list in 
1813 ‘the first six dialogues…of Plato, from the Euthyphron to the Theaetetus inclusive’.3   
This was quite a course.  And yet, it was supplemented by the works of Enlightenment 
historians and accounts of heroic individuals.4  At twelve, Mill began his study of logic, which 
was to remain a lifelong pursuit, and only a year later his education turned toward political 
economy.5  Certainly, his youthful instruction was, as Mill attested, ‘unusual and remarkable’.6  
However, it was not in itself Utilitarian.  The Ancients, the Moderns and the Enlightenment 
thinkers in between furnished the young Mill with a vast array of concepts, categories and 
arguments that remained an influence over him throughout his life.   
                                                          
1 I. Hampsher-Monk, A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx  
(Oxford, 1995), p.339.   
2 J.S. Mill, Autobiography (London, 1989), pp.27-28.   
3 Mill, Autobiography, p.28.   
4 Ibid, pp.29-30.   
5 R. Reeves, John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand (London, 2008), pp.23-24.   
6 Mill, Autobiography, p.25.   
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Alongside such rich material, Mill was given a particular moral outlook.  ‘The Benthamic 
standard’, he wrote in his Autobiography, ‘of ‘the greatest happiness’ was that which I had 
always been taught to apply’.7  If eclecticism, perhaps comprehensiveness, was the 
benchmark against which Mill’s intellectual development had been measured, the greatest 
happiness principle was the criterion that was intended to define his moral outlook.  It was, 
Mill argued, ‘the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary component 
parts of my knowledge and beliefs.’  But, it was more than a mere intellectual frame on which 
he could hang the diverse elements of his unique upbringing.  ‘I now had opinions’, Mill told 
his readers, ‘a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses of the word, a 
religion’.  The moral perspective inculcated by Bentham and his father gave Mill a purpose.8   
Carlyle was born into a family of Burgher Seceders, a sect that had left the Scottish Free Kirk 
in 1740.  This group was noted for its utter rejection of elite control of clerical appointments, 
the stress it placed on individual independence, and for the application of a stringent morality 
to everyday life.9  This was supplemented by the instruction he received in classical languages 
and literature from early life.  Aged seven, Carlyle began to learn Latin in private classes with 
his Burgher Seceder minister.10  At eleven, Carlyle was sent to Annan Academy, where he 
continued to learn Latin – at which he was extremely gifted – and also to study ‘French, 
Geography’ and ‘the Greek alphabet’.11   
Alongside these subjects, Carlyle dedicated himself to mathematics, for which he had shown 
a precocious ability.12  The elements of Carlyle’s education, then, were decidedly liberal in 
                                                          
7 Ibid, p.67.   
8 Ibid, p.68.   
9 J. Morrow, Thomas Carlyle(London, 2006), p.3.   
10 S. Heffer, Moral Desperado: A Life of Thomas Carlyle (London, 1995), p.29.   
11 Morrow, Thomas Carlyle, p.6. 
12 Ibid.   
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expanse and humanist in many of the specifics.  Carlyle proceeded to gain a place at Edinburgh 
University aged fourteen, which was not unusual for Scottish children from backgrounds 
characterized by limited means.13  There, Carlyle ‘embarked upon the standard four-year arts 
course’, where he took his Greek further before diversifying into mathematics and logic.14  If 
his education was not as rigorous as Mill’s, it was almost as extensive.   
Tocqueville’s upbringing was equally singular.  His aristocratic heritage and the lost era, the 
ancien régime, in which his antecedents had lived was central to the cast of his mind.  
‘Tocqueville’s families, paternal and maternal, nobles of the sword and the robe,’ Brogan 
highlighted, ‘were distinguished in that lost world, and he took a proper pride in their 
achievements.’15  Indeed, his aristocratic heritage extended deep into France’s (and Britain’s) 
history.  One of Tocqueville’s earliest ancestors fought for William the Conqueror at the battle 
of Hastings and another, Malesherbes, famously, though unsuccessfully, defended Louis XVI 
at the latter’s trial before the revolutionary tribunal.16  Brogan argued that Tocqueville and 
his ideas simply ‘cannot be understood’ in the absence of his aristocratic descent.17  Certainly, 
Tocqueville was acutely aware of his heritage and felt uncomfortable amongst those who did 
not share it and its values.18   
Central to those values was the Catholic faith and a commitment to the Bourbon throne.  
Tocqueville’s family was devout in the Jesuit tradition and Tocqueville imbibed it in his early 
years.19  It is all but clear now that his youthful tutor, the much beloved Abbé Le Sueur, 
                                                          
13 The Scottish educational system was dramatically different from its English counterpart in this period.  Sons 
of peasants were commonplace at Edinburgh University, which offered an affordable, though still rigorous, 
educational programme.  See Heffer, Moral Desperado, pp.31-32.   
14 Ibid, p.32.   
15 H. Brogan, Alexis de Tocqueville: Prophet of Democracy in the Age of Revolution (London, 2006), p.1.   
16 A. Kahan, Alexis de Tocqueville (London, 2010), p.4.   
17 Brogan, Tocqueville, p.4.   
18 Kahan, Tocqueville, p.3.   
19 Brogan, Tocqueville, pp.4-6.   
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complemented the family’s Jesuitism with the Jansenism André Jardin claimed the prelate 
preferred.20   
These early influences on the minds of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle expose the stark 
differences that existed between them from an early age.  However, they also highlight the 
broad similarities in outlook.  Each was raised in an environment that cultivated clear and 
precise moral standards.  Pre-eminent amongst these was independence.  The morality to 
which Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were subjected was inculcated religiously and it 
indefinitely framed their perceptions of politics.   
A further similarity between Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle – as we move from childhood to 
adolescence – was their rejection of the incipient creeds of their youth.  Mill’s early 
utilitarianism did not survive.  It came under pressure during the now famous years in which 
he experienced what would today be referred to as a mental breakdown.  In the autumn of 
1826, Mill found himself in a state of ennui.  He asked himself a simple, yet pressing, question.  
Mill recorded this in his Autobiography.  ‘Suppose that all your objects in life were realised’, 
he thought, ‘that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward 
to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness 
to you?’  The answer that rushed in on him from all sides was an emphatic ‘No!’21  This 
realization spurred Mill to break with the narrow creed of utility and seek out new opinions 
from diverse sources.   
                                                          
20 A. Jardin, Tocqueville: A Biography (London, 1988), pp.40-42.  Brogan challenged the significance Jardin 
attributed to this.  The former argued that it is unclear whether seventeenth-century Jansenist debates would 
have meant much to the young Tocqueville.  See Brogan, Tocqueville, p.51.   
21 Mill, Autobiography, p.112.   
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Carlyle devoured the works of Enlightenment thinkers and these destroyed his youthful 
Christianity.  As with so many of Carlyle’s contemporaries, it was Edward Gibbon’s Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire – which he read in twelve days, a volume a day – that was most 
damaging.22  Fifty years after having read Gibbon’s great work, Carlyle told correspondent 
William Allingham that he had ‘studied the Evidences of Christianity for several years, with 
the greatest desire to be convinced, but in vain.  I read Gibbon, and then first clearly saw that 
Christianity was not true.’23  This could only have been compounded by his engagement with 
the works of David Hume and the French classics, which followed his reading of Gibbon.24   
Tocqueville’s commitment to throne and altar did not survive intact.  His Catholicism was the 
first to fall by the wayside.  Tocqueville’s education had been carried out at first by the Abbé.  
When Le Sueur’s protégé outgrew his capacity, Tocqueville was transferred to a school in 
Metz close to his father.  In the library of his father’s prefectural residence Tocqueville 
encountered the works of eighteenth-century philosophes for the first time.  It was a 
happenstance that changed his life and ideas forever.   
Voltaire, Montesquieu, Buffon, Rousseau, Mably and Raynal poured into his mind and 
destroyed the metaphysical certainties of his youth.25  The crisis that this provoked was long 
and unparalleled in Tocqueville’s life; its remnants were documented in painful letters he 
wrote in the years immediately prior to his death.  Henceforth, he became a Deist; Catholicism 
was no longer a possibility for him.26   
                                                          
22 Heffer, Moral Desperado, p.41.   
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.   
25 Jardin, Tocqueville, pp.62-63.   
26 Brogan, Tocqueville, p.52.   
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If Enlightenment ideas were responsible for Tocqueville’s alienation from the Catholic Church, 
contemporary events ruined his attachment to the Bourbon throne.  Scholarship has tended 
to locate Tocqueville’s estrangement from monarchism in the events of 1830.27  Certainly, 
this event was important as a symbol of Tocqueville’s disillusionment with the Bourbons, but 
it was the dénouement rather than the début of a process that had been progressing in that 
direction for some time.   
The crises experienced by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were deeply painful and remained with 
them throughout their lives.  But, at the same time, these experiences were fundamentally 
liberating.  In search of certainty, each expanded his field of vision and took in the widest 
possible array of influences.   
Hampsher-Monk saw in Lord Macaulay’s ‘devastating review’ of James Mill’s Essay on 
Government the primary driver of Mill’s reworking of his early creed.28  But, there were other 
sources of greater significance.  First among these were those that can be termed Romantic.29  
Mill incorporated poetry into his intellectual diet.  He read Wordsworth and Coleridge, among 
others, and the poetic standpoint evinced by such writers gave Mill a profound interest in 
individual character.  ‘The character of individuals’, Reeves maintained, ‘became as important 
to Mill as the design of institutions or legislation.’  He developed a strong interest in ‘internal 
                                                          
27 See Brogan, Tocqueville, p.127; Jardin, Tocqueville, pp.86-87. 
28 Hampsher-Monk, Modern Political Thought, pp.343-346.   
29 Capaldi is the most prominent advocate of this line of thought.  In his biography of Mill he claimed that, 
although the influence of Romanticism over Mill has been acknowledged, ‘What is not generally recognized is 
how pervasive that influence was.’  See N. Capaldi, John Stuart Mill: A Biography (Cambridge, 2004), p.89.  
Capaldi proceeded to trace two currents of Romanticism through Mill’s thought, both of which were highly 
influential: ‘literary’ and ‘philosophical’.  See Capaldi, Mill, pp.89-93.  Robert Devigne also emphasized the impact 
on Romanticism on Mill.  Devigne’s argument is long and complicated, but the essential point is that Mill 
embraced Romantic ideas as a counterpart and corrective to the excesses of the empirical outlook he had 
acquired in his youth from Bentham and his father.  This enable Mill to arrive a new conception of liberty that 
incorporated elements of both.  See R. Devigne, Reforming Liberalism: J.S. Mill’s Use of Ancient, Religious, 
Liberal, and Romantic Dialects (New Haven, 2006), pp.62-72.   
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culture’; in other words, he came to consider emotional states and individual feelings 
important.30   
Goethe and other German Romantic thinkers introduced Mill to the notion of Bildung or self-
creation, which showed Mill the significance of individual autonomy.31  From the Saint-
Simonians and Auguste Comte, Mill derived a new perspective on the philosophy of history 
and its importance, which resulted in his rejection of the naïve universalism of utilitarian 
philosophy.32  Skorupski saw in Mill’s interaction with such Romantic theorists the foundation 
of his concern with human development.  These thinkers ‘affirmed the teleological criterion 
of human flourishing’ that Mill adopted.  This novel telos resulted from ‘a romantic hellenism 
which owed most to German romantic philosophy.’33  The Romantic outlook emphasized ‘the 
historicity of human nature and morality’, Skorupski continued, and it focused on ‘developing 
and empowering human beings.’34   
Alongside other voices, the Romantic characters that populated Mill’s turn away from 
Benthamism introduced conservative reflections on contemporary issues, such as democracy, 
into his thinking.  Reeves demonstrated the extent to which Carlyle, Coleridge and Tocqueville 
alienated Mill from his early Benthamism and led him to reflect on many of the goals derived 
                                                          
30 Reeves, Mill, p.65.   
31 Ibid, p.70.   
32 Ibid, pp.75-76.  Reeves failed to mention the impact of Franҫois Guizot on Mill’s thoughts on the philosophy 
of history.  Georgios Varouxakis demonstrated how important Guizot’s reflections were for Mill.  See G. 
Varouxakis, ‘Guizot’s Historical Works and J.S. Mill’s Reception of Tocqueville’, in History of Political Thought, 
Vol.XX, No.2 (Summer, 1999), pp. 292-312.  Ceri Crossley showed how Guizot was intimately related to the 
Romantic tradition and, thus, his influence is yet another Romantic current that flowed through Mill’s most 
dramatically revisionist period.  See C. Crossley, French Historians and Romanticism: Thierry, Guizot, the Saint-
Simonians, Quinet, Michelet (London, 1993), pp.71-104.   
33 J. Skorupski, ‘Introduction’, in The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge, 1998) p.23.   
34 Ibid, pp.23-24.  Skorupski argued that it is this perspective that lay at the root of Mill’s anxiety about modern 
democracy.  According to the Romantic Hellenic ideal ‘the cultivation of moral freedom requires civil and political 
liberty, and the cultivation of spontaneity requires tolerance of diversity…If democracy provides these conditions 
and gives rise to a society of developed human beings, it is good.’  See Skorupski, ‘Introduction’, p.24.  As I will 
show below, Mill was seriously concerned about democracy’s potential to provide such an atmosphere.   
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from it, particularly his commitment to democracy.35  Nicholas Capaldi made a similar 
argument in his biography of Mill, but limited the so-called conservative voices that were 
important in this regard to Carlyle and Coleridge (Capaldi identified others, but they did not 
exert the impact of the two he emphasized).36   
However, Capaldi was eager to stress his view that ‘Mill never was or became a conservative, 
but he was influenced by conservative thinkers.’37  From Carlyle, Capaldi contended, Mill 
learned ‘that real change comes through changes in human self-consciousness and not by 
engineering new types of government.’38  From Coleridge, Capaldi argued that ‘Mill accepted 
the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment Project, especially the critique of the latter’s 
reductive and atomistic conception of human nature.’  Individuals had to be viewed in their 
cultural and historical context and not conceived of abstractly.39   
Carlyle developed a fascination with continental European thought.  He was impressed by 
contemporary French scholarship on mathematics and natural philosophy.40  He developed 
an interest in the Saint-Simonians and carried out an effulgent correspondence with some of 
Saint-Simon’s disciples.  Carlyle’s interaction with Saint-Simonian ideas reinforced the 
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historical notions he had imbibed from another source, German Romanticism, and furthered 
his sense of the necessity of some sort of sustainable religious belief in the modern world.41   
But, it was German Romanticism that really caught his attention.  Like many of his generation, 
this was kindled by his reading of Madame de Staël’s De l’Allemagne.42  A great deal of work 
has been done on Carlyle’s relationship with German Romantic thinkers.43  Their influence 
over him was deep and multifaceted.  Broadly, its influence has been characterized well by 
Elizabeth Vida and Simon Heffer.  For Carlyle, Vida claimed, ‘German Romanticism issued 
forth from Goethe’s and Schiller’s efforts to challenge rationalistic tendencies of the 
Enlightenment’.44   
Heffer’s account accords with and extends this judgment.  ‘The German’s he [Carlyle] read’, 
Heffer argued, ‘confirmed for him the concepts of work and duty, familiar from his Calvinist 
upbringing, as man’s chief aim.’45  Carlyle could no longer accept these lessons from 
Calvinism, because his youthful religiosity had been challenged by the expansiveness of his 
learning.  Much like Mill and Tocqueville, Carlyle’s crisis destroyed his childhood creed.46  The 
Germans were useful to Carlyle’s intellectual development in another sense: ‘They repudiated 
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the shallow values of sensualism and self-indulgence of the eighteenth century that had so 
disgusted Carlyle.’47   
In the 1820s, Tocqueville studied the law and started to read more widely than he had done 
previously.  He read Adolphe Thiers’ history of the Revolution, which he detested.48  Next, 
Tocqueville discovered Franҫois Guizot.  Guizot was particularly important for the perspective 
on history Tocqueville derived from the former’s Leҫons – lectures given over the course of a 
number of years on French and European history.  Guizot’s perspective on history and his 
historical method owed much to Romanticism and Tocqueville acquired both to a very large 
degree.49   
Equally significantly, Tocqueville’s discovery of Guizot inducted him into what Larry Siedentop 
labelled the ‘Great Debate’ that was taking place in liberal circles throughout the 1820s.50  
Roger Soltau unpacked its contents for his readers.  Scholars like Guizot were concerned with 
the nature of sovereignty and the imposition of equality before the law.  They were suspicious 
of universal suffrage, yet eager to ensure that barriers existed to the exercise of executive 
power.  Their legalism was pronounced and the emphasis they placed on well-structured 
                                                          
47 Heffer, Moral Desperado, p.53.   
48 Kahan, Tocqueville, pp.6-7.   
49 Brogan, Tocqueville, pp.90-94.  A further influence of Romantic origin that was important to Tocqueville was 
that of his cousin Franҫois-René de Chateaubriand.  Brogan asserted that Chateaubriand exerted ‘a decisive 
influence’ on Tocqueville.  See Brogan, p.11.  Brogan suggested that Chateaubriand’s influence was decisive in 
two senses: it defined Tocqueville’s writing style and, by his cousin’s example, suggested the idea of an American 
voyage to him.  See Brogan, pp.138-140.  These are rather imprecise and whimsical suggestions.  Jaume has 
given more concrete examples of how Chateaubriand influenced Tocqueville.  Jaume claimed that 
Chateaubriand’s impact on Tocqueville was threefold: he showed his cousin how despotic the French monarchy 
had been and what administrative power could accomplish through a rationalized despotism; he alerted 
Tocqueville to the idea that such a despotism could reoccur in the modern world; and he presented Tocqueville 
with the idea that institutions able to moderate democracy could be adopted, in a modified form, from the 
aristocratic past.  See Jaume, Tocqueville, pp.291-292.   
50 See L. Siedentop, Tocqueville (Oxford, 1994), pp.20-40.   
23 
 
institutions prominent.51  These features of Tocqueville’s learning could not abide the sort of 
monarchy that Charles X attempted to create from the beginning of his reign.   
Operating alongside these diverse influences on the ideas of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle was 
a humanist current.  Alan Ryan contended recently that the analysis of humanism and its 
impact on politics is fraught with difficulty and this is certainly true.52  Today, Tzvetan Todorov 
noted, humanism bears a merely affective connotation.  Humanists are simply those who 
behave humanely toward their fellow creatures or who preach the gospel of individual human 
dignity.53  Of course, this was also an important feature of early-nineteenth century 
humanism.  But, Kahan provided scholars with a clearer picture of modern humanist values.  
It is these, Kahan claimed, that underlay Mill’s and Tocqueville’s political pronouncements.   
Mill and Tocqueville, like other contemporary humanists, maintained an interest in the 
classical heritage, which retained an important place in European thought in general 
throughout the nineteenth-century.  Knowledge of classical languages was the hallmark of an 
educated individual and an essential feature of a humanist.54  An understanding of the events, 
personages and their thoughts, not to mention the languages of antiquity served as a 
common European cultural inheritance, which united learned persons from disparate 
countries.55   
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Mill, as I showed above, certainly possessed this knowledge.56  Tocqueville was no different.  
At the collège royal in Metz, Tocqueville studied rhetoric, philosophy, oratory, Latin and 
Greek.  He was introduced to a range of classical authors, such as Horace, Cicero, 
Demosthenes and Quintilian.57  Tocqueville even wrote a prize-winning essay on the progress 
of the Arts in ancient Greece.58  It was an education suffused, Jardin argued, with ‘Ciceronian 
themes’.59  Furthermore, Schleifer found that classical influence remained important for 
Tocqueville.  He consulted Plato, Aristotle and Plutarch, among others, in the interim between 
the first and second volumes of his work on Démocratie.60   
Carlyle’s outlook was similarly influenced by classical humanist sources, though this remains 
poorly understood in modern scholarship.  He was profoundly influenced by the classical era 
from his youth onwards.  Claims about Carlyle’s humanism have a long provenance.  John 
Robertson labelled Carlyle a modern humanist as long ago as 1908.  Here, he was placed 
alongside the likes of Mill, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thomas Arnold, John Ruskin and Herbert 
Spencer.61  Tamara Gosta highlighted the impact of humanism on Carlyle’s political thought 
recently.62  Morrow has also drawn attention to Carlyle’s ‘humanistic’ perspective, 
particularly in regard to his views on education.63 
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Humanism in the contemporary period was more than a shared inheritance of common 
classical metaphors.  It reached far wider than the rationality of the syllogism or the 
comprehensibility, or otherwise, of the declension.  It was neither a simple dialectical device 
nor a mere mode of inflection.  Modern humanists, according to Kahan, recognized that 
humans had a certain number of inherent, immovable needs, which required fulfilment in 
order for them to reach their ‘highest and fullest expression’.64  Humanists in this era bore a 
perception of human nature that was concerned with enabling advanced individual 
development.  Like humanists of all ages, according to Todorov, those who occupied this era 
displayed an eminent interest in education.65  Anything that threatened individual 
development was liable to incur the criticism of those situated under the humanist banner.  
As Kahan pointed out, this was a modification of the Aristotelian humanist tradition, which 
emphasized the threat posed by corruption to virtue.66   
The influences outlined above weighed heavily on the conceptions of democracy, its history 
and its problems that Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle generated.  They were also important to 
the solutions to these problems that each man held forth.  It is this fascinating mixture that 
makes both their political thought in general and their views on democracy specifically so 
powerful.  But, these men were not operating in a vacuum; notions about democracy already 
existed and were being discussed in contemporary Britain.  In order to understand just how 
important these thinkers’ ideas were to British notions about democracy, it is necessary to 
understand the state of contemporary British democratic discourse.  Specifically, it is 
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necessary to understand what democracy meant to other British political thinkers prior to the 
interventions of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.   
 
BRITISH DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE AND TOCQUEVILLE, MILL AND CARLYLE   
Perceptions of democracy and what it meant to be democratic shifted markedly throughout 
the nineteenth century, but the crucial developments in the understanding of this concept 
took place in the early to middle years of this period.  Contemporary notions of what it meant 
to be democratic or what a democracy consisted in had been at once both fixed and fluid in 
eighteenth political thought: fixed in the sense that these words signified a discussion about 
the ancient world primarily – the Greek city states and the Roman Republic – and fluid to the 
extent that the recourse to Greek and Roman exemplars did not indicate particular 
institutions or conventions that were intrinsically democratic.67   
The inherited associations that the idea of democracy laboured under began to fragment 
significantly in the opening years of the American Revolution and the intellectual torpor under 
which democracy had lain was blown away finally with the triumph of revolutionary ideas in 
France.  Though the Greco-Roman heritage was not entirely eclipsed by these events, the 
ancients’ importance as a source of democratic experience declined considerably.  Indeed, 
Innes and Philp argue that ‘Once democracy began to be re-imagined in the age of revolutions 
– in political argument and through political experiment – that heritage [Greco-Roman] 
fractured, splintering into very different forms’.68   
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These three distinct contexts – the ancient, the American revolutionary and the French 
revolutionary – remained important to the reflections of nineteenth century democratic and 
anti-democratic thinkers.  Significantly, they remained important settings against which new 
ideas of democracy were defined.  In Europe, for example, democracy suffered from the 
depredations and acts of terror that had been committed by the most zealous French 
revolutionaries.  As a result, for many it connoted little more than ‘insurrectionary 
movements, mass petitioning and crowd phenomena, as much as it did any particular 
institutional set-up.’69  In turn, this coloured Europeans’ perception of the nascent American 
democracy.  ‘One of the great ironies of transatlantic affairs’, Frank Prochaska maintains, ‘was 
that the French Revolution, heralded as another republican dawn, tended to discredit 
America’s political experiment, even among some who had been sympathetic to it.’70   
However these events impacted on one another, they were, separately and in combination, 
very important to the process of re-imagining that took place in democratic discourse in the 
first half of the nineteenth century.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle took part in this debate and 
interacted with each of the three distinct contexts outlined above.  By the mid-nineteenth 
century, the idea of democracy had crystallized around a broadly shared set of institutional 
forms and a widely understood mechanism for selecting legislators and governments – 
universal male suffrage.71  That is not to say that these positions benefitted from a broad 
based network of proponents, simply that both democrats and anti-democrats – not to 
mention all those in between – agreed that these elements were components of a democratic 
settlement.   
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Nevertheless, despite thinkers’ coagulation around a shared group of basic ideas about what 
democracy signified, much remained contentious and innovators diverged greatly in their 
notions about the meaning, importance, longevity and, crucially, desirability or otherwise of 
democracy.  Innes and Philp claim that such differences can be accounted for through 
reference to ‘local circumstances’.  Local conditions – ‘disputes and power struggles’ – lie at 
the root of the basic differences that appeared between the democratic ideas of particular 
individuals.72  Clearly, local conditions were significant in this process.  However, the 
argument made by Innes and Philp is too parochial; it over-emphasises local circumstances at 
the expense of transnational conversation and cross-fertilization.  The principal events that 
influenced the development of democratic discourse were not national, but international, 
events or, in the case of the ancient world, part of a shared European culture.  They were 
discussed widely across Europe and were the subject of cross-border conversations.   
The networks of influence and exchange in Europe were well-developed and the 
conversations and intellectual transfers that took place within them significantly influenced 
conceptions of democracy, particularly in Britain.  This thesis is intended to illustrate such a 
transfer through reference to a particular network – that of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  Mill 
and Carlyle were signally European in perspective, if British by nationality, and the impact of 
European events and culture shaped their ideas on a whole range of subjects, including 
democracy.  The comparison of these two British thinkers with Tocqueville, which is the object 
of this thesis, demonstrates the importance of European currents of thought in the chain of 
causality that resulted in the transformation of British conceptions of democracy in the period 
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under consideration.  For, this thesis will show that the ideas of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle 
on the subject of democracy were quite different from their British contemporaries.   
For example, Jeremy Bentham’s conception of democracy was grounded on his view of the 
moral imperative of a polity: to work towards the greatest happiness of the greatest number.  
This became the Utilitarian cri de coeur.  In Bentham’s view, only democracy could realise this 
goal, because it relied on ‘a coincidence between the interests of the governors and the 
interests of all’.73  Bentham’s view was supported by his most ardent disciple, James Mill.  
Both Bentham and Mill regarded the community as a single group, out of which issues a clear 
and singular will for the greatest happiness of the greatest number.  This is not the result of 
‘a dynamically obtained compromise’, but of a single, continuing will.74   
A democracy based on this rationale must continually guard against the rise of sinister 
interests, according to Bentham and Mill, which are sectional interests that are not aligned to 
the community’s will.  Given this requirement, Bentham and Mill proposed a democratic 
system of government that was characterised by annual or triannual elections, publicity of 
parliamentary activity, parliamentary recall, the refusal of parliamentary seats to place men 
and the secret ballot.75  These measures were intended to prevent the appearance of sinister 
interests antagonistic to the community as a whole.   
James Mill developed the institutional basis of the Utilitarian democratic agenda in his well-
known Essay on Government.  Mill’s Essay is deeply flawed – a fact that Lord Macaulay took 
great pleasure in pointing out in an Edinburgh Review article.76  However, Mill took pains to 
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establish the necessity of universal suffrage to the effective promotion of the public interest 
– though, on the basis of economy, he subsequently curtailed the extent of the suffrage by 
excluding women, children, working men and all those under the age of forty.77  Their 
interests, he argued, were bound up with those of their husbands, fathers and brothers and, 
therefore, did not require independent expression.   
The measures proposed by Bentham and Mill constituted the Utilitarian understanding of 
democracy and, by extension, the position that their disciples, the Philosophic Radicals, 
advocated.  John Arthur Roebuck, for example, a member of the Philosophic Radical clique, 
declared in his Pamphlets for the People (1835) that ‘if good government is to be hoped for 
on earth, it must be the off-spring of democracy’.78  Roebuck’s assessment of democracy 
highlights a final point about the Utilitarian notion of democracy that it is important to note.  
Utilitarians tended to judge democracy unreflectively.  Though not entirely unaware of the 
problems of democracy, they consistently ignored or underplayed them.  Utilitarians made 
no extensive effort to explore such problems.   
Utilitarians, or Philosophic Radicals, were by no means the only commentators on democracy 
in the contemporary period.  Britain was changing rapidly as a result of industrial expansion 
and urbanisation.  The movement from a rural-agrarian population to an urban-industrial 
labour force underpinned the shift in working people’s expectations of their polity.  The 
struggle for the Reform Bill in the early 1830s took place in this context.  Much of the debate 
about the Bill was constitutional and, therefore, as much legal as strictly political.  It took place 
within the discourse of the mixed constitution, with its complementary (or competing, 
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depending on one’s perspective) elements of king, lords and commons – the one, the few and 
the many.79  The root of this discourse lay in the events of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 
and its aftermath.   
In this context, democracy was understood to be the popular or elective branch of this 
constitutional mixture.  For those engaged in this debate, democracy encompassed little more 
than the broad elements of election and a qualified suffrage.  The problems identified by 
commentators on the Reform Bill were expressed in the language of the mixed constitution.  
These were a world away from the sort of difficulties Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle expected 
democracy to produce for one simple reason: their understanding of democracy was very 
different.  Proponents of the mixed constitution were concerned about the possibility that an 
extension of the democratic element in Parliament would disturb the balance between the 
one, the few and the many.  Many placed this in the context of the French Revolution and 
predicted the destruction of the monarchy and the church as well as widespread confiscation 
of property.80   
A further strand of radical thought emerged in the wake of the Reform Act.  Many labouring 
people felt underwhelmed by the scale of enfranchisement granted by this measure and 
determined to campaign for a set of political rights equivalent to the ones that had been given 
to those who had been enfranchised.  This campaign was formalized into a charter of 
demands: the People’s Charter.  ‘The language of democracy’, Innes and Philp claim, ‘was 
central to the utterances of Chartists.’81  Indeed, their reform programme included measures 
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that were considered to be unquestionably democratic by their contemporaries, such as 
universal male suffrage, the secret ballot and equal electoral districts.82   
The democratic language of Utilitarianism, the mixed constitution and Chartism shares at 
least one point in common: the notions of democracy specific to each were overwhelmingly 
institutional.  They regarded things like the mechanism of voting, the extent of the electoral 
franchise and the publicity of political activity as central to the idea of democracy.  The 
primarily procedural understanding of democracy that thinkers in these movements 
proffered is, of course, perfectly valid.  However, it is limited when compared to the notions 
of democracy found in the works of Mill and Carlyle, which had benefited from exposure to 
European currents of thought, like those found in the work of Tocqueville.  What is also clear 
is that the contemporaries of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were limited in their understanding 
of the problems of democracy.  Some failed to engage properly with the potential drawbacks 
of a democratic state, others relied dogmatically on assumptions drawn from outmoded 
categories of analysis, whilst still others perceived democracy as a universal panacea to the 
shifting contours of contemporary Britain.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle, on the other hand, 
engaged in a sophisticated, philosophical analysis of the difficulties that a democratic state 
was likely to encounter.  This was grounded on a profound enquiry into the concept of 
democracy itself.   
Within the pantheon of thinkers about democracy, therefore, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle sit 
at a crossroads in the understanding of what it meant to be a democrat, democratic or to be 
part of a democracy.  Their contribution to political thought was to enrich these ideas through 
a deeper and more philosophical understanding of their origins and implications.  Their ability 
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to do so relied on their understanding of European events from the ancient and modern 
worlds, as well as local movements and ideas.  In the case of Mill and Carlyle, the impact of 
European ideas was crucial to their ability to reconceptualise democracy and apply it to a 
British context.  The comparison with Tocqueville in this thesis illustrates this.  This thesis 
shows, in particular, how the influence of continental European thinking about democracy 
affected British notions of democracy, through the comparison of Mill and Carlyle with 
Tocqueville.  In so doing, it explores how European democratic currents influenced the 
development of liberal and conservative strands of democratic thought in Britain.   
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CHAPTER 1: 
REVOLUTION PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
‘It is no paradox’, Hugh Brogan claimed, ‘to say that the greatest event of Tocqueville’s life 
occurred before he was born: the French Revolution’.  The actions of the French 
revolutionaries, Brogan continued, ‘decisively influenced almost everything’ that Tocqueville 
achieved.83  Tocqueville was supportive of the goals the men and women of 1789 had 
pursued.  ‘He described the old regime as detestable’, Kahan argued, ‘even though in doing 
so he risked condemnation from many of his own class and family.’84  The Revolution’s 
personal significance to him, a man who had lost a number of family members to the 
guillotine, was as important to his thought as the national consequences for a France still to 
recover fully from the wars this event had provoked or the political ramifications it entailed 
for the European continent as a whole.  This Revolution was the first cause around which 
Tocqueville’s entire intellectual life revolved.   
For Mill, the Revolution bore a significance mid-way between the personal and the political.  
He admitted in his Autobiography that he had once wanted to transpose 1789 onto an English 
backdrop.  Reading about the events of 1789 and beyond in the early-1820s (he admitted to 
being unsure when he first did this) offered the young Mill what seemed to be a precedent 
for the enactment of his political beliefs, which were also his personal creed.  He recounted 
how ‘the subject took an immense hold of my feelings’ from that moment.85  It mixed with 
his ‘juvenile aspirations to the character of a democratic champion.’  The ‘most transcendent 
glory’ he found himself capable of conceiving at that time was that he might be ‘a Girondist 
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in an English Convention.’86  The Revolution validated his incipient political ideas and, given 
his famously partisan upbringing, his childhood.   
Carlyle had no desire to play the part of a Scottish Girondin.87  Nonetheless, the Revolution 
provided an important means of understanding the present.  In fact, it offered the only means 
of doing so.  Carlyle’s feelings towards this event were presented much more cogently in a 
review essay he released in the same year on the subject of his great work, ‘Parliamentary 
History of the French Revolution’, than they are in The French Revolution: A History itself.  
Here, he declared that the ‘French Revolution’ was ‘the event of these modern ages’.88  It had 
been a singularly cataclysmic event, the likes of which were rare in history.  ‘A huge explosion, 
bursting through all formulas and customs; confounding into wreck and chaos the ordered 
arrangements of earthly life; blotting-out, one may say, the very firmament and skyey 
loadstars, - though only for a season.  Once in the fifteen-hundred years such a thing was 
ordained to come.’89  In the final essay of his work On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic 
in History, Carlyle maintained that ‘Truly, without the French Revolution, one would not know 
what to make of an age like this at all.’90 
Given the importance Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle attributed to the Revolution, it is necessary 
to know what they understood it to have meant.  What had it signified and what relation did 
bear to the contemporary world?  This chapter will explore these questions and show how 
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this event related to the political thought of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  These men saw in 
the Revolution an historical caesura.  It had changed the face of modern Europe and those 
who tried to reawaken the political and social structures of the past were misguided.  
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle demonstrated this through their critique of Edmund Burke’s 
reactionary writings.  The Revolution had been a sign that had announced the political and 
social direction of the modern world.  Just what that route looked like will be discussed in the 
final section of the present chapter.   
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION   
Tocqueville wrote two tracts on the French Revolution, both histories.  The first was an essay 
for the London and Westminster Review, written in 1836 at the request of Mill.  The second 
was the first instalment of what was conceived of as an extensive study of the event, its causes 
and, undoubtedly, its consequences.  Tocqueville never finished this proposed epic; all that 
remains is the first volume, L’Ancien régime et la revolution, and a few chapters, notes and 
other research materials for a second volume.  There are clear differences between the two 
historical accounts Tocqueville offered his contemporaries.  Franҫois Furet has examined 
these in some detail.91  Nonetheless, Furet was right to contend that his illustrious 
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compatriot’s ‘general interpretation of the French Revolution’ can be glimpsed in the London 
and Westminster piece.92   
Tocqueville used the first book of Ancien Régime to demonstrate both his novelty and his 
opinion of the Revolution.93  Contrary to popular opinion the revolutionaries had not aimed 
at destroying religion, nor had they desired ‘to make anarchy into a method’ in order to 
abolish political authority.94  Put simply, all they had wanted was to ‘abolish the political 
institutions which for several centuries had reigned unopposed among the majority of 
European peoples, and which we call feudal institutions.’95  Their purpose in this endeavour 
was to replace these institutions with ‘a more uniform and simple social and political order’, 
which was grounded on ‘social equality.’96   
Thus far, the French Revolution fitted neatly into the historical typology that Tocqueville had 
identified in his work on American democracy.97  The men that had made the Revolution 
wanted to substitute a democratic social state for one that was decidedly aristocratic.  
Tocqueville gave this added emphasis:  
The Revolution finished off quickly, by a feverish and convulsive effort, without 
transition, without precautions, without regard for anything, what would have 
been done anyway, little by little, in the long run.  This was its effect.98   
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It signified the sudden end of a social state that was destined to disappear and the precipitous 
birth of another that could not help but be born.99  It announced the coming of democracy in 
loud, bloody and acrimonious terms, but democracy would have emerged as if by 
somnambulism had this event not chanced upon the world.   
Tocqueville claimed that though the revolutionaries certainly wanted to put as much distance 
as possible between themselves and the former regime, they ‘innovated much less than is 
generally supposed’.100  This has come to be known as the ‘continuity thesis’ in Tocqueville 
scholarship.101  In Dominic LaCapra’s view, Tocqueville argued that ‘the Revolution did 
relatively little of a positive nature in changing basic structures and institutions’.102  The 
profound continuity between the modern world and the ancien régime accounted for the 
prolongation of revolution across the rupture of 1789.103   
Carlyle treated this theme at length in his full scale work on the Revolution.  1789 had been 
significant of much and he was determined to make his readers understand just what it had 
truly meant.  Towards the end of the first volume Carlyle’s account turns toward the 
philosophical.  He asked his readers ‘what these two words, French Revolution, shall mean’.104  
They still seemed to require final definition, Carlyle thought, because there were ‘as many 
meanings as there are speakers’ of those words.  Doubtless, revolution implied ‘speedier 
change’ than that which would take place in the absence of such, but this did not in itself 
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suggest that it was the arbiter of change.  Change, according to Carlyle, was natural to 
mankind and was unavoidable.105  What was particular about this rapid change in French – 
and European – affairs?   
‘For ourselves,’ Carlyle argued, ‘we answer that French Revolution means here the open 
violent Rebellion, and Victory, of disimprisoned Anarchy against corrupt worn-out 
Authority’.106  It was ‘a great Phenomenon’, ‘a transcendental one’, ‘the crowning 
Phenomenon of our Modern Time.’  It was a reminder at a time when ‘it seemed as if no 
Reality any longer existed, but only Phantasms of realities,’ that ‘Man and his Life rest no more 
on hollowness and a Lie, but on solidity and some kind of Truth.’107   
What truth had it revealed to France and Europe?  Which corrupt, distended, dilapidated 
authority had it rebelled against?  Feudalism and aristocracy.  The French Revolution 
represented nothing less than ‘The extreme-unction day of Feudalism!’108   
A superannuated System of Society, decrepit with toils…and with thefts and 
brawls, named glorious-victories; and with profligacies, sensualities, and on the 
whole with dotage and senility, - is now to die: and so, with death-throes and birth-
throes a new one is to be born!109   
Carlyle’s French Revolution was not merely, as Brian Young claimed, the ‘most damningly 
influential account of the eighteenth century to appear in Victorian Britain’.110  It was an 
endorsement of the revolutionaries’ attempts to re-centre government and society: to found 
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it anew on stable, genuine foundations free from hypocrisy.  To quote Vanden Bossche, 
Carlyle ‘believed that the revolutionary overturning of authority had become necessary’.111  
But, he did not think, like a number of his contemporaries, that it was part ‘of a sequence that 
was independent of human agency’; it attested to the ability of human beings to contribute 
‘to processes of reformation’.112  The Revolution, then, represented something in particular 
to the Scotsman: an attempt at individual and collective reform.  However, this took a 
particular direction, which John Burrow highlighted: for Carlyle, 1789 signified ‘the advent of 
Democracy…in the modern world.’113   
There is a very limited literature on Mill’s perception of the French Revolution.114  In large 
part this is the result of the fact that he wrote no extensive treatise on the event itself.  Mill’s 
thoughts on the Revolution were expressed in the public domain in reviews of works by other 
authors on the subject.  Mill considered writing a history of the Revolution, though he gave 
the idea up entirely in the early-1830s.  In 1833 he told Carlyle, with regard to the possibility 
of writing such a history, that ‘it is highly probable I shall do it sometime if you do not’.115  But, 
the difficulties attached to such an endeavour were clear to Mill and these dissuaded him.  
Mill was put off by the event’s continuing political sensitivity.  Unless one could speak of 
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Christianity as it was then spoken of in France, the true history of the Revolution would be 
lost.116   
One could not, now, say this openly in England, and be read – at least by the many; 
yet it is perhaps worth trying.  Without saying out one’s whole belief on that point, 
it is impossible to write about the French Revolution in any way professing to tell 
the whole truth.117   
Mill praised Carlyle’s treatise on the event for treating it with exactly the sort of candour he 
felt it required.  As to the question of whether Carlyle was: 
Tory, Whig, or Democrat; is he for things as they are, or for things nearly as they 
are; or is he one who thinks that subverting things as they are, and setting up 
Democracy is the main thing needful?  we answer, he is none of all these.  We 
should say that he has appropriated and made part of his own frame of thought, 
nearly all that is good in all these several modes of thinking.118   
This was important, because Mill was disgusted with the inadequacy of contemporary British 
accounts of the Revolution.  Mill vented his frustration in a review of ‘Mignet’s French 
Revolution’.   
There is nothing more disgraceful to Englishmen than their utter ignorance, not 
only of the causes and effects, but of the very events, the story, of the French 
revolution.  With the majority of them, even of those among them who read and 
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think, the conception they have of that great event is all comprehended in a dim 
but horrible vision of mobs, and massacres, and revolutionary tribunals, and 
guillotines, and fishwomen, and heads carried on pikes, and noyades, and 
fusillades, and one Robespierre, a most sanguinary monster.119   
To be understood properly, Mill thought, the Revolution needed to be considered without 
prejudice.  In his major contribution on the events of France’s revolutionary epoch – a review 
of Walter Scott’s Life of Napoleon – the Revolution signified the emergence of democratic 
nationalism.  Despite the difficulties of charting anything clearly amid ‘this vast convulsion, 
the springs by which so much complex machinery was now set in motion, now stopt, now 
swept away,’ this much was clear to his mind.  ‘Heretofore, when a change of government 
had been effected by force in an extensive and populous country, the revolution had been 
made always by, and commonly for, a few’.120  But, 1789 had interrupted the typical trajectory 
of revolutionary movements.  It had been ‘emphatically the work of the people.’121   
Commenced by the people, carried on by the people, defended by the people with 
a heroism and self-devotion unexampled in any other period of modern history, 
at length terminated by the people when they awoke from the frenzy into which 
the dogged resistance of the privileged classes against the introduction of any 
form whatever of representative government, had driven them…122   
This was the major significance Mill saw in France’s break with the ancien régime, though this 
was not all.  It had displayed a singular and ‘mighty power’ that was able to unite the nation 
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as a whole under one banner.  Its ‘force’ had converted ‘a whole people into heroes,’ which 
had bound the ‘entire nation together as one man…not merely to overpower all other forces, 
but to draw them into its own line, and convert them into auxiliaries to itself.’123  The 
Revolution had turned the French into a single people.  Mill recounted the significance of this 
event once more in his Autobiography.   
I learnt with astonishment, that the principles of democracy, then apparently in so 
insignificant and hopeless a minority everywhere in Europe, had borne all before 
them in France thirty years earlier, and had been the creed of the nation.124   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle saw in the French Revolution the advent of democracy.  But each 
felt it necessary to demonstrate that aristocratic society, as it had been constituted prior to 
the Revolution, was dead – not to mention how that had happened.  Each, in their turn, did 
just this.   
 
THE CAUSES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION   
Mark Cumming argued that a sense of ‘moral inevitability’ underscored Carlyle’s conception 
of the Revolution.125  Aristocratic corruption had led the nobility away from its duty towards 
the people and in failing to fulfil its obligations it had become a sham.  Whilst this mock 
aristocracy indulged in Epicurean delights, the people en masse suffered countless hardships.   
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Fancy, then, some Five full-grown Millions of such gaunt figures, with their 
haggard faces (figures hâves); in woollen jupes, ask, as in forest-roarings, their 
washed Upper-Classes, after long unreviewed centuries, virtually this question: 
how have ye treated us; how have ye taught us, fed us and led us, while we toiled 
for you?  The answer can be read in flames, over the nightly summer sky.  This is 
the feeding and leading we have had of you: EMPTINESS, - of pocket, of stomach, 
of head and of heart.126   
Revolutionary Sansculottism had grown out of ‘Hunger’ as much as anything else.  Hunger 
itself was symbolic of ‘agitation, contention, disarrangement’ – precisely the things that had 
resulted from the aristocracy’s ineptitude and moral decline.127  The Revolution ‘was a 
demonstration of divine justice,’ Burrow claimed Carlyle thought, ‘passed on a corrupt 
aristocracy which believed in nothing.’128  It signified a moment of rebirth, through which a 
corrupt past could be interred and a brighter future inaugurated.  Indeed, the sense of rebirth 
is never far away in Carlyle’s account.  He expressed it best through his use of the phoenix 
metaphor.   
Behold the World-Phœnix, in fire-consummation and fire-creation: wide are her 
fanning wings; loud is her death melody, of battle-thunders and falling towns; 
skyward lashes the funeral flame, enveloping all things: it is the Death-Birth of a 
World!129   
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Carlyle’s account is thus riddled with hope.  He saw in the Revolution the emergence of a new 
world free from the trammels of hypocrisy.  The Revolution had been just in as much as it had 
cleared away the rotting carcass of an unworkable political and social structure.  In this, 
Burrow maintained, there is something of the ‘Old Testament-nurtured Puritan’ in Carlyle’s 
epic.130   
Broadly construed, Mill agreed with Carlyle’s analysis of the Revolution’s causes.  He said as 
much in the review he wrote on the latter’s French Revolution.  ‘Differing partially from some 
of Mr. Carlyle’s detached views,’ Mill wrote, ‘we hold his theory, or theorem, of the 
Revolution, to be the true theory; true as far as it goes, and wanting little of being as complete 
as any theory of so vast and complicated a phenomena can be.’131   
But what did Mill hold Carlyle’s theory of the Revolution to be?  ‘That it was the breaking 
down of a great Imposture: which had not always been an Imposture, but had been becoming 
such for several centuries.’132  The two great authorities of the ancien régime – the nobility 
and the clergy – had ‘held their exalted stations’ on the condition that they afforded 
‘guidance’ to the masses.  The first of these maintained order in society, among other duties, 
and the second ministered ‘to their spiritual teaching and culture.’133  ‘But for centuries before 
the French Revolution,’ Mill thought, ‘the sincerity which once was in this scheme of society 
was gradually dying out.’134  The nobility no longer performed its duty toward the people and 
the clergy had abandoned its position as spiritual guardian.   
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In his review of Scott’s Life of Napoleon, Mill saw this borne out in the geography of the 
Revolution.  Only where temporal and spiritual duties had not been neglected, in La Vendée, 
had the people risen up against the revolutionaries and fought for their king.135  In his review 
of Carlyle’s French Revolution, Mill noted that pre-revolutionary society rested on nothing 
other than tyranny and ‘the obedience of twenty-five millions to a few hundred thousand 
never yet was yielded to avowed tyranny.’136   
Mill had emphasized the role that tyrannical rule had played in the coming of Revolution 
almost a decade earlier.  The revolutionaries themselves had been ‘patriots striving to free 
their country from a yoke which weighed it down to the earth.’  In this lost France, ‘every 
man’s liberty was at the mercy of every minister or clerk of a minister, or lacquey of a minister, 
or mistress of a lacquey of a minister’.  The situation had been unbearable.  Every man’s 
‘property was at the mercy of intendants and subdélégués’ and this was in perhaps the most 
‘odious system of fiscal tyranny ever known’.137  On top of this, and a hundred other ills, was 
mounted the ineligibility of the tiers-état to hold any governmental office.138  It had not been 
an imaginary tyranny.  It was not an image that had been fostered in the people’s minds by 
mischievous philosophes.   
The feelings of the people are not wont to be excited by an abstract principle.  It 
is not a distant or a contingent evil which works upon them.  The tyranny which 
excites them to resistance must be felt, not conceived; they must discover it by 
their sensations, not by their reason.139   
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Mill cited the famous agriculturalist-travel writer, Arthur Young, in conclusion.  Despite his 
conservative sensibilities, even Young had recognized the scale of the problem.  Mill approved 
of his sentiments.  There could be ‘no man of common sense and feeling’, according to Young, 
who could ‘lament the fall of such a government, or look with any but a mitigated severity 
upon the terrible retribution which an oppressed people exacted from their tyrants the 
moment they were free.’140   
Both Carlyle and Mill saw the causes of France’s revolutionary moment in the longue durée.  
Carlyle expressed this in as novel a fashion as ever.  The Revolution was as much in the 
revolutionaries’ minds as it was in their outward actions.  Carlyle presented his readers with 
a suggestive question.  He wanted to understand ‘Where the French Revolution specially is?’  
Had it been located within ‘the King’s Palace’, in the ‘National Assembly’, or in ‘the Reporter’s 
Chair’?141  Of course, Carlyle has his own opinion of its whereabouts: ‘In general, may we not 
say that the French Revolution lies in the heart and head of every violent-speaking, of every 
violent-thinking French Man?’142  The events of 1789 had been prefaced by a psychological 
break in the first place.  The ancien régime was dead in the majority of people’s minds long 
before they took up arms against it.143   
From the outset of Carlyle’s celebrated work on the subject he made it clear that the 
Revolution could not be understood in terms of its novelty alone.  Certainly, both the scale of 
the event and its ferocity were unusual, but it had deep roots in the past.  The opening pages 
of Carlyle’s French Revolution made this abundantly clear.  Carlyle plunged straight into a 
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scene, which was vividly evoked.  ‘PRESIDENT HÉNAULT, remarking on royal Surnames of 
Honour how difficult it often is to ascertain not only why, but even when, they were 
conferred, takes occasion, in his sleek official way, to make a philosophical reflection.’144   
Charles-Jean-François Hénault, seen here reflecting on royal nicknames, was a member of the 
Parlement de Paris from 1705 and President of the Parliament’s Première Chambre des 
Enquêtes from 1710.  He came to prominence under Louis XIV and died 19 years before the 
Revolution began.  And yet, Carlyle judged it appropriate to begin his narrative of the 
Revolution with this apparently innocuous anecdote.  Set in 1744, this suggests that he 
thought that the events of 1789 and beyond had been prepared mid-way through Louis XV’s 
reign and, perhaps, given his citation of President Hénault, in that of his predecessor, the 
revered Louis XIV.  At the very least, the better part of the eighteenth-century had contributed 
to the coming of Revolution.  In Carlyle’s account, it is not until the fifth book of the first 
volume (almost 160 pages) that the storming of the Bastille is recounted.  In earlier essays on 
The Diamond Necklace and Count Cagliostro portents of the Revolution are seen in events 
long predating the advent of the sorts of popular disturbances it heralded.145   
Mill agreed that the degradation of aristocratic and ecclesiastical authority had taken place 
gradually, over a prolonged period.  The Revolution’s causes lay deep in the past and could 
not be explained without a proper appreciation of that complex historical tapestry.  Mill 
criticized Sir Walter Scott for his treatment of ‘the remote causes of that catastrophe’, which 
made them seem almost trivial.  These were ‘the quintessence of the internal history of 
France during more than a century.’146   
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Most significant of all these long term changes, Mill asserted in a review essay entitled Alison’s 
History of the French Revolution, was the modification in the mind of man himself.  This was 
what really lay at the bottom of the individual’s rebellion.  ‘All political revolutions,’ Mill 
believed, ‘originate in moral revolutions.’147  Overturning established institutions was only 
one result of a more general subversion of conventional opinions.   
The hundred political revolutions of the last three centuries were but a few 
outward manifestations of a moral revolution, which dates from the great 
breaking loose of the human faculties commonly described as the “revival of 
letters,” and of which the main instrument and agent was the invention of 
printing.148   
The progressive enlightenment of the human mind lay at the remotest edge of the 
Revolution’s causes and who knew where or when this would end.   
Tocqueville’s account of the causes of France’s Revolution is hyperextended in a way that the 
accounts of Mill and Carlyle simply are not.  Tocqueville charted the growth of social equality 
through the decline of the French aristocracy. He addressed this issue first in his 1836 essay.  
He recounted how, like all aristocratic bodies, the French noblesse had originated ‘in 
conquest’ and ‘monopolised almost all the intelligence and wealth of society.  It had 
possessed all the land, and been master of the inhabitants.’149  But, in the concluding years of 
the eighteenth-century the French aristocracy resembled its forebear only in name.   
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It had lost its influence over both the prince and the people.  The king still chose 
from its ranks the principal officers of Government, but in this he rather followed 
instinctively an ancient custom, than recognised an acquired right.150   
In order to justify its existence a nobility must either remain masters of the people or place 
itself at their head in order to lead them.  But the French aristocracy of the eighteenth-century 
did neither the one nor the other, according to Tocqueville.151   
Despite this, they maintained a host of privileges that separated them from the populace as 
a whole.  Nobles ‘enjoyed the exclusive right of furnishing officers to the army.’152  They did 
not have to pay ‘some of the taxes, and they levied from the inhabitants of their domains, 
under diverse names, a great number of annual contributions.’  Such rights and pecuniary 
privileges did little to augment the wealth of the nobility, ‘but they erected the order of 
nobility into an object of general hatred and envy.’153  Tocqueville was clear about the danger 
that this posed to the order’s existence.   
When once the reality of power has been abandoned, to wish to retain its 
semblance is to play a dangerous game.  The outward aspect of vigour may 
sometimes sustain an enfeebled body, but more frequently serves to complete its 
downfall.  Those who possess the appearance of power, without its substance, 
seem, to the general eye, of sufficient consequence to be hated, while they are no 
longer capable of protecting themselves against the hatred they excite.154   
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Tocqueville extended this line of argument in book one of the Ancien Régime.  It was well-
known, he claimed, that although the aristocracy may have retreated from playing a role in 
national government, it retained its importance as the agent of local government until the 
Revolution.  But, Tocqueville stated, ‘This seems to be a mistake.’155  Far from governing the 
peasants, as other historians claimed, the lord had become ‘but an inhabitant whose 
immunities and privileges separate and isolate him from everyone else; his rank is different, 
his power is not.’  In all that related to local government, ‘parish officials were under the 
administration or control of the central authority.’156   
Amid the decline of aristocratic power, the French peasant had become a landowner.  The 
feudal dues levied by the noblesse attacked the peasant directly; they were levied on his 
land.157  ‘Imagine the situation,’ Tocqueville directed his readers, ‘the needs, the character, 
the passions of this man and calculate, if you can, the amount of hatred and envy stored 
within his heart.’158  Whilst remaining an institution of civil society, feudalism had ceased to 
be one of political consequence.  Centralization had taken the aristocrat’s power, but left him 
his privileges as a means of comfort for the loss that he had suffered.  In the context of the 
rise of peasant proprietorship such privileges, pecuniary or otherwise, provoked the most 
ardent scorn.  These social and political changes were the medium-term causes of the 
Revolution.  To conclude his discussion of the causes of France’s Revolution, Tocqueville 
turned from the longue durée to its proximate causes in the final book of his Ancien Régime.159   
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Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle understood the Revolution in similar terms.  Of course, there are 
significant differences in their respective accounts, but the broad strokes are very much alike.  
Each understood the Revolution in primarily political terms.  An aristocracy that had once 
governed had lost its place at the head of the political body; it had reneged on its duties to 
the populace whilst maintaining its privileges; and it had become, as a result, nothing other 
than a tyrannical body bereft of its raison d’être.  The purpose of the Revolution had been to 
remove it from society and inaugurate the reign of democracy.   
 
CROSSING THE RUBICON: THE AGE OF TRANSITION   
Despite the enormity of the French Revolution, the contemporary world was by no means 
politically settled.  In fact, the Revolution had started a process that was continuing apace.  
‘The first of the leading peculiarities of the present age is,’ Mill wrote in 1831, ‘that it is an 
age of transition.’  Mankind had outgrown ‘old institutions and old doctrines’ without having 
‘yet acquired new ones.’160  The same was true of political and cultural conventions.  The ‘old 
order of things has become unsuited to the state of society and the human mind’.  
Accordingly, ‘almost every nation on the continent of Europe has achieved, or is in the course 
of rapidly achieving, a change in its form of government’.  Even the British, ‘the most attached 
in Europe to its old institutions,’ had proclaimed ‘with one voice’ that they ‘are vicious both 
in the outline and in the details, and that they shall be renovated’.161   
The same movement was apparent to Carlyle.  Vanden Bossche argued that Carlyle’s works 
‘represent and attempt to resolve dilemmas raised by what he and his contemporaries 
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perceived as a revolutionary shift of authority in virtually all realms of discourse and 
institutions in western Europe.’162  Carlyle entered this debate with his essay on the Signs of 
the Times.  He perceived ‘a deep-lying struggle in the whole fabric of society’; ‘a boundless 
grinding collision of the New with the Old’.163  Profound changes were occurring at the very 
base of society and it was a myopic and obdurate man who would try to reverse them.  This 
‘age also is advancing’, Carlyle thought, and he was not one who would struggle against its 
progress, for life consists ‘not in turning back, not in resisting, but only in resolutely struggling 
forward’.164  He addressed this movement again through his avatar, Teufelsdröckh, in Sartor 
Resartus.  ‘The World…as it needs must, is under a process of devastation and waste, which, 
whether by silent assiduous corrosion, or open quicker combustion, as the case chances, will 
effectually enough annihilate the past Forms of Society; replace them with what it may.’165   
Tocqueville’s account of American democracy, according to Jeremy Jennings, as well as the 
travel diaries he compiled in England during his visits in the early- and mid-1830s, ‘were full 
of fascinating detail and revealed someone intent on trying to understand a society in the 
process of transition.’166  Tocqueville matched Carlyle in his realism, but his comments 
displayed greater finesse.  He told his readers that ‘A new political science is needed’ because 
                                                          
162 Vanden Bossche, Carlyle and the Search for Authority, p.1.   
163 CE XXVII, p.82.   
164 CE XXVII, p.80.   
165 Carlyle, Sartor, p.178.  What is more, Herman Merivale saw in Carlyle’s French Revolution a transitional 
philosophy.  ‘His is the philosophy of transition, of doubt, and of sanguine expectation’, Merivale contended, ‘it 
rejects old ‘formulas’ as barren; but instead of resting content in scepticism, it endeavours to lead the mind back 
to certain elementary principles, and to direct it in anticipation to future discoveries, as yet barely described or 
dimly imagined’.  See H. Merivale, ‘an unsigned review, Edinburgh Review’, in Seigel eds., Carlyle: Critical 
Heritage, p.79.   
166 J. Jennings, Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France Since the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford, 2011), p.182.   
54 
 
they inhabited ‘a world entirely anew’.  Tocqueville thought that his contemporaries found 
themselves in ‘a unique situation’ and, as a result, ‘laws without precedent are needed’.167   
The singularity of the contemporary era rested on its transitional status.  The French, 
according to Tocqueville, had already ‘abandoned what the old state could present of the 
good’, but they had yet to acquire ‘what the current state would be able to offer of the 
useful’.168  Tocqueville realized that aristocratic society had been destroyed and that the 
benefits of ‘a moral and tranquil democracy’ remained elusive.  Amid the ‘debris’ of the 
decaying edifice the French, ‘out of complacency’, seemed ‘to want to settle…forever.’169  
Tocqueville emphasized this again in 1840.   
The world that is rising is still half caught in the ruins of the world that is falling, 
and amid the immense confusion presented by human affairs, no one can say 
which old institutions and ancient mores will remain standing and which will finally 
disappear.170   
It was a belief that Tocqueville maintained for his entire life.  In his Souvenirs171, written in 
1850, he drew attention once more to ‘the uncertain physiognomy of my time’172 and 
followed this statement with a declaration on the novelty of the era: ‘our age is not like any 
other.’173   
Equally, Mill and Carlyle continued to believe, throughout their literary careers, that their era 
was one of transition.  The former prefaced an 1861 work outlining his Considerations on 
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Representative Government with similar statements of uncertainty.  Both ‘Conservatives and 
Liberals’, he thought, ‘have lost confidence in the political creeds which they nominally 
profess, while neither side appears to have made any progress in providing itself with a 
better.’174  Mill took this opportunity to make his own plea for a new political science.   
Yet such a better doctrine must be possible; not a mere compromise, by splitting 
the difference between the two, but something wider than either, which, in virtue 
of its superior comprehensiveness, might be adopted by either Liberal or 
Conservative without renouncing any thing which he really feels to be valuable in 
his own creed.175   
Once more, in 1869, at the beginning of his tract on The Subjection of Women Mill alluded to 
‘the progress of the great modern spiritual and social transition’ taking place all around.176   
If Carlyle did not exactly proclaim the need for a new political science, he certainly did make 
a vehement case for a new world.  In the first of his Latter-Day Pamphlets, ‘The Present Time’, 
he made just this sort of proclamation: ‘There must be a new world, if there is to be any world 
at all!’177  That this statement was the conclusion towards which the very first page of this 
essay progressed demonstrated its importance to Carlyle.  But he went further:  
That human things in our Europe can ever return to the old sorry routine, and 
proceed with any steadiness or continuance there; this small hope is not now a 
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tenable one.  These days of universal death must be days of universal newbirth, if 
the ruin is not to be total and final!178   
The period in which Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle lived was, by their own admission, unusual.  
Certainly, it was a period of change in which the political and social forms of old were no 
longer relevant or appropriate.  Numerous commentators on both sides of the Channel 
alluded to this peculiarity.  The spirit of the age captivated the attention of commentators.  
Indeed, this phrase gained widespread currency in this period.  Whether it entered the English 
lexicon via German sources as the frequency of its contemporary usage suggests or through 
French as its English syntax implies is unclear.179   
Whatever its origin, at the beginning of the nineteenth century this phrase was a unit of 
common European currency.  The notion that there was something unique about this era 
persisted into mid-century and beyond.  For Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle the French 
Revolution itself lay at the root of the contemporary world’s oddity.  It was the great chasm 
that divided the modern from the pre-modern world.  ‘The study of the French Revolution’, 
Alan Kahan noted, ‘was important not simply because France was typical of Europe but 
because the French Revolution was the beginning of the present’.  Moreover, it gained added 
significance because for many of the nineteenth-century’s most prominent thinkers ‘the 
Revolution that began in 1789 did not end in 1815, 1830, or even 1848.’180  It was a living, 
vibrant force in the world.   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle subscribed to this theory.  It was this incomplete revolution that 
was driving the transition taking place in the contemporary world.  Mill was the first to voice 
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this notion.  In prophetic words, written as part of his demolition of Alison’s History of the 
French Revolution, he wondered about the extent of the Revolution’s influence.  ‘How much 
of the course of that moral revolution yet remains to be run,’ he asked, ‘or how many political 
revolutions it will yet generate before it be exhausted, no one can foretell.’181  This had real 
consequences for England as much as for France.   
But it must be the shallowest view of the French Revolution, which can now 
consider it as any thing but a mere incident in a great change in man himself, in 
his belief, in his principles of conduct, and therefore in the outward arrangements 
of society; a change which is but half completed, and which is now in a state of 
more rapid progress here in England, than any where else.182   
Tocqueville lagged a little behind Mill in concluding something similar about the continuing 
presence of the Revolution in the modern world.  The French, he wrote in 1836, ‘for the last 
fifty years, have been in an almost continual state of revolution.’183  Writing to Edward 
Everett, an American correspondent, in 1850, Tocqueville drew attention to the persistence 
of this phenomenon once more, but expanded its contours.  ‘With the exception of Russia, in 
the whole of continental Europe one can see society undergoing a profound transformation 
and the old world that has crumbled into pieces.’  Its ‘drama’ was ‘the complete destruction 
of the old society and the building in its stead of I do not know what kind of human edifice’.184  
Writing to another correspondent in America, Francis Lieber, later in the decade, Tocqueville 
placed Louis Napoleon’s seizure of power in this context.  He implored Lieber not to ‘deceive’ 
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himself: ‘this is not the end of the French Revolution, it is only a manifestation of it.’185  
Tocqueville stated this idea most explicitly – and with evident causticity – in his Souvenirs, 
written in 1850.  His comments deserve to be quoted at length.   
Seen as a whole from a distance, our history from 1789 to 1830 appears to be 
forty-one years of deadly struggle between the Ancien Régime with its traditions, 
memories, hopes and men (i.e. the aristocrats), and the new France led by the 
middle class.  1830 would seem to have ended the first period of our revolutions, 
or rather, of our revolution, for it was always one and the same, through its various 
fortunes and passions, whose beginning our fathers saw and whose end we shall 
in all probability not see.186   
‘To Carlyle,’ Hugh Trevor-Roper noted, ‘the French Revolution had not been destroyed with 
Napoleon’.  He saw that ‘its roots were still living and would sprout anew; and these roots 
would never be destroyed by mere political treatment.187  Carlyle made his sense of the 
continuing interaction of the Revolution with the contemporary world explicit in 1839.  In 
Chartism, a celebrated essay on the woes of the English working classes and the seeming 
inability of its governors to solve them, he asked: ‘Has not broad Europe heard the question 
put, and answered, on the great scale: has not a FRENCH REVOLUTION been?’  ‘Since the year 
1789,’ Carlyle continued, ‘there is now half a century complete; and a French Revolution not 
yet complete!’188   
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In order to understand the parlous state of modern Europe, it was necessary to grasp the 
nature of this persistent force.  ‘He who would understand the struggling convulsive unrest 
of European society,’ Carlyle proffered, ‘in any and every country, at this day, may read it in 
broad glaring lines there, in that most convulsive phenomenon of the last thousand years.’189  
B.E. Lippincott argued that ‘Carlyle’s French Revolution was not only a prose epic but a tract 
for the times; it was a profound warning to England to avoid the catastrophe that he feared 
all his life long was imminent.’190  This was a theme he retained in writing his Latter-Day 
Pamphlets.191   
According to Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle, then, the French Revolution remained an unspent 
force in the world.  Understanding its contours was key to defining the course of the modern 
era.   
 
REFUTING THE OLD POLITICAL SCIENCE: A BURKEAN ENCOUNTER         
Given their mutual recognition of the significance of the French Revolution and their united 
perspective regarding the age of transition it had opened, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle felt it 
necessary to demolish the claims of those who stood for the politics of the ancien régime.  
They were eager to emphasize the finality of 1789 as it applied to aristocratic rule.  This forced 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle to refute Edmund Burke’s reactionary writings on the subject.  
Burke offered a view of politics that jarred sharply with the goals of the Revolution.  In his 
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works, no political science could be found that was appropriate to the demands of the post-
revolutionary age.   
In 1826, Mill thought that all English readers understood of the Revolution was what ‘Tory 
prints choose to tell them of this most interesting period of modern history’.192  Mill’s 
irritation at Tory prejudice on the subject of the Revolution would surface again later in the 
decade.193  At the centre of this mistreatment of 1789 was Burke and his account of the 
Revolution.  Mill alluded to this is his review of ‘Scott’s Life of Napoleon’ before attacking 
Burke directly.  The public imagination had been influenced ‘by the torrents of unmeasured 
and undiscriminating invective which have been poured forth against the Revolution’.194   
Though Mill did not mention him by name, it is clear that Burke was at the root of this 
perspective.  What was its consequence?  Put simply, ‘a feeling has been generated, which 
predisposes men to credit upon any evidence or no evidence, any assertion with respect to 
the French Revolution or revolutionists, provided only it be sufficiently unfavourable’.195  Mill 
attacked Burke by name, later in this essay, on his understanding of the trajectory of the 
Revolution.196  However, he was less interested in dismantling the particulars of Burke’s 
account so much as the general atmosphere it had created.   
With regard to Carlyle’s criticism of Burke and his rendering of the Revolution, his French 
Revolution has spawned a number of interpretations of the relationship between the two 
men.  Louise Young read Carlyle as an inheritor, through Coleridge, of Burkean ideas and H. 
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Ben-Israel saw significant points of overlap between the two of them.197  Philip Rosenberg 
perceived important differences between the two in their views on the Revolution as did 
Vanden Bossche.198  Brian Young claimed that the relationship between Burke and Carlyle was 
‘complicated, but essentially, and interpretatively, it was a close, but deeply critical one’.199  
Lowell Frye drew attention to this.  Carlyle dealt with Burke’s account with great delicacy.  
Frye showed how Carlyle invoked Burke’s name rarely and when he did it was in a spirit of 
approval.200  This was part of a rhetorical strategy, according to Frye, which signalled his 
approval of Burke’s interpretation whilst subtly and steadily undermining it.  He did this 
through a reorientation of many of the scenes that characterized Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, which would have been well known to contemporary readers.201   
Carlyle’s understanding of the French Revolution had much more in common with radicals, 
like John Stuart Mill, than with conservatives.202  His break with the past and his radicalism 
was underscored by his rejection of Burke, which he stressed in his assessment of the man 
himself.  Comparing Burke with Samuel Johnson in an 1832 essay, Carlyle concluded that the 
former had been ‘essentially a Whig, and only, in reaching the verge of the chasm towards 
which Whiggism from the first was inevitably leading, recoiled’.203  Carlyle despised the Whigs.  
In making this comparison he signalled his dissent from Burke and his major doctrines.   
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Lord Acton’s assessment of Carlyle’s French Revolution is thus insightful.  Carlyle’s volumes 
on the subject, Acton claimed, with their ‘vivid gleam’ and their ‘mixture of the sublime with 
the grotesque,’ had truly ‘delivered our fathers from thraldom to Burke.’204  Consequently, 
Carlyle’s French Revolution amounted, in Acton’s opinion, to ‘the most remarkable piece of 
historical thinking in the language.’205  But, as we have seen and as Acton well knew, it was a 
majestic rethinking.   
Tocqueville was well aware of the numerous works by contemporary French historians on the 
Revolution and their various interpretations of 1789.  He was familiar, for example, with Louis 
Blanc’s claim that it represented ‘a revolt of the individual against authority’ and with 
Michelet’s definition of it ‘as the advent of a new world based on justice’ in contrast to the 
old, which had been grounded on ‘arbitrary divine will.’206  Tocqueville denied – in the opening 
pages of his Ancien Régime – both of these interpretations, though he addressed them 
covertly.207  At no point did he mention his compatriots by name.   
In fact, the only commentator on the events of the Revolution that he challenged openly was 
Burke.  Why was this the case?  Various commentators have addressed the place of Burke in 
Tocqueville’s account of the Revolution, though none have justified his prominence vis-à-vis 
French historians.  Robert Gannett Jr. argued that Tocqueville’s Ancien Régime has ‘a Burkean 
frame’.208  Gannett’s work demonstrated the many similarities between Tocqueville’s and 
Burke’s understanding of the Revolution, but suggested no overall reason for this.209   
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Linda Orr claimed that Tocqueville placed Burke in his account in order to illustrate an 
alternative socio-political organisation to the one inaugurated by the Revolution and 
formalized under Napoleon’s Empire.  He reminded readers of the benefits of an organic state 
with a decentralized institutional apparatus, which was epitomized by the prevalence of 
common law.210  Ralph Lerner, in his somewhat colloquial account of Tocqueville’s 
relationship with Burke, asserted that the Frenchman misrepresented his English forebear 
intentionally in order to satisfy his primary political concern: convincing the French of their 
agency so as to persuade them that they were not condemned to live either in a state of 
revolution or under the hand of a despot.211 
There may be an altogether more simple reason for the prominence of Burke in Tocqueville’s 
history.  In his Démocratie, Tocqueville had been eager to emphasize at the outset that he 
was allied to no camp or faction in particular.212  Given the political significance of the heritage 
of the Revolution and the divisive nature of contemporary French politics, Tocqueville’s 
choice of a foreigner – an Englishman no less – against whom he could pose his argument 
enabled him to assert his independence from the vying factions of the French political arena.  
Tocqueville could assert his claim to the sort of political authority control of the Revolution’s 
history conferred without alienating any of the camps around him.   
Despite the ‘sympathetic and respectful’ verdict Tocqueville accorded to Burke’s account of 
the Revolution, what is certainly clear is that he rejected the latter’s conclusions entirely.213  
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‘Burke’, Tocqueville wrote, had simply not realized ‘that what stands before his eyes is the 
revolution which will abolish the common law of Europe; he does not understand that this is 
its sole purpose.’214  The old world, which Burke had tried to defend so valiantly, was dead 
and there was to be no turning back.   
 
CHARTING THE COURSE OF THE MODERN WORLD   
Thus far, this chapter has outlined the meaning Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle found in the 
French Revolution, the causes and continuing importance of this event in the contemporary 
world, and the manner in which each of these men refuted the Burkean account of it.  The 
Revolution had attempted to destroy the ancien régime and its modern children were actively 
pursuing this project.  Burke’s understanding of the Revolution, its causes and consequences 
was incorrect.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle accepted the outcome of the Revolution and 
categorically rejected Burke’s prescription, which recommended a return to the ancien 
régime.   
Where did this leave the modern world?  To what was it in transit?  Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle answered these questions unambiguously.  In the first review Mill authored on 
Tocqueville’s Démocratie he told his readers that ‘M. de Tocqueville’s is, in our eyes, the true 
view of the position in which mankind now stand’.215  What was the view of Tocqueville’s to 
which Mill assigned his consent?  ‘It is indifferent to him what value we set upon the good or 
evil of aristocracy, since that in his view is past and gone.’216  What Tocqueville meant by 
democracy will be discussed in what follows, but, for the purpose of continuity, it may be said 
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that Tocqueville’s definition signified the absence of all entrenched social divisions and, 
therefore, the rise of civil equality.  Democracy was the future.   
Mill signalled his acceptance of this future a year later in an essay on Civilization.217  Indeed, 
in his essay on The Subjection of Women, published near the end of his life, Mill reinforced 
his agreement with Tocqueville.  Here, he maintained that ‘the course of history, and the 
tendencies of progressive human society, afford not only no presumption in favour of this 
system of inequality of rights, but a strong one against it’.218  And why was this the case?  
Because the world had changed irrevocably.   
For, what is the peculiar character of the modern world – the difference which 
chiefly distinguishes modern institutions, modern social ideas, modern life itself, 
from those times long past?  It is, that human beings are no longer born to their 
place in life, and chained down by an inexorable bond to the place they are born 
to, but are free to employ their faculties, and such favourable chances as offer, to 
achieve the lot which may appear to them most desirable.219   
That this was Tocqueville’s opinion is beyond doubt.  It is inscribed on every page of the 
‘Introduction’ to his first instalment of the Démocratie.  Turning his gaze from the American 
continent to his own Tocqueville recognized that ‘equality of conditions, without having 
reached its extreme limits as in the United States, approached those limits more and more 
each day; and this same democracy that reigned in American societies, appeared to me to 
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advance rapidly toward power in Europe.’220  Tocqueville’s rhetorical brilliance is at its very 
best throughout this extended announcement of the course of the modern era.   
A great democratic revolution is taking place among us; everyone sees it, but not 
everyone judges it in the same way.  Some consider it as something new and, 
taking it for an accident, they hope still to be able to stop it; while others judge it 
irresistible, because it seems to them the most continuous, oldest and most 
permanent fact known in history.221   
Carlyle also looked on the advent of democracy as an inescapable reality.  During one of his 
lectures On Heroes in 1840 he declared as much with typical force.  This ‘new enormous 
Democracy’ was ‘an insuppressible Fact, which the whole world, with its old forces and 
institutions, cannot put down’.222  He stated this again, three years later, in Past and Present.  
‘To what extent Democracy has now reached, how it advances irresistible with ominous, ever-
increasing speed, he that will open his eyes on any province of human affairs may discern.  
Democracy is everywhere the inexorable demand of these ages, swiftly fulfilling itself.’223  In 
the first of his Latter-Day Pamphlets Carlyle returned to the same thought.   
For universal Democracy, whatever we may think of it, has declared itself as an 
inevitable fact of the days in which we live; and he who has any chance to instruct, 
or lead, in his days, must begin by admitting that: new street-barricades, and new 
anarchies, still more scandalous if still less sanguinary, must return and again 
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return, till governing persons everywhere know and admit that.  Democracy, it 
may be said everywhere, is here…224   
The age of transition that Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle had each identified was moving 
inexorably toward democracy.  The French Revolution was the defining event in this process.  
It was a fissure in western European chronology, which had finally broken the power and 
prestige of hereditary aristocracy.  One historical period had ended; another was just 
beginning.  But the transition from aristocracy to democracy had deeper, more profound 
roots in European history than those that had been laid in 1789.  It is to these that the next 
chapter is dedicated.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THE COMING OF DEMOCRACY 
The urge to understand democracy led Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle to explore its history.  
Each saw in the past an historical trajectory that could explain the advent of democracy in the 
modern world.  Its roots lay deeper than the French Revolution.  Though the Revolution, as 
the previous chapter demonstrates, was central to the conception Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle had of the birth of democracy, its causes were more diverse than a single event.225  
The present chapter will explore the roots of democracy, which each of these men perceived 
in European history.  Prior to exploring the arguments Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle made in 
respect of the foundations of democracy, it is important to understand the influences that 
weighed on their notions of history and the importance of historical discourse in the 
contemporary era.   
Recently, Eduardo Nolla highlighted the prominence of history in the early-nineteenth 
century.  ‘It is undoubtedly difficult’, Nolla claimed, ‘to find a period when the question of 
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history attracted more attention than in the first half of the nineteenth century.’226  Rosemary 
Jann showed the reach of the historical idiom: ‘The historical was indeed the common coin of 
the nineteenth century, the currency of its most characteristic art, the security for its most 
significant intellectual transactions.’227  But, history was not merely a banal record of events; 
in this period it was worked into a tapestry that illuminated the course of development across 
the ages.  In other words, there was a novel interest in the philosophy of history.   
Any attempt to understand the political and social contours of the present had to begin with 
a profound knowledge of the past.  Only in understanding the direction of historical travel 
could the modern world be comprehended.  This was the overall position adopted by 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  The historicism it implied formed the basis of their political 
thought.   
What is more, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were not alone in their historicism.  From the 
middle of the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, there appeared in Europe a 
sudden and widespread interest in philosophical history.  The century situated between these 
two poles generated enormous varieties of metahistory in such a voluminous fashion that 
Frank E. Manuel labelled it ‘the classical age of modern essays in philosophical history’.228  The 
search for laws underlying historical movement pervaded the era.  It was a singularly powerful 
intellectual movement, Jann argued, ‘given the force with which the rapid current of change 
was undermining traditional assumptions and authorities.’229   
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Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were part of this movement.  But, their interest lay principally in 
the rise of democracy.  Investigation into how it had triumphed filled great passages of their 
works.  This chapter will analyse their understandings of the rise of democracy throughout 
history.  Democracy was the result of two related, though distinct, historical causes: the rise 
of the psychology of democracy and its sociological precursors.  Underlying these specific 
causes lay a more clandestine moral motor.  Each of these will be explored in the present 
chapter.   
However, before starting on this path we must briefly trail another.  Given the prevalence of 
metahistorical explanations of the past in the contemporary world, it is necessary to ask what, 
if anything, these figures imbibed from the prevailing intellectual atmosphere.  Tocqueville 
was a product of the scholarly proclivities of the 1820s.  He read history for the most part, but 
the history he read was laden with political consequence.  It drew heavily on ‘liberal 
argument’, according to Larry Siedentop, and, consequently, ‘a great deal of social and 
political theory.’230  Tocqueville became particularly attached to the work of Franҫois Guizot, 
one of a small cadre of so-called doctrinaire thinkers, and attended his lectures on history 
before devouring his writings on the history of European civilization.231  Guizot, along with his 
doctrinaire companions, developed a theory of history that posited the existence of an 
irresistible process that forced European societies away from aristocratic social arrangements 
towards those that were democratic.232   
The influences that fostered Mill’s historical approach were considerably more complex than 
those of his French counterpart.  His youthful Benthamism decried the claims of history.  
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However, Mill came to embrace a favourable perspective through his interaction with the 
works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Carlyle, the Saint-Simonians, Tocqueville, Guizot, and 
Auguste Comte, not to mention Goethe and other German sources.   
Indeed, the ‘Germano-Coleridgean school’, as Mill called it, was the first to ‘inquire with any 
comprehensiveness or depth into the inductive laws of the existence and growth of human 
society.’233  The interplay between the methods of Bentham and Coleridge – of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries – in Mill’s mind has been described by Frederick Rosen.234  By the 
time Mill wrote these words on the Germano-Coleridgean school he had already encountered 
counter-currents that challenged his Benthamite upbringing.  He corresponded with the 
Saint-Simonians from 1828 and in their writings he encountered – for the first time – the idea 
of historical periodicity.  From them and through their estranged disciple, Comte, Mill 
accepted, ‘unequivocally’, in I.W. Mueller’s view, the idea that there were ‘successive stages 
in history’ and that these ‘were marked by alternating attitudes and states’.235   
Mueller made great claims for Tocqueville’s influence over Mill’s historical vision.  According 
to her, Mill accepted the historical trajectory towards ever-increasing equality of conditions 
that Tocqueville set out.236  Georgios Varouxakis challenged this interpretations; he argued 
that Mill mediated Tocqueville’s claims through the lens provided by his interaction with the 
works of Guizot, which antedated his reading of Tocqueville’s work.237  In many respects, 
Tocqueville confirmed in Mill the profundity of Guizot’s view of history.238   
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‘The nineteenth century’s rejection of an allegedly ahistorical Enlightenment’, M.S. Phillips 
maintained, ‘has often been taken as a founding moment of a modern historical 
understanding – indeed of modernity itself.’239  Carlyle was at the forefront of reaction against 
the eighteenth-century and his view of history was congruent with this critical perspective.  
This implied a necessary historicism.  Peter Allan Dale claimed that ‘one of Carlyle’s major 
contributions’ was ‘to bring serious historicist concerns to nineteenth-century English 
criticism.’240  There are numerous quotations that could be cited to illustrate this.  In Sartor, 
for example, Carlyle emphasized that ‘the new man’ is always ‘in a new time, under new 
conditions; his course can be the facsimile of no prior one, but is by its nature original.’241  It 
is the constantly changing nature of life that caused Carlyle to conclude that ‘Day after day, I 
must thatch myself anew’.242   
Within his historicism, Carlyle incorporated the notion of alternating epochs.  Just where he 
had discovered this means of analysing history is debatable.  In 1833, concluding his essay on 
Diderot, Carlyle argued, as Goethe had previously, that history oscillated between epochs of 
‘UNBELIEF and BELIEF.’  ‘All epochs wherein Belief prevails,’ he noted, ‘under what form it 
may, are splendid, heart-elevating, fruitful for contemporaries and posterity.’  On the other 
hand, ages ‘wherein Unbelief, under what form soever, maintains its sorry victory…vanish 
from the eyes of posterity’.243  In Sartor there are references to Saint-Simonian ideas of 
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historical change.  ‘L’age d’or’, Carlyle quoted Saint-Simon directly, ‘qu’une aveugle tradition 
a placé jusqu’ici dans le passé est devant nous’.244   
Was Carlyle’s historicism primarily German-influenced or Saint-Simonian-oriented?  E.M. Vida 
argued for the former and saw in the notion of rebirth, following a period of unbelief, the 
influence of the German Romantic writer John Paul.245  Schelling and Goethe also offered 
Carlyle the notion of a zeitgeist that underpinned his vision of history, according to Vida.246  
Allan Dale stated that Carlyle was firmly in the Liberal Anglican camp of historical philosophy, 
which was indebted to Coleridge and by extension German philosophy.247  What is certain, 
though, is that Carlyle’s historicism was possessed of a telos.  ‘Like most of his 
contemporaries’, Allan Dale argued, ‘Carlyle accepted the prevailing myth of progress.  
Mankind does not simply move in endless cycles of belief and unbelief but moves forward.’248  
What mankind had been moving towards and, crucially, how it had done so occupies the 
remainder of this chapter.     
 
THE REFORMATION AND THE PRESENT 
A number of contemporary thinkers saw in the Reformation an antecedent of the events of 
1789.  In fact, a direct line of descent was drawn by philosophical historians from the crisis of 
religion to modern democracy.  In this trajectory, once the temporal and spiritual authority 
of the papacy had been challenged by an ascending Protestantism, it was inevitable that the 
revolutionary events of 1789 would come to pass and democracy replace the society of the 
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ancien régime.  Joseph de Maistre advanced this teleological framework in the most acerbic 
terms – the Reformation was necessarily responsible for the twin evils of Jansenism and 
Jacobinism in his view – though he was not alone.249   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle adopted a teleological framework that was similar.  But, their 
accounts did not imitate Maistre’s loathing of Protestantism.  ‘For many centuries,’ Mill wrote 
in the penultimate instalment of his Spirit of the Age, ‘undivided moral influence over the 
nations of Europe, the unquestioned privilege of forming the opinions and feelings of the 
Christian world, was enjoyed, and most efficiently exercised by the Catholic clergy.’  The 
‘word’ of this body ‘inspired in the rest of mankind the most fervent faith.’250  Mill did not 
doubt the sincerity or practicality of this arrangement.  The clergy was almost exclusive in its 
love of learning and this made it, as a body, intellectually superior to the populace.  ‘But the 
age of transition arrived’, Mill noted.  The Catholic Church ‘became itself incompatible with 
improvement.’  ‘Mankind’, Mill claimed, simply ‘outgrew their religion, and that, too, at a 
period when they had not yet outgrown their government’.251   
The more advanced communities of Europe succeeded, after a terrific struggle, in 
effecting their total or partial emancipation: in some, the Reformation achieved a 
victory—in others, a toleration; while, by a fate unhappily too common, the flame 
which had been kindled where the pile awaited the spark, spread into countries 
where the materials were not yet sufficiently prepared; and instead of burning 
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down the hateful edifice, it consumed all that existed capable of nourishing itself, 
and was extinguished.252 
This had laid the seeds of the modern world.  Those countries in which the Reformation 
succeeded became increasingly secular.  The ‘moral influence’, that is to say the ‘the 
unquestioned heritage of the Catholic clergy, passed into the hands of the power over the 
minds of mankind, which had been for so many ages wealthy classes, and became united with 
worldly power.’253   
Freed from the shackles of clerical authority, this rising wealthy class developed the ‘doctrines 
of the British constitution’, which contained ‘the opinions, respecting the proper limits of the 
powers of government, and the proper mode of constituting and administering it, which were 
long characteristic of Englishmen.’  New notions regarding the Constitution and the limits of 
political power were complimented by new ideas ‘respecting morality, education, and the 
structure of society.’  These novel impressions ‘spread far,’ Mill maintained, ‘and took a deep 
root in the English mind.’254  The ‘comparative freedom’ offered by ‘our Constitution’ had 
‘enabled the people to train themselves in every habit necessary for self-government’.  It 
helped them prepare ‘for the rational management of their own affairs’ through ‘the 
extensive latitude of action which it allowed to the energies of individuals’.255   
When the people were thus trained to self-government, and had learned by 
experience that they were fit for it, they could not continue to suppose that none 
but persons of rank and fortune were entitled to have a voice in the government, 
                                                          
252 Ibid.   
253 Ibid, p.313.   
254 Ibid, pp.314.   
255 Ibid.   
76 
 
or were competent to criticise its proceedings. The superior capacity of the higher 
ranks for the exercise of worldly power is now a broken spell.256   
The Reformation had thus led directly to the rise of democracy through Protestantism’s 
insistence on secular government, which had resulted in the cultivation of the people en 
masse due to the newfound political liberties it made possible.  This was supplemented by its 
emphasis on education and morality, which improved individual culture.  The stress it laid on 
the individual’s relationship with God encouraged ideas of equality, which supplanted those 
of hierarchy that the Catholic clerical establishment had embodied.   
Carlyle picked up the trail of this line of reasoning in his essay on ‘The Hero as King’, which 
gave his thoughts on, among other things, the phenomenon of ‘Modern Revolutionism’.  He 
emphasised once more that his contemporaries were living in ‘times of revolution, and have 
long been.’257  Never shy of addressing the issues of his era in flamboyant terms, Carlyle took 
this opportunity to indulge in a literary flourish.   
The bricklayer with his bricks, no longer heedful of plummet or the law of 
gravitation, have toppled, tumbled, and it all welters as we see!258   
Revolution abounded because those in charge of building the structural edifice of society had 
failed to take account of the most basic laws of nature.259  ‘But the beginning of it’, he was 
eager to emphasize, ‘was not the French Revolution; that is rather the end we can hope.260   
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As the previous chapter demonstrates, Carlyle thought that the French Revolution had 
inaugurated the reign of democracy.  But what lay at the root of the French Revolution?  To 
ask this question is merely an extended means of asking what the foundation of democracy 
in the modern world was.  Carlyle was startlingly clear: ‘It were truer to say, the beginning 
was three centuries further back: in the Reformation of Luther.’261  Carlyle revered Luther.  He 
had anointed the Saxon theologian as one of his heroes in an earlier essay.262  Luther’s part in 
the coming of the modern world was obvious to any Calvinist intellectual.  The problems of 
the Catholic Church had forced Luther to act.   
That the thing which still called itself Christian Church had become a Falsehood, 
and brazenly went about pretending to pardon men’s sins for metallic coin money, 
and to do much else which in the everlasting truth of Nature it did not now do: 
here lay the vital malady.  The inward being wrong, all outward went ever more 
and more wrong.  Belief died away; all was Doubt, Disbelief.263   
Christian institutions had become a chimera; a veil for personal enrichment.  The Pope himself 
embodied the evils of a decrepit Catholicism.  Luther had seen into the heart of this and had 
been disgusted by what he had found.  What is more, there was a clear line of descent from 
the efforts of Luther to those of France’s revolutionaries.   
From that first necessary assertion of Luther’s, ‘You, self-styled Papa, you are no 
Father in God at all; you are – a Chimera, whom I know not how to name in polite 
language!’ – from that onwards to the shout which rose round Camille Desmoulins 
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in the Palais-Royal, ‘Aux armes!’ when the people had burst-up against all manner 
of Chimeras, - I find a natural historical sequence.264   
The Reformation, much like the French Revolution, had put an end to insincerity and falseness 
– two of Carlyle’s bêtes noires.  ‘Hollowness, insincerity has to cease; sincerity of some sort 
has to begin.’  Of this, if at times little else, Carlyle was abundantly clear.  ‘Cost what it may, 
reigns of terror, horrors of French Revolution or what else, we have to return to truth.’265  In 
asserting truth against Papal falsity in the sacerdotal sphere, Luther had set the scene for 
temporal revolt against insincerity.  In tracing a line of trajectory from the Reformation to the 
French Revolution, Carlyle drew unmistakable links between it and the onset of modern 
democracy.   
As in so many instances, Tocqueville outlined his understanding of this process circuitously.  
It is in discussing the philosophical method of the Americans that he delineates his stance on 
the relationship of the modern era to that of the Reformation.  This attests to Tocqueville’s 
skill as a writer, to his ability to disguise his true meaning with a distinct mixture of subtlety 
and seeming candour.  In addressing the origins of the philosophical method of the Americans 
he is, in fact, defining his perception of the foundations of the modern world’s psychological 
disposition.   
Much like Mill and Carlyle, Tocqueville began with the Reformation.  ‘In the XVIth century, the 
men of the Reformation subject some of the dogmas of the ancient faith to individual reason; 
but they continue to exclude all the others from discussion.’  In his notes to this section 
Tocqueville developed this point further.  In the books of the sixteenth century, he saw that 
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‘one preaches to men that each one of them has the right and the ability to choose the 
particular road that should lead to heaven.’266   
I am assured that half of the nations of Europe have adopted this new doctrine.  
That is enough.  I do not need to be taught that a great political revolution has 
preceded and accompanied the religious revolution whose history is provided for 
me.267   
The subsequent challenges to authority in the temporal world, whether they were intellectual 
or political in nature, were merely an extension of the spirit of the Reformation.  In the 
seventeenth century, ‘Bacon, in the natural sciences, and Descartes, in philosophy strictly 
speaking, abolish accepted formulas, destroy the rule of traditions and overthrow the 
authority of the master.’268  The philosophes of the 18th century ‘finally generalising the same 
principle, undertake to submit to the individual examination of each man the object of all his 
beliefs.’269  ‘Who does not see’, Tocqueville claimed, ‘that Luther, Descartes and Voltaire used 
the same method, and that they differ only in the greater or lesser use that they claimed to 
make of it?’270  Here, Tocqueville is tracing the birth of the psychology of democracy.  Each of 
these men, Luther, Descartes and Voltaire, shared a methodological principle: that of 
subjecting their beliefs to the light of individual reason.  But Luther had applied it only to 
inherited religious beliefs.  Descartes had extended this mentality into the intellectual domain 
and Voltaire, finally, along with the other philosophes, had applied it to every subject on which 
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belief was tied to tradition.  This mentality had traversed the religious sphere and entered, 
albeit gradually, men’s considerations on any and all domains of life, including politics.   
Tocqueville probed the issue of Franco-American difference.  How had the Americans 
maintained stability if they possessed a similar philosophical disposition to the French?  This 
disposition was, after all, this chapter’s purported subject.  Why, in other words, had this 
trajectory created a revolutionary democracy in France and a non-revolutionary one in the 
United States?  Tocqueville answered thus:  
It is not because the French changed their ancient beliefs and modified their 
ancient mores that they turned the world upside down; it is because they were 
the first to generalise and bring to light a philosophical method by the aid of which 
you could easily attack all things old and open the way to all new things.271   
The French had applied this mode of analysis to all areas of life where the Americans had 
restricted it only to one: religion.  This lay at the root of their differences.  In both cases, 
however, the spirit of the Reformation had led to the adoption of democratic forms, to the 
recognition of equality.  Here, Tocqueville addressed the psychology of equality; he would 
outline the sociology of equality elsewhere.   
 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL PRECURSORS OF DEMOCRACY 
The Reformation had prepared the minds of men for democracy.  By instilling in them a 
questioning spirit it had enabled them to challenge inherited opinions and acquired usages.  
One of the great problems of the era, as I showed in the last chapter, was that of halting this 
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revolutionary spirit.  Though the Reformation had laid the philosophical foundations of 
modern democracy, it was not alone in determining its rise.  Other factors, of a sociological 
bent, had helped to foster the nascent democratic society with which Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle were concerned.   
Tocqueville traced a story of sociological change throughout the opening pages of his 
Démocratie.  Here we can see the impact of Guizot and other Doctrinaire thinkers on 
Tocqueville’s historical understanding.  Tocqueville directed his readers to consider France’s 
remote past, beginning seven hundred years prior to their own era.  At this time a small 
number of families owned the land and governed all of the inhabitants; authority was 
transferred between generations via the mechanism of inheritance alone; men had only one 
means of acting on one another, ‘force’; and ‘landed property’ was the sole source of 
power.272   
But, this began to change gradually.  The church acquired greater prominence and with it 
equality began to ‘penetrate’ into ‘government’.  A man who would have ‘vegetated as a serf 
in eternal slavery’, Tocqueville averred, ‘takes his place as a priest among nobles and often 
goes to take a seat above kings.’  The church acted as the primary motor of social mobility 
and this was increased by society’s advancing civilization.273  Life in more civilized 
communities is ‘more complicated’ than in others and this creates a need for institutional 
apparatus which can accommodate that complexity.  Thus, a need was felt for more ‘civil 
laws’, which created new offices for ‘jurists’ who emerged ‘from the dark precinct of the 
courts and from the dusty recess of the clerks’ offices’.  From such inauspicious beginnings, 
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these men gradually came to sit alongside ‘the prince’ and ‘feudal barons covered with ermine 
and iron.’274   
At the same time as this advancing social mobility was taking place, kings and great nobles 
gradually ruined themselves in ‘great enterprises [and] private wars’ whilst ‘commoners’ 
enriched themselves in commercial ventures.  Money, trade, and commerce then became 
important new sources of power and financiers rose to ‘a political power that is scorned and 
flattered.’  Enlightenment emerged from ivory towers and gilded courts to descend into the 
crowd.  Literature and the arts gained a new prominence and ‘intelligence’ itself became ‘a 
social force’.  Men of letters arrived as a public power.275  ‘As new roads to achieve power are 
found,’ Tocqueville wrote, ‘we see the value of birth fall.’   
In order to maintain their ascendancy over other nobles or a king, noblemen ‘gave political 
power to the people.’  Often, kings enlisted the power of the people ‘in order to humble the 
aristocracy.’276  ‘As soon as citizens began to own the land’, Tocqueville argued, ‘no 
discoveries were made in the arts, no further improvements were introduced into commerce 
and industry, without also creating as many new elements of equality among men.’   
When you skim the pages of our history you do not find so to speak any great 
events that for seven hundred years have not turned to the profit of equality.277 
The diffusion of knowledge, the rise of commerce and the petty struggles of nobles and kings 
alike furthered the progress of this idea.  Finally, the Reformation and Protestantism added 
the coup de grâce.  The rebellion against Catholic authority and the gestation of a new 
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Christian creed taught that ‘all men are equally able to find the way to heaven.’278  But before 
that psychological blow had been delivered society was already fast progressing toward 
equality.   
Mill offered a comprehensive sociological history of the origins of modern democratic society.  
This is divided across three entirely separate works: his collection of essays on the Spirit of 
the Age, an 1836 piece on Civilization (a title that is likely to have been inspired by Guizot 
given its subject matter279), and the Principles of Political Economy.  Given the chronology of 
these works, it is evident that Mill had been thinking about this issue in detail for at least 17 
years.  In the Spirit of the Age, Mill grappled with a commonplace notion about the socio-
political changes taking place around him.  They were not the result, as was often held, of an 
‘increase of wisdom’.  Instead, a more fundamental change had taken place.  The size of the 
political community – and by that I mean those taking part in political discussion or, in Jürgen 
Habermas’ terms, the public sphere – had increased.  ‘Discussion has penetrated deeper into 
society’, Mill noted.  ‘The progress which we have made,’ Mill maintained, ‘is precisely that 
sort of progress which increase of discussion suffices to produce, whether it be attended with 
increase of wisdom or no.’280  ‘Men may not reason, better,’ he thought, ‘concerning the great 
questions in which human nature is interested, but they reason more.  Large subjects are 
discussed more, and longer, and by more minds.’281   
Pluralization in society had fostered an increased spirit of discussion regarding political issues.  
But, how did this promote progressive change?  Mill could not have been clearer:   
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To discuss, and to question established opinions, are merely two phrases for the 
same thing.  When all opinions are questioned, it is in time found out what are 
those which will not bear a close examination.  Ancient doctrines are then put 
upon their proofs; and those which were originally errors, or have become so by 
change of circumstances, are thrown aside.282   
Having identified and established the outcome of the process of pluralization that had taken 
place, Mill then moved to outline the sociological changes that had resulted in the 
diversification of the public sphere.  At its root lay the gradual encroachment of 
‘civilisation’.283  Civilization had a number of effects.  First among them was the fact ‘that 
power passes more and more from individuals, and small knots of individuals, to masses: that 
the importance of masses becomes constantly greater, that of individuals less.’284  Two causes 
accounted for this change in the dynamics of power.  The first related to ‘property’ and the 
second to the ‘powers and acquirements of mind.’285   
Both property and intelligence had been ‘confined to a few persons’ during the ‘early stage 
of civilisation’.  In fact, Mill argued that throughout ‘the beginnings of society, the power of 
the masses does not exist; because property and intelligence have no existence beyond a very 
small portion of the community’.286   
The character of this state of society was the utmost excess of poverty and 
impotence in the masses; the most enormous importance and uncontrollable 
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power of a small number of individuals, each of whom, within his own sphere, 
knew neither law nor superior.287   
But the process of civilization had altered the relative positions of both the masses and the 
small cadre who had exercised power in its entirety.  Mill drew his readers’ attention to the 
development of the middle classes through which this process had been exercised.   
We need only ask the reader to form a conception of the vastness of all that is 
implied in the words, growth of a middle class; and then bid him reflect upon the 
immense increase of the numbers and property of that class throughout Great 
Britain, France, Germany, and other countries in every successive generation…288   
Embodied in the middle classes, the process of civilization across the centuries had led to 
‘property and intelligence’ becoming ‘widely diffused among millions’ as well as an increase 
in individuals’ ability to compromise and coalesce.  This was because, Mill claimed, ‘It is only 
civilised beings who can combine.’289  Mill proceeded to outline in greater detail the gradual 
unfolding of these elements of civilization – the division of property, the widening of 
intelligence, and the increasing tendency to coalesce – in the following pages.  Only one 
conclusion could be supported.   
The triumph of democracy, or, in other words, of the government of public 
opinion, does not depend upon the opinion of any individual or set of individuals 
that it ought to triumph, but upon the natural laws of the progress of wealth, upon 
the diffusion of reading, and the increase of the facilities of human intercourse.290   
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The ideas he articulated in his essay on Civilization were restated in his review of Tocqueville’s 
second volume of Démocratie.291  It is true that in Mill’s view the rise of democracy was only 
one of the consequences of the broad movement of sociological change that he saw in history.  
But, J.H. Burns is right to argue that it was by far ‘the most important political result of 
civilization’.292   
Mill drew the attention of his readers to the process of civilization again in his ‘Preliminary 
Remarks’ to the Principles of Political Economy.  Here, though, the focus is less extensive for 
one obvious reason.  The Principles was primarily a treatise on political economy.293  Mill 
contented himself with demonstrating how wealth had been divided across the ages.294  He 
noted that ‘extraordinary differences’ that existed in respect to wealth ‘between different 
ages of the world; differences both in the quantity of wealth, and in the kind of it; as well as 
in the manner in which the wealth existing in the community is shared among its members.’295   
Mill drew an economic picture in which there existed four states in regard to wealth, which 
he organized into a clear hierarchy.  The savage state of wealth Mill placed at the bottom of 
civilization’s pyramid.  It was a condition in which ‘no one has much more than absolute 
necessaries, and in case of deficiency must share even those with his tribe.’296  Next came the 
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‘shepherd state’.  This was the period in which ‘inequality of possessions’ first entered into 
human affairs.297  This bore a progressive counterpart.  Inequality fostered leisure, if only for 
a few, which promoted the development of new tastes that required innovation in the various 
Arts of life in order to be satisfied.298   
The agricultural stage followed the shepherd state.  Quantities of food hitherto unknown 
were able to be produced in this era and the ‘surplus’, Mill contended, ‘whether small or 
great, is usually torn from the producers’ in this state, ‘either by the government to which 
they are subject, or by individuals, who…have established themselves as lords of the soil.’299  
Great monarchies or powerful aristocracies resulted from the arrival of this epoch.  
Throughout it, Mill reflected, ‘the population of each country may be considered as 
composed, in unequal proportions, of two distinct nations or races, the conquerors and the 
conquered: the first the proprietors of the land, and the latter the tillers of it.’300  Despite this, 
progress in the course of civilization continued.  The demands of great kings and powerful 
aristocrats for ever greater luxuries promoted the development of the middle classes, which 
in turn stimulated new changes in the economic state of civilization.   
The final stage that Mill identified – though, he did not claim it was a moment in which history 
ended – was that of the ‘commercial and manufacturing’ age.301  At this point in time, Mill 
maintained, ‘the immediate cultivators of the soil…ceased to be in a servile or semi-servile 
state’; progress advanced at a new and speedier pace; national grandeur replaced individual 
eminence; and ‘conveniences and luxuries, other than food,’ were limited ‘no longer…to a 
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small and opulent class’.  These items descended ‘in great abundance, through many 
widening strata in society.’302  In Mill’s understanding, then, the triumph of democracy lay 
only at the two poles of economic development: in the savage state and the highly civilized.   
Carlyle hinted at something similar, though his position is far less clear or rigorous than that 
of Tocqueville or Mill.  Where Tocqueville and Mill were evidently attempting to account for 
the birth of democracy – that is, to show the sociological precursors that made democracy 
inevitable – Carlyle’s object was different in this instance.  In his essay on Chartism, Carlyle 
wanted to demonstrate how the present had arisen.  Of course, that present was democratic, 
as he well knew.  But the histoire philosophique Carlyle advanced here was not intended to 
account for democracy’s existence.   
As with Mill and Tocqueville, however, Carlyle’s interpretation of the historical sociology of 
the modern era stretched far into the past.  Carlyle showed how the public sphere had 
gradually increased in size over the centuries.  He asked his readers to ‘Consider those Barons 
of Runnymede’, indeed, to ‘consider all manner of successfully revolting men!’  The ‘Magna 
Charta’ was but one instance of such a rebellion in the history of men.  What especially did 
they mean?  ‘Call it not succession of rebellions’, Carlyle implored his readers, ‘call it rather 
succession of expansions, of enlightenments, gift of articulate utterance descending ever 
lower.’303  This was the significance of the rebellions and revolutions that punctuated the 
annals of history – of British history at least.   
Class after class acquires faculty of utterance, - Necessity teaching and compelling; 
as the dumb man, seeing the knife at his father’s throat, suddenly acquired 
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speech!  Consider too how class after class not only acquires faculty of articulating 
what its might is, but likewise grows in might, acquires might or loses might; so 
that always, after a space, there is not only new gift of articulating, but there is 
something new to articulate.304   
Once those Barons of Runnymede had been ‘satisfied’, Carlyle argued, ‘a new class hitherto 
silent…begun to speak’.  This was ‘the Middle Class’.  Amongst this class, Carlyle claimed, 
‘much had been going on’ whilst nobles were busy ruining themselves in ‘wars of Red and 
White Roses, Battles of Crecy, Battles of Bosworth’, ad infinitum.  A process of urbanization 
and commercialization was under way: ‘Sheffield had taken to the manufacture of Sheffield 
whittles’, Carlyle argued, and ‘Worstead could form wool spin yarn, and knit or weave the 
same into stockings or breeches for men.’  A veritable tiers-état had arrived in England and 
Carlyle could not let its significance go unnoticed.305   
The seven incorporated trades with their million guild-brethren, with their 
hammers, their shuttles and tools, what an army; - fit to conquer that land of 
England, as we say, and to hold it conquered!306   
This was not all.  The middle classes had not only obtained power; they had also obtained the 
gift of learning.  They had ‘acquired the faculty and habit of thinking’, as Carlyle put it, and 
‘individual conscience had unfolded itself among them; Conscience, and Intelligence its 
handmaid.’307  Shakespeare was the finest example of this trend.  He had been ‘a woolcomber, 
poacher, or whatever else at Stratford in Warwickshire, who happened to write books!’  And 
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yet, he amounted to the ‘finest human figure’, Carlyle thought, ‘that Nature has hitherto seen 
fit to make of our widely diffused Teutonic clay.’308  The industrial revolution had merely 
exacerbated the existing changes that had long been taking place in society.  Carlyle expressed 
this through recourse to symbolism.   
In this clanging clashing universal Sword-dance that the European world now 
dances for the last half-century, Voltaire is but one choragus, where Richard 
Arkwright is another.309   
Arkwright’s ideas and innovations, Carlyle thought, would last far longer than those of 
Voltaire.  When the man himself ‘shall have become mythic…we shall still spin in peaceable 
profit by him’.310  This was the sociological story of the development of the modern world 
that Carlyle advanced.  From the cradle of Magna Charta to the industrial and French 
revolutions, this was the process by which Britain had pluralized.  Given Carlyle’s breadth of 
interest and his understanding of European history as a whole, it seems fair to say that it is 
likely he applied the same logic to the European continent as a whole.  Nevertheless, Carlyle’s 
sociological story of the development of the modern world across the ages differed from that 
of Tocqueville and Mill in aim, as I said above, though much of the principle remains similar.     
 
RELIGION, CONFLICT, JUSTICE: THE HIDDEN MOTORS OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT   
The modern democratic world that Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle saw developing around them 
had been conditioned by the decline of the ancien régime and by the rise of classes that had 
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hitherto been excluded from taking part in the affairs of government and society on equal 
terms.  The previous two sections of this chapter show the way in which Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle conceived of these concurrent processes.  This section will outline the clandestine 
forces that each of these men believed lay behind the changes that had shepherded feudal 
society towards the modern era.  For Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle these forces were wholly 
different.  However, they did share a common feature: the notion of conflict.   
For Tocqueville, Providence or, at the very least, Christianity had set the world on a course to 
democracy.311  ‘The entire book that you are about to read’, Tocqueville wrote in introducing 
the Démocratie, ‘has been written under the impression of a sort of religious terror’.  
Tocqueville had been unsettled at the sight of an ‘irresistible revolution’ he perceived as 
having ‘marched for so many centuries over all obstacles’ and that was still advancing in the 
contemporary world ‘amid the ruins that it has made.’  This irresistible revolution was the 
‘gradual and progressive development of equality’, which was at once ‘the past and the 
future’ of all history, at least in the Christian world.312   
Tocqueville argued that the trend towards equality of conditions was a ‘development’ of ‘the 
sacred character of the will of God.’  Any attempt to turn back the tide would be akin to 
‘struggling against God himself’ and, consequently, men as well as nations must 
‘accommodate themselves to the social state that Providence imposes on them.’313  The 
Christian world in Tocqueville’s view, as Hugh Brogan put it, was ‘condemned to democracy’ 
because God willed it.314  It is on this section that the introduction to the Démocratie turns.  
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Placed squarely in the middle of Tocqueville’s opening section, it demonstrates the goal of his 
philosophical outline of history.  Prior to this page, he had shown how equality had arisen; 
after it he was concerned only with convincing his readers that they must take control of their 
bizarre and chaotic age, and impose a new order based on the divine trajectory he had 
outlined for them.   
The rise of the modern world that Tocqueville had perceived was not so much a record of the 
various causes that had produced the effects he had articulated as it was a form of divine 
gospel.  This is not an extrapolation from Tocqueville’s statements on history; his own words 
convey this perspective much more powerfully than any secondary commentator’s possibly 
could.   
It isn’t necessary for God himself to speak in order for us to discover sure signs of 
his will; it is enough to examine the regular march of nature and the continuous 
tendency of events; I know, without the Creator raising his voice that the stars in 
space follow the curves traced by his fingers.315   
Tocqueville’s understanding of history as such attests to the magnitude of two of his deepest 
influences: Pascal and Guizot.316  Conflict is central to Tocqueville’s conception of history’s 
development.  This is not apparent at first sight.  Throughout his account of the rise of modern 
society, though, and even in his description of that new society itself, the force of equality is 
constantly in conflict with that of inequality.  The parallel is not obvious at first simply because 
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Tocqueville placed so much emphasis on the idea of equality alone.  History, in his view, 
though, was dialectical.   
Mill saw history in similarly dialectical terms.  ‘The struggle between Liberty and Authority’, 
Mill wrote in the ‘Introductory’ to On Liberty, ‘is the most conspicuous feature in the portions 
of history with which we are earliest familiar’.317  Mill’s capitalization of these two central 
ideas, Liberty and Authority is revealing.  It is something he had undoubtedly seen in Romantic 
and pseudo-Romantic writers, Carlyle in particular.  He adopted this mode of expression 
whilst under the influence of Carlyle in the 1830s, as can be seen in various essays he wrote 
at that time, but subsequently abandoned such an idiosyncratic style.  In capitalizing ‘Liberty’ 
and ‘Authority’, however, Mill lent to them a very great significance, and it was a weight he 
obviously felt they deserved.   
These were his two great ideas, in regard to historical development, and it was through their 
interaction that change occurred.  The struggle between these two ideas was ‘so far from 
being new’, he thought, and had ‘divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages.’  The 
world in which Mill found himself was no different.  Mankind may have progressed to an 
unprecedented level but it was, nonetheless, still under the auspices of these eternally 
warring precepts.  In fact, in ‘the more civilised portions of the species’ this conflict merely 
‘presents itself under new conditions’ and, therefore, ‘requires different and more 
fundamental treatment.’318   
The essential elements underlying those societies which Mill placed under consideration had 
not changed; they had merely acquired new clothes.  This particular notion was one that he 
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had taken, in large measure, from Guizot.  J.H. Burns attributed ‘the connected view of 
history’ that Mill proffered to the influence of Auguste Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive, 
with which Mill was highly conversant.319  Comte’s inverse deductive method was certainly 
important in determining Mill’s means of approaching the past, but the contents of his 
reflections mirror those of Guizot.   
Mill traced, through the rest of the ‘Introductory’ to On Liberty, the political (primarily) and 
sociological (secondarily) manifestations of the constant formations, disintegrations, and 
reformations that the eternal conflict between liberty and authority had produced in 
European history.320  It was this conflict that had been at the root of the movement towards 
democracy.  Moves to limit the power of kings, through securing ‘political liberties or rights’, 
were the first efforts in this direction.  Contravention of these ‘liberties or rights’ justified 
either ‘specific resistance’ or ‘general rebellion’.   
Later, ‘constitutional checks’ were established to limit monarchical authority.  The ‘consent 
of the community’, in this instance, ‘was made a necessary condition to some of the more 
important acts of the governing power.’321  Finally, ‘men ceased to think it a necessity of 
nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to 
themselves.’  At this point, it seemed more suitable ‘that the various magistrates of the State 
should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure.’322  The force of liberty had 
thus triumphed over that of authority.  But, the battle was not won, it had only changed 
shape.  Mill discussed this in detail over the course of the following pages of On Liberty.323  
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Significantly, though, and perhaps in contradiction to Mill’s actual intentions, he had drawn 
an historical trajectory that was dependent on a first cause: the conflict between liberty and 
authority in history.  This conflict fostered the sort of pluralization in the public sphere that 
Mill had charted in other works and had led, ultimately, to the rise of democracy.324   
Carlyle’s notion of history was equally dialectical.  In Carlyle’s work, the conflict that is 
responsible for the changes that occur in society is always the same.  Revolts, rebellions, even 
revolutions, in history result from the eternal battle between sincerity, truth, or reality and 
insincerity, falsity, or semblance.  The Manichean struggle taking place between these 
timeless forces operates clandestinely for the most part.  But in moments when the ideal a 
system of society is based on ceases to be a reality and the conventions extant in any culture 
cease to represent the actual social situation, conflict between semblance and reality bursts 
through the thin layer of habit in order to proclaim the truth.   
In Past and Present, Carlyle expressed this cogently.  In any society, he thought, ‘the Ideal 
always has to grow in the Real, and to seek out its bed and board there’ and by ‘the law of 
Nature, too, all manner of Ideals have their fatal limits and lot; their appointed periods, of 
youth, of maturity or perfection, of decline, degradation, and final death and 
disappearance.’325  Once the truth that lies in them fades away, the sands of time wash such 
ideals into the tide of eternity.   
The Ideal, the True and Noble that was in them have faded out, and nothing now 
remaining but naked Egoism, vulturous Greediness, they cannot live; they are 
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bound and inexorably ordained by the oldest destines, Mothers of the Universe, 
to die.326 
Carlyle identified two instances when this had happened, both moments of tremendous 
upheaval: the English Civil War and the French Revolution.  In the former, the ‘English 
Regicides’ had utterly destroyed ‘Flunkeyism’.327  Puritanism had been the last appearance of 
‘conviction and veracity’ in England, perhaps in Europe; though, it had since given way to 
‘hollow cant and formalism’.328  The French Revolution provided a similar example of falsity 
giving way to truth.  It was, according to Carlyle, a ‘true Apocalypse, though a terrible one,’ 
which had demonstrated that ‘Semblance is not Reality; that it has to become Reality, or the 
world will take-fire under it’.329   
His most striking comments on the French Revolution’s status as an event in which eternal 
truths had been reasserted against contemporary fallacies were, unsurprisingly, in his major 
work on that event.  ‘Great truly is the Actual’, Carlyle stated, ‘is the Thing that has rescued 
itself from bottomless deeps of theory and possibility, and stands there as a definite 
indisputable Fact’.330  The French Revolution, more than any other event on record, had 
proved that lies could not continue, and Carlyle implored his readers to recognize this singular 
fact.  ‘Where thou findest a Lie that is oppressing thee,’ he cajoled his audience, ‘extinguish 
it.  Lies exist there only to be extinguished; they wait and cry earnestly for extinction.’331  The 
ultimate truth was simple.  All lies, regardless of their power, ‘have a sentence of death 
written down against them, in Heaven’s Chancery itself; and, slowly or fast, advance 
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incessantly towards their hour.’332  The revolutionaries themselves, similar to the English 
Regicides Carlyle identified, had debunked the falsity they found around them and reasserted 
reality – or at least attempted to.  ‘A set of mortals has risen,’ Carlyle argued of the 
revolutionaries, ‘who believe that Truth is not a printed speculation, but a practical Fact’.333   
Carlyle’s conception of history and the hidden motor of historical development represented, 
if not, like Tocqueville, a divine plan, at least the reign of divinely sanctioned principles.  The 
eternal struggle between semblance and reality that Carlyle identified presupposed no 
necessary course of human development outside of moral righteousness.  However, in the 
context of the arguments Carlyle advanced in regard to the sort of society that had existed 
under the ancien régime, which are outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, it is not difficult 
to see how this theory of historical change accorded with the move towards democracy 
Carlyle had highlighted.  The French aristocracy’s corruption and its inability to fulfil the duties 
towards other classes that were required in order to justify its existence had made its 
continuation seem spurious.  Democracy was the result, as the lower and middle classes rose 
up in arm against their former leaders’ speciousness.  Historical change according to such 
divinely sanctioned principles implies the existence of an underlying form of justice that is 
inherent in individual human beings.  For Carlyle, then, history moves in reaction to 
divergences from justice.   
The views Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle proffered on the historicity of democracy formed the 
basis of their respective understandings of its inevitability.  Long-prepared by changes in the 
social psychology and social structure of European civilization, democracy’s arrival was 
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inescapable.  In this view, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were united.  Where they differed was 
in their notions of just what had been driving the changes that had fostered ever more 
democratic societies.  Tocqueville saw in the historical trajectory he perceived the hands of 
Providence.  Mill thought all historical movement since the end of the classical period had 
been defined by the interaction of two fundamental principles on a grand scale: liberty and 
authority.  Carlyle believed that the formation, destruction and subsequent reformation of 
polities occurred in accordance with a divinely-sanctioned and inculcated principle of justice.   
What should now be obvious is that the notions of democracy with which Tocqueville, Mill 
and Carlyle were working were not narrowly political.  They encompassed much more than 
the institutional and electoral dynamics of a democratic polity.  It is to their respective 
conceptions of democracy that we shall now turn.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONTOURS OF DEMOCRACY 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were eager to understand the meaning of the new democratic 
world into which they had been born.  What did democracy entail?  What were its contours?  
This was one of the many tasks that occupied a young Tocqueville as he travelled throughout 
the American continent.  Though he has often been criticized for his ambiguous use of the 
term, Tocqueville clearly understood the importance of arriving at a reliable definition of 
democracy.  In the notes accompanying one of the chapters of his great work on Démocratie 
– ‘That The Salient Point Of The Social State Of The Anglo-Americans Is To Be Essentially 
Democratic’ – he directed his efforts toward this very end.  Tocqueville reminded himself to 
‘Explain what is understood by democracy.’334  That he at times may have strayed from the 
sort of rigour he demanded of himself and led readers into the realm of ambiguity in 
consequence adds to the richness and diversity of Tocqueville’s work, according to James 
Schleifer.335   
Carlyle set himself a similar task.  In 1841 Carlyle confided in a letter to Richard Monckton 
Milnes that democracy still remained to be properly understood.  Only ‘a truly brave and 
seeing man’ would be able to ‘understand that great black inevitable fast-swelling rising tide 
of Democracy’.  The task allotted to such a man, though, was more challenging than that of 
simply defining democracy.  To ‘interpret it’ was merely a beginning.  What was required was 
a man who could ‘wisely yield to it, wisely resist it, in fact wisely accomplish what of just and 
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right it inarticulately means’.336  By the time he came to write his Latter-Day Pamphlets nine 
years later, Carlyle believed that his contemporaries had still not understood the meaning of 
democracy.   
What is Democracy; this huge inevitable Product of the Destinies, which is 
everywhere the portion of our Europe in these latter days?  There lies the question 
for us.  Whence comes it, this universal big black Democracy; whither tends it; 
what is the meaning of it?337   
Carlyle was sure that it must have a ‘meaning’, otherwise ‘it would not be here.’338  Once 
more, he outlined the importance of understanding its significance, using similar language to 
that which he had in his letter to Monckton Milnes.  ‘If we can find the right meaning of it, we 
may, wisely submitting or wisely resisting and controlling, still hope to live in the midst of it’.  
But he left his readers in no doubt.  If the ‘right meaning’ cannot be found, ‘if we find only the 
wrong or no meaning in it, to live will not be possible!’339  Understanding democracy was not 
a mere intellectual exercise for Carlyle, it was central to chances for stability in the 
contemporary world.  Of this, he was sure.   
Mill was sceptical about the possibility of understanding democracy.  In the second review 
article he authored on Tocqueville’s Démocratie he argued that ‘Democracy is too recent a 
phenomenon, and of too great magnitude, for any one who now lives to comprehend its 
consequences.’   At most, he thought, ‘A few of its more immediate tendencies may be 
perceived or surmised; what other tendencies, destined to overrule or to combine with these, 
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lie behind, there are not grounds even to conjecture.’340  Despite his obvious scepticism, Mill 
did attempt to understand democracy’s meaning.  He wrote a celebrated treatise on 
Representative Government, which was the culmination of an intellectual life in which he had 
engaged continuously with democracy, its history and its problems.   
This chapter will outline the contents of the term democracy in the respective lexicons of 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  Given the nature of this thesis, and with that end in view, it will 
examine primarily the overlap between these three men in respect of their understanding of 
this concept.  Doubtless, it is a key idea in the works of each and the manner in which they 
used it suggests significant overlap between their respective definitions.  In assessing these 
definitions it is possible to see the different intellectual and contextual spheres that 
influenced their thought.   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle each related their notions of democracy to the classical polis.  
The ancient world was significant to their respective understandings of what constituted a 
democracy.  Each thought the ancient republics to be an important category in explaining the 
political and social features of modern democracy.  In this they were little different to their 
contemporaries.  There was a renewed interest in the classical period, specifically ancient 
Greece, amongst the generation of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  This was particularly pointed 
in regard to ancient democracy.  Debate about the applicability of classical democracy to the 
nineteenth-century spanned the European continent.  Goethe, Hegel, Shelley, and 
Kierkegaard as well as Arnold, Frazer, Nietzsche and Fustel de Coulanges were among a wide 
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variety of scholars, ranging from poets, critics, and historians to philosophers of all kinds that 
played an active part in this debate.341   
Benjamin Constant and Franҫois Guizot took up the baton in France, arguing that the modern 
world was qualitatively different from that of the ancient and had little to learn from its 
illustrious forebear.342  Constant considered the ancient’s inability to conduct a life in private 
inimical to the conditions of the modern era, which had in effect privatized personal lives.343  
Guizot located the source of European civilization not in the Greek world, but in Christianity 
and the Goth’s understanding of moral responsibility, commonality, trust and loyalty.344  In 
England, Lord Macaulay and Edward Bulwer-Lytton agreed with their French counterparts in 
seeing the inapplicability of ancient Greece to contemporary political debate and attempted 
to remove it entirely.345  But, their attitude to the classical world and its applicability was 
representative of the views of only a minority.  Connotations of democracy were still 
encumbered with the heritage of the classical past and the ancient world was retained as an 
important lens through which democracy was understood in the early-nineteenth century.346  
This was markedly prevalent in Chartist publications and the mainstream press in Britain.347   
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However, contemporary debates and examples were no less important.  In Britain, the 
examples offered by revolutionary France and America as well as Chartism, with its demands, 
helped to shape notions of democracy.  It was an idea that contained diverse meanings.  Many 
saw in it the spectre of popular power, of the people’s exercise of political power.348  Others 
saw in it a particular social group that was distinguished from both the monarch and the 
nobility as well as a specific principle that was distinct from the monarchical and aristocratic 
principles.349  Some equated democracy with social and economic, as well as political, 
equalization and la carrière ouverte aux talents350 whilst others identified it primarily with the 
institutional reforms suggested by Chartists in the eponymous ‘People’s Charter’351   
In France, though, the understanding of the contents of this idea varied much less widely.  Of 
course, the Revolution and the recognition of its persistence in the modern world framed 
interpretations of democracy broadly.352  But, this was gradually being superseded by a new 
intellectual synthesis.  ‘Whether on the left of the political spectrum or on the right,’ Michael 
Drolet argued, ‘French political thinkers understood democracy primarily as a form of society, 
defined by social equalization.’353  Democratic society was the result of the destruction of the 
entrenched social divisions that had characterized the ancien régime.354   
In what remains of this chapter it will become evident that Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle 
synthesized these diverse contextual and historical discourses in order to arrive at a 
conception of democracy that was distinct from that of their contemporaries.  It incorporated 
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a political and social dimension that emphasized the break with the past – the ancien régime 
– that Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle had taken such care to establish.   
 
ANCIENT AND MODERN DEMOCRACY   
That Carlyle was an active participant in the debate about ancient democracy and its 
relevance to the modern world should come as no surprise.  He was a voracious reader, 
comfortable with Latin and Greek texts, and well aware of European intellectual trends.  He 
entered this discourse in 1818, in a letter to Robert Mitchell, which contrasted Athens 
favourably to the modern world via the medium of a private difficulty that was then afflicting 
him.  He was a schoolmaster, but had grown bored with the trade.  
Where then would be my comfort?  Had I lived at Athens, in the plastic days of 
that brilliant commonwealth, I might have purchased ‘a narrow paltry tub,’ and 
pleased myself with uttering gall among them of Cynosarges.  But in these times – 
when political institutions and increased civilization have fixed the texture of 
society – when Religion has the privilege of prescribing principles of conduct, from 
which it is a crime to dissent – when, therefore, the aberrations of philosophical 
enthusiasm are rewarded not by admiration but contempt – when Plato would be 
dissected in the Edinr review, and Diogenes laid hold of by a ‘society for the 
suppression of beggars’ – in these times – it may not be.355   
The political and social contours of the modern world were far more restrictive than they had 
been in Athens.  Thus far Carlyle saw little resemblance between the circumstances of the 
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two.  But this was not the last time he would articulate his thoughts on the ancient world.  In 
1838 Carlyle delivered a series of Lectures on the History of Literature in London, of which the 
first three dealt exclusively with the ancients.  The Greeks were feted.  Greece had produced 
‘the first great spirits of our western world’.356  This nation had given birth to the first 
remarkable men in history.  Carlyle’s analysis of Grecian history is divided into three epochs.  
The first ran from the siege of Troy until the Persian invasion, which marked the beginning of 
the second.  The third, and final, epoch began with the invasion of Philip of Macedon.   
For Carlyle, it was in this final period of Grecian history that its splendour was greatest.  ‘It 
was the flower time of Greece…and at this period she developed an efflorescence of genius 
such as no other country ever beheld’.357  Finally, Europe declared her independence from 
the empires of the East in this era.  It bore a startling similarity to Carlyle’s own century.  This 
was due both to the character of the French and the influence of the French Revolution.  
Carlyle perceived ‘a remarkable similarity in character of the French to these Greeks.’358  The 
prime feature of both was a sort of incoherent strength he called ‘vehemence’.  Of the 
Moderns, only the French retained a comparable ‘fiery impetuosity’.359   
More significantly, Carlyle saw in Greek history an episode that mirrored the French 
Revolution.  This was ‘the sedition of Corcyra’, of which Thucydides had written so powerfully.  
‘Here, too, the lower classes were at war upon the higher or aristocrats, as the French would 
have called them.’  It was suspected that the higher orders wished to carry the lower in slavery 
to Athens.  The latter thus imprisoned the former and ‘man after man they were brought out 
of the prison, and then with stabs and pikes they were massacred one after another’.  On 
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learning the fate of their fellow aristocrats the remainder refused to come out when called.  
The mob then massacred them in a hail of arrows.  ‘In short,’ Carlyle maintained, ‘the whole 
scene recalls to the reader the events of September 1792.’360   
Carlyle saw another mirror of the French Revolution in the classical era; this time in the 
everyday life of the Roman Republic.  ‘It appears to have been a very tumultuous kind of 
polity,’ he noted, ‘a continual struggle between the Patricians and the Plebeians, the latter of 
whom were bent on having the lands of the State equally divided between them and the 
upper orders.’  Carlyle bemoaned this turbulent, almost revolutionary, state of affairs and did 
not decry the fall of the Republic when it came.  ‘I cannot join in the lamentation made by 
some over the downfall of the Republic’.361  Given the status of the French Revolution in 
Carlyle’s thought, as the harbinger of modern democracy, the comparison he drew between 
it and classical events is telling.  Here, he emphasizes the anarchy of democratic politics, not 
to mention the class conflict inherent in the kind of polity that is based on competition 
between the rich and the poor, and these are certainly features of his overall notion of 
democracy.   
The similarities Carlyle saw between ancient and modern history went even further into the 
domain of contemporary political debates.  He admired the sense of discipline instilled in and 
by Romans because it tempered the sort of liberty that characterized democratic politics.  
Though he acknowledged that it was not ‘mild’, he thought it was beneficial.  ‘In spite of all 
that has been said and ought to be said about liberty,’ Carlyle remarked, ‘it is true liberty to 
obey the best personal guidance, either out of our own head or out of that of some other.’  
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Clearly, he went on, there is no one who ‘would wish to see some fool wandering about at his 
own will, and without any restraint or direction; we must admit it to be far better for him if 
some wise man were to take charge of him…although it seems but a coarse kind of 
operation.’362   
Carlyle addressed this issue 30 years later in returning to the example of the Roman Republic 
in an inaugural address to students at the University of Edinburgh on being elected to the 
post of Rector.  On this occasion, he cited Machiavelli’s opinion of democracy, which, he told 
his audience, had been given in reference to Rome.  The Italian, Carlyle remarked, ‘in speaking 
of the Romans,’ argued ‘that Democracy cannot long exist anywhere in the world; that as a 
mode of government, of national management or administration, it involves an impossibility, 
and after a little while must end in wreck.’363  Here, democracy is conceived of as a means of 
government or national administration.  It is grounded on a central idea, which Machiavelli, 
Carlyle claims, had denigrated: ‘he considers it a solecism and impossibility that the universal 
mass of men should ever govern themselves.’   
Democracy was founded on the idea that each and every individual was responsible for his 
own governance; at least, Roman republicanism had exemplified this characteristic.  Carlyle 
recounted how Machiavelli had been forced ‘to admit of the Romans, that they continued a 
long time’.  However, Machiavelli believed the longevity of this classical democracy ‘was 
purely in virtue of this item in their constitution, namely, of their having the conviction in their 
minds that it was solemnly necessary, at times, to appoint a Dictator’.364  Carlyle’s notion of 
democracy, therefore, associated it fundamentally with chaos.  His comparisons between the 
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French Revolution and the ancient Republics, not to mention his criticism the sort of freedom 
democracy preferred, attest to this.    
Carlyle’s allusions to the chaotic nature of ancient Republics’ political cultures and what they 
showed modern thinkers when compared to present events did not exhaust his interaction 
with humanist discourse.  ‘Of ancient Republics, and Demoi and Populi,” he wrote in Latter-
Day Pamplets in 1850, ‘we have heard much; but it is now pretty well admitted to be nothing 
to our purpose’.  This was because ‘a universal-suffrage republic, or a general-suffrage one, 
or any but a most-limited-suffrage one, never came to light, or dreamed of doing so, in ancient 
times.’365  The democracies of the ancient world were inapplicable to modern circumstances 
precisely because modern conditions were different.  Universal suffrage, or even calls for it, 
had never been a prospect in the city states of the classical period.  Ironically, Carlyle thought 
that this was part of the reason for their prosperity. 
When the mass of the population were slaves, and the voters intrinsically a kind 
of kings, or men born to rule others; when the voters were real ‘aristocrats’ and 
manageable dependents of such, - the doubtless voting, and confused jumbling of 
talk and intrigue, might, without immediate destruction…go on; and beautiful 
developments of manhood might be possible beside it, for a season.366   
Three years later, Carlyle was reading Plato’s Republic for the first time in 40 years in an 
attempt to unlock its political wisdom.  He told Ralph Waldo Emerson as much in 1853.  ‘I was 
much struck with Plato, last year, and his notions about Democracy’.367  On receiving a new 
                                                          
365 CE XX, p.18.   
366 Ibid, p.19.   
367 Carlyle Letters Online: http://carlyleletters.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/full/28/1/lt-18530513-TC-RWE-01 
109 
 
copy of The Republic from a friend in 1852, Carlyle wrote back declaring that the ‘Divine Plato 
is always welcome to me’.368   
What does all of this show us about Carlyle and his notion of democracy?  Firstly, it 
demonstrates how significant the example of ancient cultures was to his understanding of the 
contours of democracy.  Carlyle contrasted the idea of democracy present in contemporary 
political discourse, which included the notion of universal suffrage, with that of the ancient 
republics and found classical democracies wanting in this regard.  Furthermore, he saw in 
these republics the ideas of liberty and individual responsibility.  These were important 
concepts to modern democrats.  They had been of similar importance to the ancients.  Carlyle 
thought that such ideas had led to periodic crises that had to be corrected by the existence 
of a dictator.  Democracy was chaos in Carlyle’s view.   
Classical practices had denied the majority political power, which was fundamental to 
democracy.  Carlyle expressed this notion in an essay on ‘National Education’ in 1835.  He 
thought that the ‘Democratic Force in England which had long been increasing, has hence 
forth become irresistible, if still more or less modifiable’.  The Scotsman argued ‘that while 
new results of all kinds are rapidly shaping themselves, it is the mass of the people mainly 
which will decide their shape; that with the mass of the people the whole destiny of all classes 
in England now lies.’369  The democratic force of which he wrote was synonymous with 
popular power.  In its absence something other than a democracy existed.   
Aligned to popular authority, Carlyle explained, was a mode of expression that characterized 
democracy.  It was ‘considered a kind of ‘Government’’, Carlyle noted with some scorn.  But 
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what kind of government?  Parliamentary.  In 1839, he told his readers that ‘Democracy, we 
are well aware, what is called ‘self-government’ of the multitude by the multitude, is in words 
the thing everywhere passionately clamoured for at present.’370  It had been ‘modelled into 
suffrages’ and ‘furnished with ballot-boxes’.371  ‘The old model, formed long since,’ he 
continued, ‘and brought to perfection in England now two hundred years ago, has proclaimed 
itself to all Nations as the new healing for every woe: “Set-up a parliament; let us have 
suffrages, universal suffrages’.372   
Thus, Carlyle’s understanding of democracy was related to particular institutions, popular 
engagement, and a notion of liberty that in many ways reflect our own conceptions of such a 
form of government.  A democracy had to rely on active popular engagement in the political 
process.  This was regularized through the development of certain types of institution, such 
as parliaments.  Without these, particularly mass engagement through widespread suffrage, 
no system of government could claim to be democratic in Carlyle’s understanding of that 
term.  It was for exactly this reason that Carlyle had rejected the example provided by ancient 
democracy.  It is important to note here that this notion of democracy is entirely political.  
Carlyle emphasized the institutional requirements and modes of election in order to define 
the democratic.   
Whilst still struggling to come to terms with his awe, bordering on incredulity, at what he was 
witnessing on the other side of the Atlantic, Tocqueville, in 1835, offered a similar outcry 
against the fallacious comparisons that many of his contemporaries were attempting to draw 
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between the democratic states of the classical past and modern democracies, such as the 
United States.   
When I compare the Greek and Roman republics to these republics of America, 
the manuscript libraries of the first and their coarse populace, to the thousand 
newspapers that crisscross the second and to the enlightened people that inhabit 
the republics of America; when I then think of all the efforts that are still made to 
judge the one with the aid of the others and to foresee what will happen today by 
what happened two thousand years ago, I am tempted to burn my books in order 
to apply only new ideas to a social state so new.373   
What Tocqueville was trying to explain to his readers was how the United States and, by 
extension, all modern democratic countries, differed entirely from their ancient predecessors.  
The experience of the ancient world could shed no light on humanity’s present predicament.  
Tocqueville’s notes on the 1840 volume of the Démocratie expressed, once again, his 
frustration with those who persisted with such useless comparisons.  ‘I do not know when 
people will tire of comparing the democracy of our time with what bore the same name in 
antiquity.  The differences between these two things reveal themselves at every turn.’374  
Much like Carlyle, Tocqueville thought the ancient city states were essentially aristocratic in 
nature.375   
                                                          
373 Tocqueville, Démocratie, pp.490-491.  His father, Hervé de Tocqueville, thought this an overstatement.  In his 
comments on this section of the text he wrote: ‘I do not like this idea. Why would you burn your books because 
a thousand newspapers crisscross the territory of the Union?’  See Tocqueville, Démocratie, p.491n.   
374 Ibid, p.795n.   
375 This is one example of Tocqueville’s famously comparative method of understanding political and social 
issues.  The central duality that runs throughout Tocqueville’s entire oeuvre is that of aristocracy vs. democracy.  
Though his comparative mode of analysis encompasses geographical and chronological juxtapositions as well as 
that of aristocracy and democracy, it is the last of these that is best known.  For an in depth analysis of 
Tocqueville’s comparative approach, see M. Richter, ‘Comparative Political Analysis in Montesquieu and 
112 
 
For me, I do not need to think about slavery or other reasons that lead me to 
regard the Greeks as very aristocratic nations despite some democratic 
institutions that are found in their midst.  I agree not to open Aristotle to finish 
persuading me.  It is enough for me to contemplate the statues that these peoples 
have left.  I cannot believe that the man who made the Belvedere Apollo emerge 
from marble worked in a democracy.376   
Tocqueville considered the republics of the classical era to be of absolutely no relevance to 
modern democracies.  They had been characterized by entrenched social inequality.  This was 
at the root of their cruellest excesses – such as slavery, for example – and their finest 
achievements.   
The emphasis that Tocqueville placed on the social basis of political regimes appeared again 
in the 1840 volume of his Démocratie.  Here, he referred to the Ancients once more:  ‘In 
Athens, all citizens took part in public affairs; but there were only twenty thousand citizens 
out of more than three hundred fifty thousand inhabitants’.  The rest ‘were slaves and fulfilled 
most of the functions that today belong to the people and even to the middle classes.’  
‘Athens,’ he went on, ‘with its universal suffrage, was, after all, only an aristocratic republic 
in which all the nobles had an equal right to government.’  ‘Rome’, Tocqueville averred, must 
be considered ‘in the same light’377   
Tocqueville made similar remarks in considering Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories in 1836.  In 
his notes to these, which he read whilst travelling through Switzerland, he wondered if the 
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Florentine republic was analogous to modern democratic states.378  Tocqueville decided that 
at no time had Florence been democratic, because it had never possessed a democratic social 
state of the sort he had outlined in the Démocratie.379   
From the foundation of the Florentine republic in 1255 until 1343, the city had not 
only an aristocratie, but also a noblesse, or body of nobles (un corps de nobles) 
which exercised feudal dominion over the countryside surrounding the city…This 
noblesse possessed considerable wealth, which was transmitted by the laws of 
inheritance…No one could call this state of affairs a democratic type of society 
(état social démocratique).380 
After the noblesse fell from its predominant position in 1343, a new aristocracy of wealth 
replaced what had been one of birth.381  Despite the change in Tocqueville’s mode of analysis 
– from an aristocracy of birth to one of wealth – the result remained the same: radical, 
entrenched social inequality.  Ancient and medieval republics differed from their modern 
counterparts because they had ‘been governed by aristocratic rather than democratic 
principles.’382   
Despite their rejection of ancient and, for Tocqueville, Renaissance republics, did these 
republics’ features contribute anything to Tocqueville’s and Carlyle’s conception of 
democracy itself?383  Yes.  They helped them define what democracy was not and could not 
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be.  In so doing Tocqueville and Carlyle were able to understand more easily what constituted 
democracy in the modern world.   
Carlyle’s understanding of ancient republics’ undemocratic nature was grounded on primarily 
political considerations: the nature and extent of the electoral franchise.  Carlyle admired the 
manner in which the Roman Republic had set limits to the sort of democratic liberty heralded 
by many of his contemporaries.  Ancient democracy had been, in Carlyle’s view, a totally 
different animal to its modern counterpart.  Tocqueville, on the other hand, divided the 
political and the social, only considering the latter.  By the time he began to write on this sort 
of stage, Cheryl Welch argued, the distinction between the political and the social spheres of 
life had become commonplace.384  Indeed, the development of these separate domains of 
categorization has been traced by Frederick Neuhouser.385  Tocqueville thought that 
humanity had entered a new social state, which could be called democratic, and that this was 
totally unprecedented.  Democracy, in this sense, was a new phenomenon and comparisons 
with republican pasts were redundant for that reason.386   
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But Tocqueville, like Carlyle, came to possess an alternative and competing rights-based 
notion of democracy.  Melvin Richter recently charted the apparent development of this 
aspect of Tocqueville’s thought.  He traced the Frenchman’s changing conception of 
democracy from an initial position, which was ‘primarily social’, to one that incorporated 
elements ‘both social and political’ and, finally, to another that was ‘primarily political.’387  
According to Richter, France’s revolutionary experiences were the main drivers of this change.  
The revolution of 1848 and the subsequent coup d’état of 1851 accounted for Tocqueville’s 
radical alteration of Guizot’s conception of democracy as a social construct.388  Richter’s 
account built on that of Pierre Manent, who also perceived a unity of political and social 
democracy in Tocqueville’s work.389  Tocqueville came to think of democracy, Jennings 
concluded, ‘as both a political and a social principle, as a principle of both government and 
civil society.’390 
Mill took a different approach to classical democracy.  Like his friend, the Philosophic Radical 
George Grote, he expressed almost unbounded admiration for the Athenian polity.  Both 
thought that the Moderns could learn valuable lessons from their ancient counterpart.391  The 
influence of ancient Greek thought and practice on Mill has been charted by others and my 
intention is not to recapitulate that here.392  I only wish to show how it influenced his notion 
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of democracy.  Mill thought that the Greek heritage had been totally distorted by 
contemporary historians and polemicists.  He declared that ‘Athenian democracy had been 
so outrageously, and without measure, misrepresented’ by those who had formerly sought 
to depict it.  Anyone who had read ‘Thucydides and the orators with decent intelligence and 
candour, could easily perceive that the vulgar representation [it had been subjected to] was 
very wide of the truth’.  Fortunately, the ‘mountain of error’ that had amassed around the 
subject had been largely dispelled by the efforts of Dr. Thirlwall and Grote.  The latter in 
particular, ‘so constantly on his guard against letting his conclusions outrun his proofs’, had 
arrived at a considerable ‘positive and certifiable result.’393   
Nonetheless, Mill continued to lament the eighteenth century’s unfavourable interpretation 
of Athenian democracy, which was a staple of nineteenth-century discourse.394  Mill staunchly 
defended Athens from this sort of ridicule and asserted the inconsistency of this 
interpretation with the facts.  Grote had, more than anyone else, vindicated this incarnation 
of democracy against these claims.  He had shown that: 
Athenian government was of surpassing excellence, its time and circumstances 
considered; that no other form of society known to the ancients realized 
anything approaching to an equal measure of practical good government; and 
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that this was mainly owing to the nearer approach which it made to democratic 
institutions.395 
Mill’s understanding of why Athenian democracy offered a positive picture gives us some 
comprehension of how he had come to conceive of democracy itself.  He thought that Athens 
had ‘many important points in common with democracy.’396   
It was a government of unlimited publicity, and freedom of censure and 
discussion.  Public officers were subject to effective responsibility.  The tribunals, 
being multitudinous and appointed by lot, were, like modern juries, generally 
incorrupt.  And there was no distinction in political rights and franchises between 
poor and rich, lowborn and highborn.397   
These were traits of democracy Mill was to refer to again three years later, in 1853, in an 
extended piece on Grote’s History for the Edinburgh Review.  The ‘Athenian Constitution’ was 
democratic in as much as it possessed a feature ‘more practically important than even the 
political franchise; it was a government of boundless publicity and freedom of speech’, which 
was the equal of modern liberty of the press.  Moreover, it was an open and equal society in 
one crucial respect.  ‘Every office and honour was open to every citizen, not, as in the 
aristocratic Roman republic (or even the British monarchy), almost nominally, but really’.398  
Finally, it really ‘was government by a multitude, composed in majority of poor persons – 
small landed proprietors and artisans.’399   
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Mill qualified his acceptance of Athenian democracy and his caveat seriously impinged on its 
applicability to modern society.  He acknowledged that Athens was not an example of a 
‘democracy in the full sense of the term’ because ‘women, slaves, and a multitude of 
permanent residents of all ranks and classes were not citizens’.  They could not take part in 
the political process, nor were they even recognised by the constitution of the state itself.400  
Mill returned to this theme in 1853 and drew an explicit parallel between the ancient and 
modern worlds.  He argued that the Greek republics were as entitled to the democratic 
designation as ‘the northern States of America’, which, much like the Greek governments, 
excluded women and slaves ‘from the rights of citizenship’.  Nonetheless, Mill claimed, this 
was ‘an exclusion which…militates against the democratic principle.’401  He drew attention to 
this once more in his Considerations.  There are two ‘very different’ notions of democracy, he 
told his readers, which ‘are usually confounded’ under the same name.402   
The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the 
whole people by the whole people, equally represented.  Democracy, as 
commonly conceived and hitherto practiced, is the government of the whole 
people by a mere majority of the people exclusively represented.403   
In his view, only the ‘former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens’.  The ‘latter’, he 
argued, ‘is a government of privilege in favour of the numerical majority, who alone possess 
practically any voice in the State.’404  The latter represented nothing more than a form of class 
government.  Mill’s discussion of antiquity and his thoughts on the possibility of class 
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government reveal something fundamental about his notion of democracy that is little 
emphasized.  It is now a commonplace to claim that his perception of democracy was 
grounded on the example of the Athenian republic.  This was a primarily political 
understanding that stressed particular institutional arrangements.  By and large Mill’s 
statements support this conclusion.  However, there is clearly a sociological element to his 
reflections.  States that claimed to be democratic and maintained an element of entrenched 
social inequality could not be described as democracies.   
Unlike Tocqueville and Carlyle, Mill saw in classical democracy much that was to be admired 
and, in fact, a great deal that was relevant to the contemporary world.  The political 
dimensions of it were significant for Mill and the fact that it was a government exercised by a 
poor multitude was clearly a characteristic part of what made it a working democracy in his 
view.  Other features such as equality of opportunity, equal access to justice and, crucially, 
freedom of speech were as important as equal electoral rights in a country being defined as 
a democratic state.  These were aspects of government and society that were replicable in 
the modern world.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle offered their readers distinct perspectives on 
ancient democracy.  Nonetheless, ancient examples provided them with a means of 
understanding their modern counterparts.  Democracy in the modern world connoted 
something different to that which had gone before.  Crucial to this was the dynamic of social 
equality, which formed an important element of the conceptions of democracy formed by 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.   
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THE NATURE OF SOCIETY: DEMOCRACY AS EQUALITY OF CONDITIONS   
Tocqueville, as we have seen, objected to the democratic claims of the ancient and medieval 
republics primarily on sociological grounds.  This was because – despite Melvin Richter’s 
recent remarks and in accordance with Drolet’s assessment of French intellectual currents – 
the basis of Tocqueville’s understanding of democracy was primarily sociological.405  
‘Democracy’, he wrote in 1835, ‘constitutes the social state; the dogma of the sovereignty of 
the people, the political law.’  In the following paragraph he went even further.  ‘These two 
things are not analogous.  Democracy is society’s way of being.  Sovereignty of the people, a 
form of government.’406   
Popular sovereignty was only a form of government because it could be separated from 
democracy in practice.  Tocqueville announced it as a fact that ‘democracy is even more 
compatible with despotism than with liberty’.  Regardless of whether these features were 
likely to appear together, due to their ‘correlative’ nature as well as the fact that popular 
sovereignty ‘is always more or less a fiction wherever democracy is not established’, 
democracy itself did not have to rest on popular sovereignty.407  It was thus a social 
framework on which particular political forms were overlaid.   
Whatever its shape equality of conditions was the generative force at the bottom of any 
democratic society or, as Pierre Manent explained, equality ‘is the common centre of 
democratic societies, and it prevails in them all, more or less.’408  Tocqueville reinforced this 
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point in his notes in the margin of the manuscript of the Démocratie, though the ambiguity 
that was to impair his work had already begun to appear.  In a telling reminder to himself in 
the gloss accompanying the main text, he wrote that ‘the social state must never be confused 
with the political laws that follow from it; equality or inequality of conditions, which are facts, 
with democracy or aristocracy, which are laws.’409   
Social equality was crucial to Tocqueville’s understanding of democracy.  This followed from 
his understanding of the work of Guizot and the other Doctrinaires, such as Pierre-Paul Royer-
Collard, that he had encountered in what Siedentop labelled the great debates of Restoration 
era France.410  In line with Tocqueville, Mill also created a direct link between the balance of 
power in society and that extant in the political institutions of the state.  On Liberty confirmed 
the distinction that Mill had made between social and political democracy.  He told his readers 
that ‘There is confessedly a strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic 
constitution of society, accompanied or not by popular political institutions.’411  The country 
in which ‘this tendency is most completely realised’ or, put alternatively, ‘where both society 
and the government are most democratic’, is ‘the United States’.412   
But where had this come from?  Where had Mill learned to distinguish between social and 
political democracy in this way?  Given his knowledge and understanding of Tocqueville, not 
to mention their close correspondence for several years, it is tempting to attribute this aspect 
of Mill’s thought to the Frenchman.  But, Tocqueville seems to have reinforced rather than 
fostered Mill’s appreciation of this subtlety.  Mill’s francophilia heavily influenced him in this 
respect.  The very same debates that had so influenced Tocqueville during the 1820s had 
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exerted a decided impact upon Mill and his thought.  In reflecting on the work of Guizot, Mill 
came to see in democracy the emergence of a new egalitarian society of the sort Tocqueville 
described.  In a now famous 1835 letter to Joseph Blanco White, Mill not only demonstrated 
his own debt to Guizot, but made an implicit connection between Tocqueville’s work and 
Guizot’s thought.   
I have begun to read Tocqueville.  It seems an excellent book: uniting considerable 
graphic power, with the capacity of generalizing on the history of society, which 
distinguishes the best French philosophers of the present day, & above all, 
bringing out the peculiarities of American society, & making the whole stand 
before the reader as a powerful picture. — Did you ever read Guizot’s Lectures?  
If not, pray do.413   
Five years later, in a letter to Robert Barclay Fox, Mill emphasized his connection to Guizot.  ‘I 
have dinned into people’s ears’, he wrote, ‘that Guizot is a great thinker & writer, till they are, 
though slowly, beginning to read him – which I do not believe they would be doing, even yet, 
in this country but for me.’414   
Guizot’s influence over Mill was profound.  Two essays in particular, both extensive pieces, 
attest to his enduring influence over Mill: Civilization (1836) and Guizot’s Essays and Lectures 
on History (1845).  In the latter, Mill signalled his acquiescence to Guizot’s notion of socially 
determined conditions; that is, the idea that the social disposition of any society is responsible 
for the laws, habits, and conventions that characterize it.  This had certainly been the case in 
ancient societies.  ‘Some one idea’, Mill confirmed, ‘seems to have presided over the social 
                                                          
413 CW XII, p.259.   
414 CW XIII, p.57.   
123 
 
framework, and to have been carried out in all its consequences, without encountering on 
the way any counterbalancing or limiting principle.’415  ‘Some one element, some one power 
in society,’ Mill continued, ‘seems to have early attained predominance, and extinguished all 
other agencies which could exercise an influence over society capable of conflicting with its 
own.’416   
Some societies had been under the influence of a theocratic principle, others had operated 
under the aegis of a military caste or aristocratic body.  Still others had been dominated by 
‘the democratic principle.’  As an animating force, the principle of democracy in this sense 
was characterized by the ‘sovereignty of the majority, and the equal participation of all male 
citizens in the administration of the State’.  These were ‘the leading facts by which the aspect 
of those societies was determined.’417  Mill understood that modern democracy was as much 
social as it was political.  In Civilization, Mill thought that the progress of civilization carried 
‘irresistible consequences’ in its wake.418  The ‘most remarkable’ consequence of the 
progressive movement of civilization, Mill thought, was ‘that power passes more and more 
from individuals, and small knots of individuals, to masses’.  Or, in other words, ‘the 
importance of the masses becomes constantly greater, that of individuals less.’419  This was a 
sociological fact that had a demonstrable historical trajectory.     
An extension of both material and mental acquirements was at the root of this movement.  
Property and intelligence had been diffused much wider than ever before, and this was a self-
perpetuating process.  These changes amounted to ‘the greatest ever recorded in human 
                                                          
415 CW XX, p.267.   
416 Ibid.   
417 Ibid.   
418 CW XVIII, p.119.   
419 Ibid, p.121.   
124 
 
affairs’.  At this point Mill quoted Tocqueville’s prescription for the modern age: ‘Il faut…une 
science politique nouvelle à un monde tout nouveau.’420  It was futile to attempt to maintain 
and protect the outward manifestations of aristocratic power when society had changed 
beyond all recognition. 
The whole face of society is reversed – all the natural elements of power have 
definitively changed places, and there are people who talk to us of standing up 
for ancient institutions, and the duty of sticking to the British Constitution 
settled in 1688!421   
Mill returned to this theme in his Considerations.  In the first chapter, Mill was at pains to 
understand whether the form of government present in any given society is a matter of choice 
or otherwise.  ‘The government of a country, it is affirmed, is, in all substantial respects, fixed 
and determined beforehand by the state of the country in regard to the distribution of the 
elements of social power.’422  Was this an accurate or fair reflection of reality?  It was only 
true if, as Mill had already demonstrated in 1836, the elements of ‘property and intelligence’ 
were added to ‘mere muscular strength’.423  Once this was accepted, government could not 
but be admitted to be dependent upon social conditions.  However, that was not to say that 
only one sort of government could suit a particular set of conditions.  In fact, the notion ‘that 
the government of a country is what the social forces in existence compel it to be, is true only 
in the sense in which it favours…the attempt to exercise, among all forms of government 
practicable in the existing condition of society, a rational choice.’424   
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In the modern world, these changes highlighted something fundamental that he clearly 
wanted to communicate to his readers.  They were the clarion call that announced the advent 
of democracy.  It was the only viable choice, in his view, given the social disposition of the 
era.  ‘The triumph of democracy,’ he had told his readers in 1836, ‘or, in other words, of the 
government of public opinion, does not depend upon the opinion of any individual or set of 
individuals that it ought to triumph, but upon the natural laws of the progress of wealth, upon 
the diffusion of reading, and the increase of the faculties of human intercourse.’425   
Democracy’s social foundations were clear and they were already in place throughout Europe.  
The disjunction between the social and the political situation, though, was a potential source 
of conflict, which is why Tocqueville had recommended a new political science.  Mill, for his 
part, agreed with Tocqueville.  ‘The distribution of constitutional power’, he concluded, 
‘cannot long continue very different from that of real power, without a convulsion.’426  
Democracy was a fact in the contemporary world.  Guizot and Tocqueville, through their 
respective works, had demonstrated this adequately to a receptive Mill.  The social nature of 
democracy could not be denied.  This complimented Mill’s already well-developed sense of 
the political requirements of a democracy properly so defined.   
Carlyle also introduced an important distinction into his figuring of democracy that separated 
the political and social spheres.  In one of his many reformist essays in Latter-Day Pamphlets, 
‘Downing Street’, he drew a picture of democracy that would sit more comfortably alongside 
those of contemporary French Doctrinaires, such as Guizot or Charles de Rémusat.  ‘For the 
sake of our Democratic friends,’ Carlyle offered ‘one other observation’ on democracy.427   
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Is not this Proposal the very essence of whatever truth there is in ‘Democracy’; 
this, that the able man be chosen, in whatever rank he is found?  That he be 
searched for as hidden treasure is; be trained, supervised, set to the work he alone 
is fit for.428   
‘All Democracy lies in this’, Carlyle claimed, and this was equal to the ‘worth’ of ‘all the ballot-
boxes and suffrage movements now going.’  Social equality, which implied a commitment to 
equal access to careers (particularly those that were governmental in nature), was the truth 
that Carlyle found in democracy.  It was the aspect of its portents that he admired.  ‘Not that 
the noble soul, born poor, should be set to spout in Parliament, but that he should be set to 
assist in governing men: this is our grand Democratic interest.’429  ‘True democracy’, then, in 
Carlyle’s view, ‘was a democracy of work where everybody had an equal chance of finding 
useful employment.’430  Carlyle implored ‘reformers, constitutional persons, and men capable 
of reflection’ to consider this.  Social equality was the means by which democracy and 
aristocracy could be conjoined and the benefits of both realized.  Carlyle was eager to know 
‘By what method or methods can the able men from every rank of life be gathered, as 
diamond-grains from the general mass of sand: the able men, not the sham-able; - and set to 
do the work of governing, contriving, administering and guiding us!’431  ‘All that Democracy 
ever meant’, he thought, ‘lies there: the attainment of a truer and truer Aristocracy, or 
Government again by the Best.’432   
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In Carlyle’s estimation, then, democracy was synonymous with social equality and equality of 
opportunity.  It was this that enabled the development of the sort of meritocracy that he 
evidently longed for.  Carlyle would have seen social equality’s equation with democracy in 
the opening pages of Tocqueville’s Démocratie, which his letters confirm he read.433  Here, he 
would have encountered the ideas of Guizot in a mediated form.  Despite his perusal of 
Tocqueville, his feelings about social equality and equal access to careers for the talented had 
a longer pedigree.  On the one hand it emanated from his religious views.  ‘All men, we must 
repeat, were made by God,’ Carlyle wrote in Chartism, ‘and have immortal souls in them.’  
This represented an underlying equality that Carlyle felt was undeniable.  ‘The Sanspotato’ – 
an ironic reference to the Irish – ‘is of the selfsame stuff as the superfinest Lord Lieutenant.’434  
On the other hand, it derived from his appreciation of Napoleon and the French Revolution.  
In an 1838 piece on Sir Walter Scott Carlyle set this out clearly.   
Napoleon himself, not the superfinest of great men, and ballasted sufficiently with 
prudence and egoisms, had nevertheless…an idea to start with: the idea that 
Democracy was the Cause of Man, the right and infinite cause.435   
That Napoleon was apparently ‘the armed Soldier of Democracy’ and, according to Carlyle, 
‘did vindicate it in a rather great manner’ might have struck contemporary readers – and still 
does modern readers – as a strange sentiment.  How could a man who had himself proclaimed 
as First Consul for life and then Emperor of France be described as ‘the armed Soldier of 
Democracy’?436  Carlyle did not leave his readers waiting for an explanation.   
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Nay, to the very last, he had a kind of idea; that, namely, of ‘La carrière ouverte 
aux talents, The tools to him that can handle them’; really one of the best ideas 
yet promulgated on that matter, or rather the one true central idea, towards 
which all others, if they tend anywhither, must tend.437   
In his final essay On Heroes, in 1840, Carlyle returned to this issue once more.  This ‘new 
enormous Democracy’ that had asserted itself ‘in the French Revolution’ as ‘an insuppressible 
Fact’ was indicative of one truth:  ‘La carrière ouverte aux talents, The implements to him who 
can handle them’; this actually is the truth, and even the whole truth; it includes whatever 
the French Revolution, or any Revolution, could mean.’438  Carlyle argued that it was in this 
sense that ‘Napoleon, in his first period, was a true Democrat.’439   
Modern democracy was not what it had been in the classical world.  The differences were 
clear to Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  However, Mill emphasized the applicability of the 
classical example of democracy to the modern world where Tocqueville and Carlyle denied it.  
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle welded distinct currents of thought, ancient and modern, into a 
new conception of democracy.  This demarcation allowed them to expand the idea of 
democracy to include a notion of equality that was not implicit in classical conceptions.   
The principal achievement of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle lay in the separation of democracy’s 
political and social spheres.  It is this demarcation that will be pursued in the following two 
chapters.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle, as I have shown, thought that democracy was 
unavoidable in the modern world.  As a result, they committed themselves to examining its 
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meaning and the problems that arose from it.  The former has been discussed in the present 
chapter; the latter will be addressed in the following two chapters.   
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CHAPTER 4 
ON THE PROBLEMS OF A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL STATE   
Democracy was the force that characterized the modern world.  For Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle this was a fact.  It was the end towards which the transitional movement from the 
debris of the ancien régime to the modern world was progressing and it had implications for 
both politics and society.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were acutely aware of the dangers 
posed by this novel social and political form.440  Tocqueville went to the United States in order 
to see ‘if democracy could be made safe for the world.’441  Mill felt the danger posed by the 
unchecked force of the numerical majority in a democracy.442  ‘It is well known’, Rosen 
asserted, ‘that Mill was highly ambivalent about the virtues of modern democracy and, like 
Tocqueville, was critical and fearful of the tyranny of the majority.’443   
Mill’s hopes for the future of that majority, according to C.L. Ten, ‘were tempered by his fears 
about letting them dominate social and political life in their present unenlightened state.’444  
Carlyle, despite the fact that he was among democrats, mistrusted democracy perhaps more 
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than any of his contemporaries.445  ‘Government’, John Morrow argued of Carlyle’s view, 
‘existed only where the less able were placed under the careful superintendence of the more 
able.  Democracy…was, in fact, the consummation of non-government since it left the less 
able to their own devices.’446   
However, the strength of their suspicions about the problems democracy posed to the 
modern world are difficult to judge.  Graeme Duncan maintained that Mill’s distrust of 
democracy was so strong that his strictures on the subject leave his view looking distinctly 
like a form of ‘democratic Platonism’.447  Joel Johnson also highlighted Mill’s Platonic critique 
of democracy.448  Rosen categorically rejected this assertion as did Urbinati.449  Francis and 
Morrow asserted that ‘if one assembled all of Mill’s statements on democracy it would be 
easy to demonstrate that he…was convinced that democracy was an unfortunate 
phenomenon which would have to be tolerated.’450  Nevertheless, William Stafford claimed 
that Mill was more pro-democracy than Tocqueville and that he failed, as a consequence, to 
‘do full justice’ to the latter’s doubts about its desirability.451   
Jack Lively’s view accorded with that of Stafford.  He argued that it was difficult to think of 
Tocqueville as an ‘ardent advocate of political democracy’ and claimed that the Frenchman 
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only supported democracy because he thought the alternative would be worse.452  G.A. Kelly 
believed that Tocqueville accepted democracy’s inevitability, which he had proclaimed of 
course, with some apprehension and became gradually more fearful of democratic passions 
as his life progressed.453  ‘Tocqueville’s view of democracy was neither very broad nor very 
enthusiastic’, Soltau argued; ‘he nowhere comes out as the bold champion of positive 
democracy as the participation of all in the business of government, as did Michelet, Quinet 
and their school.’454   
Carlyle feared democracy’s incompetence more than the power of the mob, according to 
Roper, and in thinking that the free rein of the majority would make bad social conditions 
worse he approached Mill’s view by a different route.455  B.E. Lippincott was the first to assert 
Carlyle’s similarity to Plato in his criticism of democracy.456  Johnson expanded this and 
incorporated an aesthetic dimension that he claimed Carlyle drew from Platonic discourse.457  
The Scotsman was, Johnson maintained, at the root of a nineteenth-century critical discourse 
that reworked Plato’s oligarchic ideal of wealth gathering, presented in The Republic, and 
applied it to modern democracy.458  Morrow was clear that, for Carlyle, political democracy 
was synonymous with the minimization of state action.  The consequence was disastrous, 
Carlyle thought, ‘because it places political control in the hands of those most in need of 
guidance and regulation.’459 
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These different views on Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle show that each was highly critical of 
democracy.  Furthermore, much of the criticism Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle levelled at 
democracy was directed from a similar vantage point.  There are a number of areas in which 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle agreed in censuring the propensities of modern democracy.  This 
chapter, alongside the next, will outline the areas in which their extensive misgivings about 
democracy intermingled.  The views espoused by Mill and Tocqueville are well-known today, 
Carlyle’s less so.  Carlyle has been written off as irrelevant due to his avowed opposition to 
political democracy, where Tocqueville and Mill were critical friends.  This reflects our own 
normative conceptions more than Carlyle’s views.  Stafford has expressed this best in his 
assessment of Mill.   
Today, democracy is routine, taken for granted.  Questions have become closed 
which were open in Mill’s day.  This does not mean that our answers are right; it 
means that we no longer pose the questions.460   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle did pose questions about the consequences of democracy’s 
triumph for institutional viability, the quality of leadership, authority, the status of the 
individual relative to the mass and the sociability or otherwise of those who lived amongst it.  
It is to these issues that both the present and the following chapter are dedicated.   
 
DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATURES   
Once legislative bodies had assumed sovereign authority they were prone to acting 
improperly.  Imbued with the consent and authority of the majority representatives tended 
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to debate rather than act.  In a letter to Carlyle, in the mid-1830s, Mill voiced just such a 
criticism.  Writing in Carlyle’s idiosyncratic dialect, Mill appeared to proffer an image of the 
hero that he came to reject in later years.  It is closer to Carlyle’s notion of the heroic man’s 
task than some scholars would like to admit and in stark contrast to the expressions of faith 
in democracy that are commonly cited by admirers of Mill and his works.   
‘I can perfectly sympathize’, he wrote, ‘in Bonaparte’s contempt of the government of 
bavards: talking is one thing and doing another: but while every corner of the land has sent 
forth its noisy blockhead to talk, over head I am near enough to see the real men of work, and 
of head for work, who are quietly getting the working part of the machine into their hands, 
and will be masters of it’.  Parliament was characterized as a ‘meddling and ignorant 
assembly’, from which only the influence of one man, a hero, could save society from ill 
consequences.461  Mill maintained that if his contemporaries:  
...let even one man come, who with honesty, & intellect to appreciate these 
working men, has the power of leading a mob, – no rare combination formerly, 
though a very rare one now; and there will be as good a government as there can 
be until there shall be a better people.462   
‘How long’, Mill concluded this passage by asking, ‘is this dreary work [in Parliament] to last; 
before a man appears?’463  Mill’s admirers have attempted to account and apologize for this 
outburst.  John Robson attributed Mill’s criticism of parliamentary government to ‘his desire 
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to please and learn’ from Carlyle but, Robson claimed, such pronouncements lessened as he 
gradually grew apart from his Scottish counterpart as the decade progressed.464   
However, Carlyle was not the only source through which Mill accessed ideas hostile to 
democracy or the notion of the heroic man in society.465  Richard Reeves argued that during 
the period in question Mill had been captured by conservative ‘wolves’ in the wake of his 
personal crisis.  These wolves, it is argued, took hold of Mill’s political and social thought.466  
This seems even less tenable.  Mill may have been suffering the after effects of his 
estrangement from strict Utilitarianism, but his independence remained intact.   
Whatever the source, Mill concluded in the 1830s that democratic bodies could degenerate 
into assemblies of bavards.  He denied the existence of this problem in the Considerations in 
1861.  But his newfound respect for parliamentary institutions was qualified by a proposed 
separation of responsibilities.  Mill argued that although ‘Representative assemblies are often 
taunted by their enemies with being places of mere talk and bavardage’, he struggled to think 
of ‘a more misplaced derision.’467   
I know not how a representative assembly can more usefully employ itself than in 
talk, when the subject of talk is the great public interests of the country, and every 
sentence of it represents the opinion either of some important body of persons in 
                                                          
464 Robson, Improvement of Mankind, pp.84-85.   
465 Mill was exposed to heroic figures as part of the infamous education he received at the hands of his father.  
‘He was fond of putting into my hands books’, Mill wrote, ‘which exhibited men of energy and  resource in 
unusual circumstances, struggling against difficulties and overcoming them’.  Mill, Autobiography, p.30.  ‘Long 
before I had enlarged in any considerable degree, the basis of my intellectual creed,’ Mill told his readers, ‘I had 
obtained in the natural course of my mental progress, poetic culture of the most valuable kind, by means of 
reverential admiration for the lives and characters of heroic persons; especially the heroes of philosophy.’  Mill, 
Autobiography, p.99.   
466 The conservative influences that Reeves identified were Coleridge, Goethe, Tocqueville, Comte and Carlyle.  
See Reeves, pp.106-128.   
467 CW XIX, pp.432-433.   
136 
 
the nation, or of an individual in whom some such body have reposed their 
confidence.468   
But this endorsement only held true, Mill thought, ‘if assemblies knew and acknowledged 
that talking and discussion are their proper business, while doing, as the result of discussion, 
is the task not of a miscellaneous body, but of individuals specially trained to it’.  Legislative 
bodies were useful as fora in which assent or other otherwise could be given to legislative 
measures; but, they were wholly unfit ‘to govern and legislate’.469   
Tocqueville was under no illusion on this front either.  In a chapter in the second volume of 
his Démocratie, on ‘Parliamentary Eloquence’ in the United States, he recorded his horror at 
the sheer ineffectiveness of the Congressional system.  Typically, he abstracted his criticisms 
from the practical effects of a state of democratic equality.  ‘All of the laws that tend to make 
the elected more dependent on the voter’, he wrote, ‘modify not only the conduct of the 
legislators…but also their language.’470   
You can count on the fact that such a system will fill the assembly with mediocre 
men and that all the mediocre men whom it sends there will make as many efforts 
to appear as if they were superior men.471   
The consequences of these acts of self-aggrandizement were clear.  In an effort to attract the 
attention of peers and voters alike, representatives would make discussion in democratic 
assemblies ‘vague and muddled’.  The assembly would ‘crawl toward the goal that is proposed 
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rather than marching towards it.’  This, Tocqueville thought, was a curse particular to ‘the 
public assemblies of democracies.’472   
Carlyle echoed much of Tocqueville’s criticism in his assessment of the modern history of 
parliaments.  In Britain, at least, parliamentary institutions had surpassed all others in their 
ability to regard only themselves.  ‘It is too true that Parliament, for the matter of nearly a 
century now, has been able to undertake the adjustments of almost one thing alone, of itself 
and its own interests’.  Other issues, such as society’s great and present problems, had been 
disregarded and left ‘to rub along very much as they could and would.’473  Parliaments’ self-
involvement was at the centre of Carlyle’s critique of their inutility and he discussed this most 
pointedly in relation to the Condition of England Question.474   
Carlyle was at the forefront of contemporary debate in regard to the parlous condition of the 
labouring poor.475  He saw deprivation and distress all around and little relief offered by those 
in positions of power in Parliament.  Such assemblies, which notionally embodied the will of 
the people and contained governors placed there at their behest, should concern themselves 
with the state of their electors before anything else.  This was particularly true of the 
‘Reformed Parliament’ Carlyle thought, which was more representative of the general public 
than any had ever been.  This had enabled the election of ‘Radical Members’, who were 
allegedly ‘friends of the people’ and had been ‘chosen with effort by the people, to interpret 
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and articulate the dumb deep want of the people!’476  Unfortunately, this theory, though 
perfectly sustainable as a theory, had not worked in practice and experience proved that ‘the 
remote observer knows not the nature of Parliaments’.  For these institutions ‘extant there 
for the British Nations sake, find that they are extant withal for their own sake’.477   
Add to this that, like Mill and Tocqueville, Carlyle recognized the burdensome nature of 
parliamentary representatives’ loquaciousness and his picture of parliaments becomes even 
more disparaging.  They were prone to ‘oceans of windy talk’ with little result and had grown 
into nothing more than a ‘National Palaver’.478  Assemblies of this sort were thoroughly 
‘Incapable…of doing business; capable of speech only’ and, Carlyle thought, ‘this none of the 
best.’479  The evidence of the ineffectiveness of the British Parliament that Carlyle had 
perceived in its attempt to deal with the Condition of England Question, as well as his musings 
on parliaments’ general tendency toward incessant chatter, fed into a broad theory of 
parliamentary assemblies as related to sovereign power, which he outlined in 1850.  He 
started by forcing his readers to confront what he thought was the central issue.   
It is first of all…to be inquired, Whether your Parliament is actually in practice the 
Adviser of the Sovereign; or is the Sovereign itself?  For the distinction is profound; 
goes down to the very roots of Parliament and of the Body Politic…480   
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In England, it was clear that the status of its Parliament in this regard inclined toward the 
latter in Carlyle’s distinction.  It was ‘the sovereign ruler and real executive King of this 
Empire’.481  But what had its sovereignty actually achieved?   
The exercise of English Sovereignty, if that mean governance of the Twenty-seven 
million British souls and guidance of their temporal interests towards a good issue, 
does not seem to stand on the very best footing just at present!482   
The much vaunted ‘reformed Parliament’ had not distinguished itself as an effective arbiter 
of sovereign power.483  Why was this the case?  Carlyle was forthright.  Parliaments were not 
fit to act ‘as Ruling and Sovereign Bodies’.  In this function they were ‘not useful, but useless 
or worse.’  A ‘Sovereign’, he contended, ‘with nine-hundred or with six-hundred and fifty-
eight heads, all set to talk against each other in the presence of thirty-four or twenty-seven 
or eighteen millions, cannot do the work of sovereignty at all’.  Placed in this position, 
parliaments were ‘smitten with eternal incompetence’.484  In other words, they were unfit to 
exercise sovereign power.  Thus far, Carlyle agreed with Mill, who, in his Considerations had 
been clear that a Parliament was not an institution fit to implement policy.   
The only examples in history of such bodies being effective, Carlyle thought, were those of 
the Long Parliament in England and the National Convention in France.  Both of these had 
existed in times of crisis and neither, Carlyle argued, were ‘inviting instances to the British 
reformer of this day.’485  Carlyle was particularly sensitive to his context, especially the 
privations of the poor.  The inability of the Reformed Parliament in the 1830s to lend them 
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succour and ameliorate their condition incurred his ire more acutely than that of his 
contemporaries.  His question to his readers was clear and unambiguous (at least, once his 
linguistic eccentricities are overcome): if this system of government did not work, should we 
not try something else?486   
 
DEMOCRATIC LEADERS 
Carlyle was equally concerned about the quality of political leaders democracies could realize.  
He told his readers in 1850 that he thought ‘that true worth, in any department, was difficult 
to recognise’ and ‘that the worthiest, if he appealed to universal suffrage, would have but a 
poor chance.’  Levin argued that, in the opinion of the Scotsman, ‘Democracy was concerned 
merely with quantity, whereas Carlyle regarded moral tone and the quality of leadership as 
the most essential.’487  Carlyle illustrated this through reference to historical personages and 
events, which would have resonated with his audience.  ‘John Milton, inquiring of universal 
England what the worth of Paradise Lost was, received for answer, Five Pounds Sterling.’  
Carlyle compared Milton with the fraudulent railway financier George Hudson.  The latter had 
been acclaimed by the majority who had reckoned him, in stark contrast to Milton, to be 
worth ‘Five Hundred Thousand’ pounds.488   
The actual relative worth of these two figures Carlyle thought obvious.  Morally, there could 
be no legitimate comparison of the two.  The majority’s enthusiastic endorsement of Hudson 
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depicted its poor judgment.  He pushed this notion even further through reference to 
religious history.  ‘Jesus Christ,’ Carlyle averred, ‘asking the Jews what he deserved, was not 
the answer, Death on the gallows!’489  ‘As a ‘Collective Wisdom’ of Nations’ Carlyle continued, 
‘the talking Parliament, I discern too well, can never more serve.  Wisdom dwells not in stump-
oratory’.490  However, he did allow it authority in some domains.   
I will consult it about the quality of New-Orleans pork, or the coarser kinds of Irish 
butter; but as to the character of men, I will if possible ask it no question: or if the 
question be asked and the answer given, I will generally consider, in cases of any 
importance, that the said answer is likely to be wrong…[and] do the reverse of the 
same.491   
Carlyle concluded this passage with characteristic gusto.  In his opinion, any appeal to 
universal suffrage really amounted to a call on the will of the average.  That is to say, it was 
an appeal to the mass of mediocre men, which could result only in the selection of rulers who 
represented the lowest common denominator.  ‘The mass of men consulted at hustings,’ 
Carlyle maintained, ‘upon any high matter whatsoever, is as ugly an exhibition of human 
stupidity as this world sees.’  ‘Surely’, he implored his readers, ‘the doctrine of judgment by 
vote of hustings has now sunk, or should be fast sinking, to the condition of obsolete with all 
but the commonest human intelligences.’492  This criticism is not unique to Carlyle.  Both 
Tocqueville and Mill made similar remarks.   
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Tocqueville noted that ‘in America, universal suffrage was far from producing all the good and 
all the evil that are expected in Europe,’ but he recognized the inferiority of its leaders 
immediately.493  ‘Many people in Europe believe without saying, or say without believing,’ he 
wrote, ‘that one of the great advantages of universal suffrage is to call men worthy of public 
confidence to the leadership of public affairs.’494  In his experience, this was not true.   
Upon my arrival in the United States, I was struck with surprise to find out how 
common merit was among the governed and how uncommon it was among those 
governing.  Today it is a constant fact in the United States that the most 
outstanding men are rarely called to public office, and we are forced to recognize 
that this has occurred as democracy has gone beyond all its former limits.495 
The distinct lack of quality contained within democratic governments sprung from various 
fonts.  All of these related to issues of supply and demand.  On the supply-side, men of 
distinction were hard to locate.  But why was this true of democracies?  The first reason that 
occurred to Tocqueville emanated from his reflection on a concept that Guizot had introduced 
him to: civilization.  Tocqueville outlined a series of questions related to this idea in one of his 
pocket notebooks.   
Why, when civilization spreads, do prominent men decline in number?  Why, when 
learning becomes the privilege of all, do great intellectual talents become more 
rare?  Why, when there are no more lower classes, are there no more upper 
classes?  Why, when understanding of government reaches the masses, are great 
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geniuses missing from the leadership of society?  America clearly poses these 
questions.496   
In other words, Tocqueville asked, if sensitively, why, when the middle classes assume 
predominant power in society, are great political leaders no longer produced?   
Added to this tendency was democratic man’s disdain for any sign of social distinction.  This 
prevented what Tocqueville called the ‘upper classes’ from entering politics.  ‘In the United 
States, the people have no hatred for the upper classes of society; but they feel little goodwill 
toward them and carefully keep them out of power’.  Tocqueville did not think that the people 
‘fear great talents’ in democracies, ‘but they appreciate them little.’497  From this, he thought 
it clear that ‘the natural instincts of democracy lead the people to keep distinguished men 
away from power’ and a complimentary ‘instinct no less strong leads the latter to remove 
themselves from a political career’.498   
The dual factors of the process of civilization and the majority’s disdain for the wealthy 
conspired to constrain the amount of exceptional talent available to electors under 
democratic conditions.  This sort of supply-side issue was fundamental to a democratic 
country’s inability to secure effective governors.  It was matched by problems on the demand-
side of the equation.  Tocqueville did not doubt the mass of the population’s desire to uphold 
the good interests of the country.499  But, the populace had to content itself with leaders of a 
lower standard than had been present in aristocracies because, in democratic societies, the 
majority did not possess the leisure required to scrutinize political candidates properly.   
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What long study, what diverse notions are necessary to get an exact idea of the 
character of a single man!  There the greatest geniuses go astray, and the 
multitude would succeed!  The people never find the time and the means to give 
themselves to this work.  They must always judge in haste and attach themselves 
to the most salient objects.500   
As a result, ‘charlatans of all types’ easily construe the manner in which they can please the 
people: such men flatter its ‘slightest passions’ and bow before its ‘smallest caprices’, and by 
these means gain its approval.501   
Initially, Mill did not endorse Tocqueville’s opinion on this issue.  In the review Mill authored 
regarding the first instalment of the Frenchman’s Démocratie and, once more, in a 
subsequent essay on a variety of works about the United States, Mill took the contrary 
position.502  In the latter, Mill declared that:  
So far as the office of President of the United States is concerned…we had 
supposed it to be generally acknowledged, not that the experiment had failed, but 
that it had succeeded a good deal better than perhaps could reasonably have been 
expected.  Of the seven Presidents who have been elected under it, the six first, 
viz. Washington, the two Adamses, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, – though 
certainly far from being on a level in point of qualifications for the office, – were 
all, by general acknowledgment, among the most eminent and best qualified 
persons in the country.503   
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In his 1835 review of Tocqueville’s Démocratie, Mill challenged his French contemporary on 
the need for extraordinary leaders in ordinary times.  Such men were only required, he 
argued, in periods of emergency.  This was why Tocqueville had seen little evidence of gifted 
men in positions of political authority in America, because it was a stable, prosperous 
country.504   
However, Mill reversed his opinion in the Considerations.  Here, in discussing the electoral 
system proposed by Thomas Hare, Mill noted that without such a mechanism a democratic 
people ‘would almost certainly miss…leaders of a higher grade of intellect and character than 
itself.’  In other words, such polities ordinarily lacked the ‘occasional Pericles’ and a ‘habitual 
group of superior and guiding minds.’505  Gregory Claeys emphasized this aspect of Mill’s 
thought in his recent work on Mill and Paternalism.  Claeys argued that Mill thought any 
government required ‘qualities of leadership which, in democracies, rarely emerged’.  This 
was ‘Tocqueville’s lesson’, according to Claeys, and Mill accepted it in the end.506   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle each concluded that democracies were devoid of the means of 
bringing talented governors to the forefront of political life.  As a consequence, modern 
polities were destined to be led by individuals of little capacity.   
 
THE PROBLEM WITH DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL AUTHORITY   
Prior to the onset of democracy the locus of authority had been clear: it had resided in a king, 
an aristocracy, or a combination of the two.  The extent of such authority had also been clear.  
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But in the age of democracy authority rested – at least theoretically – with the people en 
masse.  What did this mean for the force and extent of power in the modern world?  
Consideration of Carlyle’s notion of authority has tended to concentrate on his proposals for 
instituting a novel form of aristocratic or pseudo-monarchic control.  In this sense, such 
analysis had focused on the Scotsman’s anti-democratic inclinations and the means he 
suggested for subverting democratic institutions.507  However, much like Mill and Tocqueville, 
Carlyle’s views on the subject were forged through his analysis of the nature and extent of 
authority in democratic society and his assessment revealed that the prominent power in the 
contemporary world offered arresting problems for any political thinker.   
In a formative essay on Voltaire, Carlyle asserted his primary claim in relation to democratic 
institutions.  Here, his remarks mirrored the concerns he articulated about parliaments.  He 
challenged those who thought that democracy could offer any form of authority whatsoever.  
It was characterized by ‘the multitude of voices’ and this ‘is no authority’.508  Carlyle argued 
that ‘a thousand voices may not, strictly examined, amount to one vote.’  ‘Mankind in this 
world are divided into flocks,’ he maintained, ‘and follow their several bell-wethers.’509  
Authority could dwell only in the leader of a people and not in the people itself.   
Carlyle returned to this theme in other works and similar comments can be found in his 
correspondence.  In 1839, he argued that ‘Democracy, take it where you will in our Europe, is 
found but as a regulated method of rebellion and abrogation’.510  ‘A Chartist Parliament’, he 
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told Thomas Story Spedding, ‘or any form of Democracy is, with me, equivalent to Anarchy, 
and what the Yankees call “Immortal Smash”’.511  The French Revolution, he noted in his 
celebrated history of that event, had been ‘the baptism-day of Democracy’ and what had it 
signified?512  ‘For ourselves, we answer that the French Revolution means here the open 
violent Rebellion, and Victory, of disimprisoned Anarchy against corrupt worn-out 
Authority’513  In 1850, Carlyle dedicated himself to uncovering ‘what the meaning of this 
universal revolt of the European Populations, which calls itself Democracy, and decides to 
continue permanent, may be.’514   
This formed part of Carlyle’s wider historical narrative that emphasized the diminution of 
traditional, hierarchical modes of authority.  The hierarchical state, as I demonstrated in the 
second chapter, had been challenged from the Reformation onwards wherever it was found 
to reside.  Democracy was simply the modern incarnation of this historic movement.  Carlyle 
recognized that contemporary opinion had shifted and, in the words of Vanden Bossche, now 
represented ‘authority as vested in the individuals that constituted the state rather than in 
monarchical hierarchy.’515  For Carlyle, this amounted to the destruction of authority and not 
its realignment.   
Democracy could not sustain authority.  The same year in which he published his essay on 
Voltaire Carlyle questioned whether freedom could actually be realized under such 
conditions.  He rejected calls for democracy on this basis as myopic and idealistic.  Such calls 
relied on the notion that democracy was essential to individual liberty but Carlyle thought 
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that this required a great deal more than simply the ability to vote.  In ‘regard to Government 
itself,’ he wrote in 1829, ‘can it be necessary to remind anyone that Freedom, without which 
indeed all spiritual life is impossible, depends on infinitely more complex influences than 
either the extension or the curtailment of the ‘democratic interest’?’516  As a ‘whole', he 
continued, ‘Institutions are much; but they are not all.  The freest and highest spirits of the 
world have often been found under strange outward circumstances’.  ‘Saint Paul’, he pointed 
out, ‘and his brother apostles were politically slaves; Epictetus was personally one.’517  
Freedom was not simply related to the form of government or even to the relationship that 
existed between the individual and government.  It bore a moral and, consequently, 
immaterial dimension that Carlyle thought more important.   
In fact, Carlyle used the examples of Saint Paul and Epictetus to challenge what he believed 
to be a central feature of democratic politics: freedom from the interference of government.  
Johnson argued that Carlyle was convinced that in conceding extensive negative liberty to 
ordinary people democracy could not fail to stifle individual development.518  Negative liberty 
was a constitutive feature of the sort of anarchy Carlyle saw as inherent in modern 
democracies.  In fostering an anarchic environment and constraining the possibility of 
individual development, Carlyle saw in democracy a diminution of freedom rather than its 
opposite.   
This was stated more succinctly in Carlyle’s most controversial essay The Nigger Question.  He 
was sceptical about the possibility of abolishing slavery.  ‘My friends,’ Carlyle addressed his 
readers, ‘I have come to the sad conclusion that SLAVERY, whether established by law, or by 
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law abrogated, exists very extensively in the world, in and out of the West Indies; and, in fact, 
that you cannot abolish slavery by act of parliament, but can only abolish the name of it’.519  
What is more, Carlyle saw in democracy a new form of slavery that had not formerly existed.  
The ‘one intolerable sort of slavery…over which the very gods weep’ was not that which was 
rife in the West Indies, but that which ‘prevails in nobler countries.’520   
It is the slavery of the strong to the weak; of the great and noble-minded to the 
small and mean!  The slavery of Wisdom to Folly.  When Folly all “emancipated,” 
and become supreme, armed with ballot-boxes, universal suffrages, and appealing 
to the Dismal Sciences, Statistics, Constitutional Philosophies, and other Fool 
Gospels it has got devised for itself, can say to Wisdom: “Be silent, or thou shalt 
repent it!  Suppress thyself, I advise thee; canst thou not contrive to cease, 
then?”521   
Carlyle saw in the assertion of the rights of the stupid over those of the wise in democracy 
the onset of a novel kind of slavery.  Chaos enjoined servitude.  ‘Well,’ Carlyle maintained, 
‘except by Mastership and Servantship, there is no conceivable deliverance from Tyranny and 
Slavery.  Cosmos is not Chaos, simply by this one quality, That it is governed.’522  Democracy 
had abrogated the authority of hereditary kings and decadent aristocrats.  That Carlyle did 
not doubt or lament.  But the foundations of a new variety of legitimate authority could not 
be built atop democracy.  Only chaos, and with it slavery, could result from the attempt.   
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Mill and Tocqueville were concerned less about the absence of authority in modern 
democratic governments than about its excess, which showed itself through undue 
centralization.  In his Autobiography, Mill acknowledged his debt to Tocqueville in this 
instance.  This was a ‘subject’, he stated, ‘on which…I derived great benefit from the study of 
Tocqueville.’  The Frenchman’s analysis showed Mill the extent to which the former thought 
it necessary for the people en masse, in modern nations, to carry out ‘the collective business 
of society…without any intervention of the executive government’.523   
In an essay on Centralization, written in 1862, Mill placed Tocqueville’s views in context: 
debate about centralization and its consequences had a deeper provenance than the 
speculations of Tocqueville.  ‘In the first years of the Restoration,’ he wrote, ‘the best of the 
Liberals and the leaders of the Ultra-Royalists joined for a time in demanding local franchises 
and a limitation of the powers of government.’  The contemporary champion of this 
movement, Camille Hyacinthe Odilon Barrot, demonstrated how ‘men of such opposite 
opinions as MM. de Villèle, de Corbière, Benjamin Constant, Fiévée, Châteaubriand, Royer-
Collard, were in this one respect unanimous.’524  Tocqueville had renewed this movement, in 
Mill’s view, and made it more serious.525  Regardless of its origin, Mill thought centralization 
was ‘one among the political questions of the age’ and it bore ‘the strongest marks of being 
destined to remain a question for generations to come’.526   
Characteristically, his essay commenced with a definition of centralization.  What was it 
precisely?  It was a question of ‘the limits which separate the province of government from 
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that of individual and spontaneous agency, and of central from local government.’527  This 
much was clear.  However, its meaning ran deeper than that.  The issue of centralization was 
about the ‘degree in which political authority can justly and expediently interfere, either to 
control individuals and voluntary associations, to supersede them by doing their work for 
them, to guide and assist, or to invoke and draw forth their agency’.528   
Mill accepted that no single or universal rule could be adduced that could be applied to all 
situations equally.  The degree to which government could interfere in this manner, he felt, 
‘varies not only with the wants of every country and age, and the capabilities of every people, 
but with the special requirements of every kind of work to be done.’529  The consequences of 
this sort of interference, should it become the rule instead of the exception, Mill thought 
obvious: they would be individually stunting.  In one section of his essay he wrote:  
…that the concentration of the entire direction of national affairs in a bureaucracy 
has been more crushing in its effects on the character and capabilities of the 
nation than tyranny itself, and the main instrument by which tyranny has been 
established and maintained: that the government, by doing everything through its 
own officers, which it can possibly contrive so to do – by regulating minutely 
whatever it allows to be done by others, and requiring, in all cases which involve 
the smallest collective action, its own previous assent formally obtained, not only 
to the thing to be done, but to every item of the means proposed for doing it – has 
dwarfed not only the political, but in a great measure the entire practical, capacity 
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of the people, and even their intellectual activity and moral aspirations in every 
field of mental action except pure theory.530   
These were not Mill’s only words on the subject, though they were his most vehement.  
Centralization was an issue he had addressed years before in his Principles.  The final chapter 
of this voluminous treatise on political economy tackled the subject from the perspective of 
laisser-faire.  Should central government dominate all of a nation’s economic activity?  No.  
‘Laisser-faire,’ Mill believed, ‘should be the general practice: every departure from it, unless 
required by some great good, is a certain evil.’531  This was particularly important in a 
democratic government, Mill thought, ‘because where public opinion is sovereign, an 
individual who is oppressed by the sovereign does not, as in most other states of things, find 
a rival power to which he can appeal for relief’.532   
In his Considerations, Mill averred that it ‘is but a small portion of the public business of a 
country which can be well done or safely attempted by the central authorities’.533  Anything 
more than this small portion would amount to the administration of the people and this, Mill 
thought, ‘is a relic of barbarism opposed to the whole spirit of modern life’.534  The problems 
this caused for individual development were clear.  Mill cited an analogy of Charles de 
Rémusat in order to illustrate his point: ‘A government which attempts to do every thing is 
aptly compared…to a schoolmaster who does all the pupils’ tasks for them; he may be very 
popular with the pupils, but he will teach them little.’535  Central government authority, then, 
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could translate into a form of moral and political oppression were it to be carried too far.  
Unfortunately, as Mill recognized, Tocqueville had shown this to be a peculiarly modern 
problem.536  It is to Tocqueville’s comments that we now turn.   
Tocqueville identified the suffocating force of government action in the second volume of his 
Démocratie.  He was clear: democratic society was more prone to despotic government than 
any other that had previously existed.  ‘I believe’, he wrote near the conclusion of this work, 
‘that it is easier to establish an absolute and despotic government among a people where 
conditions are equal than among another’.  The consequence of this, in short, was equally 
clear: ‘if such a government were once established among such a people, not only would it 
oppress men, but in the long run it would rob from each of them some of the principal 
attributes of humanity.’537  But what was this new and powerful governmental force?  
Certainly, he thought, ‘the old words of despotism and of tyranny’ could not offer adequate 
description.538  Centralization was the force of which Tocqueville spoke and he considered it 
natural to democracy.   
With the fall of the ancien régime all intermediate forces between the individual and the state 
– the aristocracy, the church, powerful cities and corporations – had been either destroyed 
or marginalized.  The very notion of a body of powerful individuals placed in between the 
individual and his government appeared, in democratic centuries, repulsive to the mind.539  
Add to this that the natural inclination of a democratic people disposed them to abandon 
public affairs and collective interests in favour of private enjoyments, not to mention the fact 
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that they valued public tranquillity as an aid to commerce.540  These contradictory features of 
democratic individuals’ characters – their desire to attain certain public goods without 
wanting to exert themselves in pursuit of them – led them to seek out a power that could 
fulfil the ends they have in view.  This, Tocqueville told readers, ‘naturally disposes citizens to 
give new rights constantly to or to allow new rights to be taken by the central power, which 
alone seems to them to have the interest and the means to defend them from anarchy while 
defending itself.’541   
Every day, democratic individuals give their governments new privileges that they formerly 
lacked; abdicate responsibility for an aspect of life for which they were hitherto individually 
or collectively accountable; and abandon the public domain in favour of a peaceful private 
existence.  Government, a machine that knows no finitude relative to individual human life, 
accrues these privileges gradually and without effort.  From this it comes to exercise, 
somnolently, a ‘more extensive and milder’ despotism that is able to ‘degrade men without 
tormenting them.’542  Democratic peoples asked, through their constant inaction, to be 
treated like children and their governments obliged.  Above them Tocqueville saw rising ‘an 
immense and tutelary power’, which alone ‘takes charge of assuring their enjoyment and of 
looking after their fate.’543   
It is absolute, detailed, regular, far-sighted and mild.  It would resemble paternal 
power if, like it, it had as a goal to prepare men for manhood; but on the contrary 
it seeks only to fix them irrevocably in childhood; it likes the citizens to enjoy 
themselves, provided that they think only about enjoying themselves.  It works 
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willingly for their happiness; but it wants to be the unique agent for it and the sole 
arbiter; it attends to their security, provides for their needs, facilitates their 
pleasures, conducts their principal affairs, directs their industry, settles their 
estates, divides their inheritances; how can it not remove entirely from them the 
trouble to think and the difficulty of living?544   
This was the face of a modern tyranny.  In acquiring the management of individuals’ affairs, 
from the most important to those of the minutest significance, central government assumed 
the guise of master.  Individual free will becomes ‘rarer every day’ as this novel power 
‘encloses the action of the will within a smaller space and little by little steals from each citizen 
even the use of himself.’545   
Tocqueville and Mill disagreed with Carlyle about the nature of the problem of government 
authority, but they walked in unison with regard to its cause.  Democracy lay at the root of 
the changed aspect of the modern era and this had to be recognized in considering the 
authority of government as much as anything else.  However, if the power of government 
prompted some discord between Tocqueville and Mill on the one side and Carlyle on the 
other, the yoke of public opinion did not.   
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FROM POLITICS TO SOCIETY   
In this chapter I have addressed many of the problems Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle perceived 
in democratic politics.546  Democracies could foster inadequate institutions and mediocre 
leaders.  This was indicative of a more fundamental problem that lay at the heart of the 
democratic polity: government itself or, in Carlyle’s view, the absence of it could create the 
conditions for a new form of slavery.  Every individual could be subjected to a form of 
despotism that had hitherto never been seen.   
Such a concern was suggestive of the equally well-developed fears Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle bore in relation to democratic society, which I will examine in the next chapter.  The 
democratic age contained within it a powerful force that could restrict individual agency 
within the tightest confines: public opinion.  Popular opinion could introduce into the spirit of 
modern peoples shackles more constraining than anything else previously conceived.  It 
provided a set of psychological spancels that could compromise the independence and agency 
of the individual.  But this was not a Romantic cri de coeur in the manner of William Blake, 
who had mourned the decline of man in his poem on London and its depravity: 
In every cry of every Man, 
In every Infants cry of fear, 
In every voice: in every ban, 
The mind-forg’d manacles I hear.547 
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What Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle recognized was a new form of dominance, a popular 
despotism, exercised in peace and perfect serenity throughout society.  It is to this concern 
that I now turn.   
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CHAPTER 5   
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIETY: THE DECLINE OF THE INDIVIDUAL   
The previous chapter focused on the political problems unique to the modern democratic 
world.  The present chapter is an extension of this analysis.  Here, I will consider the social 
problems Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle identified in the turn towards democratic modernity.  
This chapter is, therefore, an extension of the previous one and should be read in that context.  
What were their criticisms of democratic society?  Broadly, they related to the decline of the 
individual.  The locus of authority in the modern world had changed.  The process of historical 
movement had resulted in the fall of aristocratic society.  Power now resided with a new social 
group: the mass.   
The consequences of this transition cannot be reduced to a single sentence or neat epithet: 
they will be considered at length in what follows below.  The end of the ancien régime had 
released powerful new forces that were coming to dominate society, social relations and, 
crucially for Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle, the individual.  The new form of contract that had 
come to dominate social interaction was proving injurious to social cohesion.  It was grounded 
on the novel ethos of commercial values, which Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle thought 
coterminous with democratic development.  Such a form of society created vast problems for 
the individual.  These will be explored below.   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle realized that the rise of mass authority had negative 
consequences for individual sovereignty.  They were convinced that individuality was being 
steadily eroded by the operation of democracy.  Deviation from the expectations and culture 
of the mass was not permitted.  Any such divergence was perceived by the majority as a 
harbinger of non-conformity and punished accordingly.  Inevitably, the sort of conventionality 
159 
 
this promoted Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle thought harmful to the individual.  Eccentricity 
was treated as a matter of reproach and spontaneity frowned upon.   
Even more disturbingly, in comparison to the mass the individual seemed weak and 
dependent.  Great and powerful individuals, characterized by their jealous independence, 
were valued no longer in democratic states of society.  What were the consequences for an 
age out of love with exceptional individuals?  Ennui, stagnation and decline.  These are the 
themes that will be explored below.  Each of them derived from the rise of a majoritarian 
form of authority in the modern world and it is with this that the present chapter will begin.   
 
THE PROBLEM WITH POPULAR AUTHORITY     
Despite the focus Carlyle placed on authority, he was concerned by the constraining nature 
of the social power of the mass.  In fact, he thought it truly despotic.  Democracy could not 
provide the sort of liberation required to free the soul of man from the yoke of arbitrary 
control in his view.  Indeed, this was one of the principal reasons for his rejection of the 
democratic regime.  Joel Johnson noted that unless ‘democrats can prove that their brand of 
liberty can invigorate the soul and encourage individual development, Carlyle is inclined to 
reject the regime.’548   
In modern democratic society Carlyle had uncovered a force that was, by its very nature, a 
check on individual development: popular opinion.  Public opinion, the handmaiden of 
democracy, was a new and powerful authority that was more constraining than any that had 
gone before.  Carlyle reproached the nagging hand of mass opinion.  It prescribed what 
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purported to be a ‘superior morality’, which contemporaries were encouraged to adopt.  In 
fact, this supposedly exalted morality was nothing other than an ‘inferior criminality’.  It was 
not the result of a ‘greater love of Virtue,’ but, instead, of a more effective ‘Police; and of the 
far subtler and stronger Police, called Public Opinion.’549   
Carlyle feared the moral agent of the majority and his language recalls Bentham’s Panopticon.  
Public opinion ‘watches over us’, Carlyle maintained, ‘with its Argus eyes more keenly than 
ever’.550  Public opinion had modified and unified the moral life into a picture of conformity.  
The power of popular opinion was simply the doctrine of ‘force of circumstances’ applied to 
the moral world.  By arguing in favour of it, Carlyle’s contemporaries ‘had argued away all 
force’ from themselves.  Instead of respecting and furthering the bounds of individuality, 
democracy had ‘leashed together’ all men, henceforth ‘uniform in dress and movement, like 
the rowers of some boundless galley.’551   
Wonderful ‘Force of Public Opinion’!  We must act and walk in all points as it 
prescribes; follow the traffic it bids us, realise the sum of money, the degrees of 
‘influence’ it expects of us, or we shall be lightly esteemed; certain mouthfuls of 
articulate wind will be blown at us, and this what mortal courage can confront?552   
‘Thus, while civil liberty is more and more secured to us,’ Carlyle lamented, ‘our moral liberty 
is all but lost.’  As a statement of the humanistic principles Carlyle applied to his criticism of 
democracy, with the power of public opinion as its mouthpiece, there is perhaps no finer 
example.  It limited individuality, encouraged conformity and, perhaps most distressing of all, 
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denied the individual any claim to agency.  ‘Practically considered,’ Carlyle concluded, ‘our 
creed is Fatalism; and free, in hand and foot, we are shackled in heart and soul with far straiter 
than feudal chains.’553   
In his tract on The Nigger Question, Carlyle returned to this issue once more.  He pitted 
‘Foolish Tomkins’ and ‘foolish Jobson’ against the individual in order to illustrate the 
majoritarian tyranny he lamented in democratic societies.  These two could not ‘now singly 
oppress you’, Carlyle thought, but another entity surely could: ‘the Universal Company of the 
Tomkinses and Jobsons’.554  This had inevitable consequences for minorities, not to mention 
individuals.  ‘The flunky-world has peace; and descends, manipulating its ballot-boxes, 
Coppock suffrages, and divine constitutional apparatus; quoting its Dismal Sciences, Statistics, 
and other satisfactory Gospels and Talmuds, – into the throat of the Devil; not bothered by 
the importunate minority on the road.’555   
Public opinion and the authority it exercised over the security and integrity of the individual 
was an important theme Tocqueville shared with Carlyle.  Tocqueville’s remarks are far more 
famous than those of Carlyle.  Tocqueville’s understanding of the face of modern authority 
was more subtle.556  The problem with democratic authority was that it could very easily 
degenerate into tyranny.  Tocqueville identified a number of tyrannical features in the 
modern democratic world, all of which originated from the same source – equality of 
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conditions – and amounted to what Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey referred to as ‘society 
tyrannising over itself.’557   
The possibility of a tyranny of the majority over each and every individual was what struck 
Tocqueville first in the United States.558  Majority power was a perverted form of democratic 
authority.  ‘I regard as impious and detestable’, Tocqueville stated, ‘this maxim that in matters 
of government the majority of a people has the right to do anything’.  However, he did not 
deny ‘that the will of the majority is the origin of all powers.’  This led Tocqueville to an 
insightful and necessary question: ‘Do I contradict myself?’559 
In order to answer this question Tocqueville went beyond the pragmatism that characterizes 
much of the first volume to a higher level of abstraction.  The law was his metaphor of choice, 
justice the specific vehicle used to illustrate his point.  ‘A general law exists that has been 
made…not only by the majority of such or such a people, but by the majority of all men.  This 
law is justice.’  Justice, according to Tocqueville, formed the limit of each people’s right to 
command beyond which no one could go.  ‘A nation is like a jury charged with representing 
universal society and with applying justice, which is its law.  Should the jury, which represents 
society, have more power than the very society whose laws it applies?’560  This example 
expressed Tocqueville’s understanding of the ideal limits of the majority’s sovereignty aptly.   
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Mankind had arrived at a principle of justice and the omnipotence of the majority threatened 
to disturb it.  In refusing to obey the dictates of the majority, Tocqueville claimed that he was 
simply appealing to the sovereignty of a higher body with greater jurisdiction.  ‘So when I 
refuse to obey an unjust law, I am not denying the right of the majority to command; I am 
only appealing…to the sovereignty of the human race.’561  In doing so, the dictates of justice 
could be restored.   
However this was not a position advocated by all of the friends of democracy.  Some claimed 
that ‘in the objects that concern only itself, a people cannot go entirely beyond the limits of 
justice and reason’.  They declare, Tocqueville claimed, ‘that we should not be afraid…to give 
all power to the majority that represents the people.’  In other words, absolute sovereignty 
should be given to the majority alone.  In Tocqueville’s opinion this ‘is the language of a 
slave.’562  Taken as a whole, the majority was nothing other than ‘an individual who has 
opinions and, most often, interests contrary to another individual called the minority.’  If ‘an 
individual vested with omnipotence can abuse it against his adversaries,’ Tocqueville claimed, 
this had to be admitted for the majority also.  This formed the basis of his most stringent 
critique of democratic society up to this point.   
What I most criticise about democratic government as it has been organised in the 
United States, is not its weakness as many people in Europe claim, but on the 
contrary, its irresistible strength.  And what repels me the most in America is not 
the extreme liberty that reigns there; it is the slight guarantee against tyranny that 
is found.563 
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If a man suffered an injustice at the hands of the majority in the United States, where could 
that man turn for recompense?  Public opinion was merely the opinion of the majority; the 
legislature obeyed the will of the majority; the executive was named by the majority; the 
police force was simply the majority ‘under arms’; and the jury was the majority clothed in 
legal authority.564  This led Tocqueville to a startling realization.  Given the majority’s power 
there was little room for individual agency.  ‘I know of no country where,’ he declared in a 
now famous statement, ‘there reigns less independence of mind and true freedom of 
discussion than in America.’565  In Europe, no sovereign could prevent the free movement of 
ideas between interested parties with much success.  There, a diverse number of powers 
remained that could oppose the will of the sovereign authority.  In the United States, only 
one power existed: the majority.  Contradicting its will was almost impossible.  As long as ‘the 
majority is uncertain’ on a topic, Tocqueville announced, ‘people speak; but as soon as the 
majority has irrevocably decided, everyone is silent’.566   
Kings or aristocrats, Tocqueville argued, could only act on the body as a means of preventing 
the circulation of unfavourable opinions.  But in a democracy, ‘the majority is vested with a 
strength simultaneously physical and moral, which acts on the will as well as on actions and 
which at the same time prevents the deed and the desire to do it.’567  Thoughts were modified 
at the level of the sub-conscious.  It was this that Mill later came to recognize.  The will of the 
majority, Tocqueville believed, ‘draws a formidable circle around thought’ and punishes 
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anyone who dares to venture beyond the contours it prescribes.  Punishment was softer in a 
democracy, but more penetrating.  The sovereign power no longer cried: ‘You will think like 
me or die’.  Instead, it said: ‘You are free not to think as I do; your life, your goods, everything 
remains with you; but from this day on you are a stranger among us.  You will keep your 
privileges as a citizen, but they will become useless to you.’568   
Democratic public opinion ostracized those who did not conform to its prescriptions, isolating 
and alienating them from the life of society.  Whilst sparing those subjected to its wrath from 
physical discomfort and allowing them to remain among others, public opinion abrogated any 
recognizable claim one could make to ‘humanity’.  ‘When you approach your fellows,’ 
Tocqueville warned, ‘they will flee from you like an impure being.  And those who believe in 
your innocence, even they will abandon you, for people would flee from them in turn.’  
Tocqueville concluded this passage with the most unsettling remark of all: ‘Go in peace; I 
spare your life, but I leave you a life worse than death.’569   
This was not simply idle theorizing of the sort that Tocqueville disparaged; it was based on 
observable evidence.  In America, ‘the wealthy classes of society are almost entirely out of 
public affairs’; ‘wealth,’ he noted, ‘far from being a right, is a real cause of disfavour and 
obstacle to reaching power.’  The majority resented and envied those who were raised, even 
momentarily, above the mediocrity of the mass.  As a result, the rich opted to abandon rather 
than attempt to sustain ‘an often unequal struggle against the poorest of their fellow citizens.’  
This was one of the reasons, as we saw in the last chapter, why democracies tended to elect 
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poor leaders.570  The impetus to conformity Tocqueville thought comparable to the travails of 
the Jews in the middle ages.   
Do you see this opulent citizen?  Wouldn’t you say, a Jew of the Middle Ages who 
is afraid of arousing suspicion of his wealth?  His attire is simple; his gait is modest.  
Within the four walls of his dwelling, he adores luxury; into this sanctuary, he lets 
only a few chosen guests that he arrogantly calls his equals.571   
Tocqueville and Carlyle both understood that inherent in the modern era was the possibility 
of a new sort of tyranny that had not been encountered before.  It abhorred diversity, 
resented anyone who rose above or went beyond the constraints of common opinion, and 
actively hindered moral freedom.  For both of these men, moral freedom was an essential 
ingredient of any wider notion of human freedom.  Its significance went beyond the contours 
of historical circumstance and chronological setting.  Without it, individuals simply could not 
be free.  As such, Tocqueville and Carlyle could not accept the oppressive force of modern 
public opinion blindly and resolved to highlight its dangers.   
Sheldon Wolin claimed that Tocqueville’s fear of the majority transformed into ‘a cultural 
formation’ in the second volume of the Démocratie, which elided the stability of a concrete 
majority.572  This misunderstands Tocqueville’s point.  The majority itself was unstable and its 
contours could be different depending on the minority it faced.  What is clear is that 
Tocqueville’s understanding of the power of the majority encompassed the material and 
immaterial domains of human life.  The majority could impose its will through laws, the police 
and the courts or via opinion.   
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What did Mill make of this tendency?  Scholars have discussed Mill’s views on authority in 
detail.573  Mill’s concern for individuality, it has been argued, ‘took pre-eminence over 
whatever theory one possessed about the foundation of a social union, and whatever the 
political institutions under which one lived.’574  Democracy had the potential to injure 
individuality.  Indeed, Ryan argued that ‘Mill had early and wholeheartedly accepted de 
Tocqueville’s view that the great danger to a democracy was its tendency to uniformity’.575  
The danger posed to individuality formed the subject of his best known political tract: On 
Liberty.   
However, issues of authority occupied his earliest thoughts on politics.  One of his first 
journalistic efforts, published under the nom de plume ‘No Worshipper of Antiquity’ in 1823, 
addressed this issue from an enthusiastically Benthamite perspective.  ‘All history proves, that 
in every nation of the earth, the powers of Government have uniformly been monopolized in 
the hands of a privileged few, who, accordingly, never failed to abuse those powers for the 
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benefit of themselves and of their connections’.576  By the time Mill came to write the Spirit 
of the Age eight years later, his categories of analysis had shifted.  He had abandoned his 
concern with sinister interests, if only temporarily.  Nor was he concerned with the arbitrary 
use of power in this instance.  Instead, Mill was concerned by the breakdown of authority.   
‘A change has taken place in the human mind’, Mill argued; ‘a change which, being effected 
by insensible gradations, and without noise, had already proceeded far before it was generally 
perceived.’  Once recognized, ‘thousands awoke as from a dream.’  It was now ‘clear that 
those were indeed new men’ and they ‘insisted upon being governed in a new way.’577  This 
was the period of transition, which Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle each identified and is 
discussed in the first chapter above.  It provided serious challenges to the existence of any 
authority.  No ‘Whig or Tory’ could any longer ‘command ten followers in the warfare of 
politics by the weight of his own personal authority?’578  There were clear ‘divisions among 
the instructed’ and such divisions ‘nullify their authority’ as ‘the uninstructed lose their faith 
in them.’  Mill thought the danger evident.  ‘The multitude are without a guide; and society is 
exposed to all the errors and dangers which are to be expected when persons who have never 
studied any branch of knowledge comprehensively and as a whole attempt to judge for 
themselves upon particular parts of it.’579   
The lacuna in authority in the contemporary world, which Mill believed to be the result of the 
transitional nature of the era, was being filled, gradually, by the majority as the democratic 
force augmented.  The problems that this presented were two-fold: the danger of a new form 
of sinister interest in government and the elimination of individual moral agency.  Mill saw 
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the existence of a very real threat to both the individual and, more broadly, minority interests 
in the accession of the mass of the population to political rights, such as the suffrage.   
In his essay on Bentham, Mill alluded to ‘the yoke of public opinion’ in disparaging terms.580  
By this time, he had read Tocqueville’s first instalment on American democracy and come to 
the conclusion that the sort of democracy Bentham advocated placed mankind ‘under the 
absolute authority of the majority of themselves?’581  The inevitable result, he thought, was 
‘the despotism of Public Opinion’.582  Mill penned a moving passage on the retarding 
consequences this would entail.   
Where there is identity of position and pursuits, there also will be identity of 
partialities, passions, and prejudices; and to give to any one set of partialities, 
passions, and prejudices, absolute power, without counter-balance from 
partialities, passions, and prejudices of a different sort, is the way to render the 
correction of any of those imperfections hopeless; to make one narrow, mean type 
of human nature universal and perpetual, and to crush every influence which 
tends to the further improvement of man’s intellectual and moral nature.583 
To raise the majority to absolute authority would limit each and every individual’s room for 
manoeuvre.  It was necessary to engineer institutions that would be able to shelter ‘freedom 
of thought and individuality of character’.584   
Mill extended this line of criticism in his Considerations.  He argued, in redeploying the 
language of Utilitarianism to suit novel ends, that ‘sinister interests’ could be as prevalent in 
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democratic countries as in those residing under the aegis of an aristocracy or a monarchy.585  
With some derision of his former Philosophic Radical associates Mill noted that ‘it is 
sometimes rather gratuitously assumed that the same kind of injurious influences do not 
operate in a democracy.’586  This was a myopic assumption.   
Looking at democracy in the way in which it is commonly conceived, as the rule of 
the numerical majority, it is surely possible that the ruling power may be under 
the dominion of sectional or class interests, pointing to conduct different from 
that which would be dictated by impartial regard for the interest of all.587   
The Philosophic Radical thought that democracy – particularly universal suffrage – would 
place checks upon varieties of sinister interest.588  But, Mill rejected this line of reasoning.  
History demonstrated that neither kings nor aristocracies had been able to govern 
disinterestedly, except in a very few instances.  They had mistaken their class interest for the 
universal interest.589  It would be ridiculous to expect more from any, especially the lowest, 
class of men: ‘the Demos, or any other.’590   
One of the greatest dangers, therefore, of democracy, as of all other forms of 
government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power: it is the danger of 
class legislation, of government intended for (whether really effecting it or not) 
the immediate benefit of the dominant class, to the lasting detriment of the 
whole.591   
                                                          
585 CW XIX, p.442.   
586 Ibid.   
587 Ibid.   
588 J. Hamburger, Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophic Radicals (New York, 1965), p.53.   
589 CW XIX, pp.444-445.   
590 Ibid, p.445.   
591 Ibid, p.446.   
171 
 
If authority were to be vested absolutely in the majority there was a very real danger that it 
could attack the social body in an attempt to expunge diversity.  The popular mass could try 
to exercise power to its advantage alone.   
Allied to this was Mill’s second and more profound concern.  In democratic countries, the 
majority might assert unlimited dominion over man’s moral being.  This is the import of On 
Liberty.  ‘The subject of this Essay’, he wrote in 1859, ‘is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, 
so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ – a duality 
Mill had already exploded in his System of Logic592 – ‘but Civil, or Social Liberty’, which 
amounted to a discussion of ‘the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately 
exercised by society over the individual.’  This was a question ‘seldom stated’, he noted, ‘and 
hardly ever discussed…but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the 
age’.  Mill thought it was ‘the vital question of the future.’593   
The evil inherent in the present was clear.  The value of individuality and eccentricity was 
‘hardly recognised by the common modes of thinking’.  ‘The majority,’ Mill continued, ‘being 
satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are…cannot comprehend why those ways 
should not be good enough for everybody’.594  Public opinion, whose prophet was the 
majority, endeavoured to suppress any outlet for the expression of spontaneous or irregular 
thought that did not correspond to the principles prescribed by the mass.595  Mill believed 
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that ‘society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens 
human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences.’  
History had moved on from a time when powerful and self-assured magnates could and would 
defiantly disobey oppressive laws and ordinances.  ‘In our times, from the highest class of 
society to the lowest,’ he howled with evident discomfort, ‘every one lives as under the eye 
of a hostile and dreaded censorship.’596   
The tutelage of the majority extended beyond the realm of conscious choice and infected the 
unconscious mind.  This produced the sort of servile resignation to fatalism Carlyle had 
highlighted thirty years before.  ‘I do not mean that they choose what is customary,’ Mill 
maintained, ‘in preference to what suits their own inclination.’  On the contrary, ‘It does not 
occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary.’597  A people thus 
administered by the majority were almost sub-human.   
Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, 
conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise choice 
only among things commonly done: peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, 
are shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their own nature, 
they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and 
starved…and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or 
properly their own.598   
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The majority was the face of modern tyranny, which was the preserve of democratic ages in 
which the crowd had assumed precedence over the individual.599  Reeves argued that Mill’s 
primary concern in denouncing this novel form of tyrannical behaviour was to protect the 
individual human being’s possibility of development.  Without the necessary freedom, Reeves 
claimed, Mill thought human growth could slow significantly or come to an end.600  Urbinati 
encapsulated this notion with great precision and related it to Mill’s intellectual heritage.  
‘One should compare the kind of tyranny denounced in On Liberty’, she contended, ‘to the 
all-seeing but unseen guardian of Bentham’s Panopticon, where inmates enjoyed the 
prerogative of habeas corpus (a negative liberty), and yet their moral, mental, and emotional 
integrity was still thwarted.’601   
 
INDIVIDUALISM   
Urbinati also argued that in creating a society-wide Panopticon, democracy provided a novel 
basis for social isolation.  Panopticon inmates were entirely alienated from one another and 
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this precluded the possibility of dialogue ‘with themselves and…others.’  This was achieved 
through arbitrary intervention in prisoners’ privacy, which destroyed their moral autonomy.  
‘In silencing individual self-inquiry,’ Urbinati maintained, ‘the “tyranny of opinion” fosters 
individualism because it fosters isolation’.  This resulted in the rise of ‘selfish characters’, 
Urbinati continued, which was inimical to the sort of public spirit that Mill cherished.602   
Urbinati cited as evidence of this Mill’s perception of Christian morality as the dominant 
opinion of the majority in contemporary Britain.  Selfishness was induced in the social body 
‘by disconnecting each man’s feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow creatures, except 
so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them.’603  And yet, 
Urbinati’s claim missed the mark she was attempting to hit.  Mill was quite clear in this section 
that it was not democracy that he thought isolating, but Christian morality itself.  ‘It holds out 
the hope of heaven and the threat of hell,’ Mill stated, ‘as the appointed and appropriate 
motives of a virtuous life: in this falling far below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies 
in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character’.604   
If Mill’s understanding of the isolating potential of modern democracy cannot be seen to the 
extent that Urbinati claimed in On Liberty, can it be found anywhere else?  Certainly, Mill 
addressed this subject in the second review article he authored on Tocqueville’s Démocratie.  
The possibility of individual isolation, as I will show below, was a feature of democracy 
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Tocqueville had identified.  In fact, Urbinati’s attempt to draw a similar argument out of the 
component parts of On Liberty seemed like subtle means of aligning Mill with Tocqueville.   
‘The Americans,’ Mill noted in his article on Tocqueville’s work, ‘not only profess, but carry 
into practice, on all subjects except the fundamental doctrines of Christianity and Christian 
ethics, the habit of mind which has been so often inculcated as the one sufficient security 
against mental slavery – the rejection of authority, and the assertion of the right of private 
judgment.’605 
America’s democratic inhabitants, Mill continued, ‘are not accustomed to look for guidance 
either to the wisdom of ancestors, or to eminent cotemporary wisdom, but require that the 
grounds on which they act shall be made level to their own comprehension.’  The problem 
with this psychological quirk was ‘a most licentious abuse of individual independence of 
thought.’606  But, Mill saw immediately that Tocqueville had, in fact, shown his readers that a 
consequence far more troubling than individual isolation resulted from democratic man’s 
novel psychological disposition.  ‘It is impossible,’ he wrote, ‘as our author [Tocqueville] truly 
remarks, that mankind in general should form all their opinions for themselves: an authority 
from which they mostly derive them may be rejected in theory, but it always exists in fact.’  
In a democratic society, individuals cannot locate this authority in a particular caste or 
individual, but find it ‘in the opinions of one another.’607  Mill grasped what this meant 
instantly.   
All being nearly equal in circumstances, and all nearly alike in intelligence and 
knowledge, the only authority which commands an involuntary deference is that 
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of numbers.  The more perfectly each knows himself the equal of every single 
individual, the more insignificant and helpless he feels against the aggregate mass, 
and the more incredible it appears to him that the opinion of all the world can 
possibly be erroneous.608 
Thus, Mill saw the danger of individualism that lay latent in a democratic society, but he 
emphasized the consequence of the individualist psychology far more than the fact of 
individualism itself.  In his understanding, albeit of Tocqueville’s account of democracy, 
individualism prepared the way for individual weakness and, ultimately, individual 
dependence on the majority.  It was also another means through which individuality could be 
subjected to the constricting conventionality of the greatest number.   
Mill’s remarks were made in response to Tocqueville’s work and it was the Frenchman who 
addressed this subject first.  In the 1840 volume of the Démocratie he outlined his concerns 
at length.  Previously, as I have shown above, Tocqueville’s concern for the individual in the 
modern world was that he could be alienated from the mass through its intolerance.  He could 
be forced out of society, isolated through the collective action of the social body.  What he 
now turned his attention to was a different cause that led to the same result.   
No longer did the individual simply have to fear the actions of the community as a whole, but 
he had to be made aware of his own separatist instincts.  ‘I have shown how, in centuries of 
equality, each man looked for his beliefs within himself’, Tocqueville stated.  Now, he wanted 
‘to show how, in these same centuries, he [the individual] turns all his sentiments toward 
himself alone.’  It is this that distinguished Tocqueville’s notion of ‘Individualism’.609   
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‘Individualism’, Tocqueville continued, ‘is of democratic origin, and it threatens to develop as 
conditions become equal.’610  He contrasted this novel idea with egoism.  Egoism was a vice 
derived from an emotional base, ‘a depraved sentiment’ as Tocqueville called it.  Individualism 
was not emotional in its origin but rational, the result of ‘an erroneous judgment’.  ‘Egoism,’ 
he confided to his notes to this section of the work, was a ‘vice of the heart’.  ‘Individualism,’ 
on the other hand, was a conclusion consciously arrived at by ‘the mind’.  Individualism was 
‘considered and peaceful’ in its operation and ‘disposes each citizen to isolate himself from 
the mass of his fellows and to withdraw to the side with his family and his friends’.  It showed 
democratic man how to create his own ‘small society’ and, in doing so, enabled him to 
abandon the wider community willingly.611   
It was here that Tocqueville deployed what has become one of his best known arguments.  
‘Aristocracy had made all citizens into a long chain that went from the peasant up to the king; 
democracy breaks the chain and sets each link apart.’612  In other words, democracy isolated 
people as a matter of course by enabling individuals to consider themselves as singular, 
autonomous units.  Agnès Antoine applied a Freudian lens in her analysis of Tocqueville’s 
description of individualism.  Under the aegis of democracy, she claimed in relation to 
Tocqueville’s fears, the individual became a ‘personnalité narcissique’.  For such an individual, 
the ‘outside world is but a second reality’, which is arranged around the self.  For democratic 
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man, therefore, ‘reality…is what concerns himself, that is to say, his body, then the different 
extensions of the self, beings and things.’613  Levin summarized Tocqueville’s argument thus: 
‘Now each individual was on his own, privatised and cut off from wider supports, and devoted 
merely to personal selfishness and material wellbeing.’614   
The consequences of this new democratic psychology were clear to Tocqueville.  Democratic 
society predisposed individuals to feel that they ‘owe nothing to anyone’.  Consequently, 
Tocqueville remarked, ‘they expect nothing so to speak from anyone; they are always 
accustomed to consider themselves in isolation’.  ‘Thus,’ Tocqueville concluded with evident 
unease, ‘not only does democracy make each man forget his ancestors, but it hides his 
descendants from him and separates him from his contemporaries’.  In short, ‘it constantly 
leads him back toward himself alone and threatens finally to enclose him entirely within the 
solitude of his own heart.’615  What sort of society could exist in an environment where 
sociability was fast dying out?  The answer was too unsettling to behold. Tocqueville seemed 
satisfied with leaving his readers to draw their own conclusions from his argument.   
Antoine suggested that Tocqueville saw the root of the modern individual’s encasement 
within himself in democratic man’s Cartesian disposition, which he described at the beginning 
of the second volume of the Démocratie.616  ‘America’, Tocqueville argued, ‘is one of the 
countries of the world where the precepts of Descartes are least studied and best 
followed.’617  But, what did he actually mean by this?  Americans and, by extension, all peoples 
raised in a democratic atmosphere, flee from the weight of tradition, be it derived from a 
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particular ‘system’, certain ‘habits’, or the obligations of ‘family’, ‘class’, or ‘nation’.  
Tocqueville saw that Americans sought in themselves and by themselves alone ‘the reason 
for things’.618  In other words, ‘they are constantly brought back to their own reason as the 
most visible and nearest source of truth.’  Faith in the opinion and expertise of others was 
destroyed as ‘each person withdraws narrowly into himself and claims to judge the world 
from there.’619 
Given Tocqueville’s analysis of this feature of democratic psychology, it should now be 
apparent why Antoine located Tocqueville’s notion of individualism squarely within it.  
Democratic man, she asserted, ‘has the habit of only drawing his opinions from himself, in 
submitting all things to the free examination of his reason’.620  But, this led Tocqueville back 
to the problem of the tyranny of popular opinion that is discussed above.  He realized, Antoine 
argued, that, ‘before being an enlightened conviction,’ democracy was ‘a collection of 
received beliefs, which varied with the dominant opinion.’  It was not the case the individual 
and collective convictions did, in fact, arise from the light of individual reason, but that they 
were imparted by the only source of power democratic individuals recognized outside of 
themselves: the majority.621  Tocqueville stated this directly.   
It is to be believed that the intellectual dominion of the greatest number would be 
less absolute among a democratic people subject to a king, than within a pure 
democracy; but it will always be very absolute, and, whatever the political laws 
may be that govern men in centuries of equality, you can predict that faith in 
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common opinion will become a sort of religion whose prophet will be the 
majority.622   
Thus, Antoine concluded that Tocqueville’s critique of democratic psychology implied that 
‘the regime supposed to emancipate man from all the obstacles to liberty…risks paradoxically 
falling into the weightiest intellectual conformism’.  It could even drive men to think no 
longer.623   
The deadening effect of individualism was reinforced, Tocqueville thought, by democratic 
man’s tendency to pursue material well-being to the exclusion of other interests.  Tocqueville 
wrote at some length about this in the second volume of his Démocratie.  He theorized a link 
between the insecurity of fortunes in democratic societies, which was the result of the lack 
of fixed caste structures, and democratic man’s particular penchant for material 
enjoyments.624  Tocqueville thought that this novel inclination resulted in two principal 
consequences.  The first was to strengthen the psychological conditions that facilitated 
individualism.  ‘It is not a question of building vast palaces,’ Tocqueville argued, ‘of 
vanquishing or deceiving nature, of exhausting the universe, in order to satisfy better the 
passions of a man’.625  In other words, the quest for material well-being in democratic eras 
was not about the creation of grand undertakings or public monuments.  On the contrary, 
Tocqueville continued, ‘it is a matter of adding a few feet to his fields, of planting an orchard, 
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of enlarging a house, of making life easier and more comfortable each moment, of avoiding 
discomfort and satisfying the slightest needs effortlessly and almost without cost.’626  The 
desire for material well-being, then, was focused squarely on the home, on the family unit, 
and not on any public undertaking.  Such petty projects, to which ‘the soul becomes attached’, 
Tocqueville told his readers, ‘finish by hiding from the soul the rest of the world, and they 
sometimes come to stand between the soul and God.’627   
The second, equally significant, consequence of democratic man’s love for material 
enjoyment was related to his ardent individualism.  In order to ensure the permanence of 
individual material well-being, society needed, at the very least, public order.  Tocqueville saw 
in this latent feature of democracy illiberal consequences.  ‘This particular taste that the men 
of democratic countries conceive for material enjoyments is not naturally opposed to order; 
on the contrary, it often needs order to satisfy itself.’628  What it did not require was freedom.   
Carlyle’s analysis of this phenomenon is grounded on the sociological rather than the 
psychological features of democracy.  He approached Tocqueville’s notion of individualism 
via a different route.  Carlyle derived his idea of it from the kernel of the cash nexus, a concept 
he had pioneered in his essay on Chartism.629  Though it could appear as if he drew his notion 
of individualism from a fundamentally economic idea, this would be an unfortunate 
misrepresentation of Carlyle’s understanding of the cash nexus.  Carlyle conceived of 
democracy as a means of individual self-government.  Essentially, that meant the triumph of 
negative liberty and a limited, anti-paternalist state.   
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This new means of political interaction extended into the social sphere.  The fundamental 
maxim of contemporary negative liberty – laissez-faire – was, in Carlyle’s estimation, inherent 
in democracy.  In Chartism, he claimed that democracy was merely ‘the consummation of No-
government and Laissez-faire.’630  It was this that was responsible for many of the evils 
afflicting the lower orders of society and, Carlyle thought, ‘a government…on a principle of 
Let-alone is no longer possible in England in these days.’631   
Social relations were no longer conducted on the basis of bonds of loyalty, love and honour, 
but had been reduced to the medium of cash alone in this novel era.  This was both a facet of 
the decline of the social compact that had characterized the ancien régime and a consequence 
of the onset of democratic conditions.  ‘Cash Payment’, Carlyle bristled in Chartism, has 
‘grown to be the universal sole nexus of man to man’.  Now, individuals were related ‘as buyer 
and seller alone, of land or what ever else it might be’.632  ‘With the supreme triumph of Cash, 
a new time has entered’, Carlyle told his readers.633  The novel era of which he spoke was 
democratic in nature.   
Carlyle rebuked his contemporaries for their false understanding of what constituted a 
society.  ‘We call it a Society’, he wrote in 1843, ‘and go about professing openly the totallest 
separation, isolation.’634  But, separation, in Carlyle’s view, was the root of numerous other 
problems.  ‘Our life is not a mutual helpfulness’, he argued, but ‘cloaked under due laws-of-
war, named ‘fair competition’ and so forth, it is a mutual hostility.’635  ‘We have profoundly 
forgotten everywhere’, Carlyle continued, ‘that Cash-payment is not the sole relation of 
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human beings; we think, nothing doubting, that it absolves and liquidates all engagements of 
man.’636   
The novel politico-economic reality into which the world had been flung had destroyed the 
social bonds that had formerly existed between men and forced them to rely on themselves 
alone.  Life had become competitive where it had once been cooperative and this was 
damaging the social body.637  Such a situation could not endure in Carlyle’s opinion and he 
ended his analysis of this phenomenon on an optimistic note.  ‘I have not heard in all Past 
History, and expect not to hear in all Future History, of any Society anywhere under God’s 
Heaven supporting itself on such a Philosophy.’638  Social isolationism and individualism had 
arrived, but they could not endure if society was to continue.   
 
THE DECLINE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
Popular opinion and the rise of individualism in the modern world were features of a wider 
trend that democracy underwrote.  This was the decline of the individual.  Carlyle was the 
first to address this subject in 1829.  ‘Were we required to characterise this age of ours by any 
single epithet,’ Carlyle wrote, ‘we should be tempted to call it, not an Heroical, Devotional, 
Philosophical, or Moral Age, but, above all others, the Mechanical Age.’  Mechanism had 
replaced individual effort as the motor of change.  It had infected every aspect of human 
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endeavour.  ‘For the simplest operation, some helps and accompaniments, some cunning 
abbreviating process is in readiness.’  Old modes of action had been discredited and replaced 
solely by ‘the great art of adapting means to ends.’639   
But what did Carlyle mean when he spoke of this mechanism?  It was the internalization and 
embodiment of an utter contempt for the capacity of the individual.  ‘No individual now hopes 
to accomplish the poorest enterprise single-handed and without mechanical aids’; ‘he must 
make interest with some existing corporation, and till his field with their oxen.’640  The modern 
mentality was dominated by the notion of mechanical contrivance and the preference 
exhibited for association by Carlyle’s contemporaries was, in the Scotsman’s opinion, 
symptomatic of it.  Merely ‘to live,’ Carlyle thought, signifies to unite with a party, or to make 
one.’  Every aspect of intellectual life had come to depend on this novel maxim, from 
philosophy to science, art, and even literature.641  Carlyle did not deplore the desire to 
associate with ones fellows, but he lamented the dependence of the individual on the mass.   
No Newton, by silent meditation, now discovers the system of the world from the 
falling of an apple; but some quite other than Newton stands in his Museum, his 
Scientific Institution, and behind whole batteries of retorts, digesters, and galvanic 
piles imperatively ‘interrogates Nature,’ – who, however, shows no haste to 
answer.642   
It was at this point that Carlyle’s critique of democracy became most interesting.  ‘Nowhere,’ 
Carlyle argued, ‘is the deep, almost exclusive faith we have in Mechanism more visible than 
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in the Politics of this time.’  Though Carlyle accepted that ‘Civil government’, by its very 
nature, naturally includes much that is mechanical, it ‘includes much also that is not 
mechanical, and cannot be treated mechanically’.  Unfortunately, he complained, ‘the 
political speculations and exertions of our time are taking less and less cognisance’ of this fact.  
The most obvious ‘sign’ of this trend was ‘the mighty interest taken in mere political 
arrangements’ in contemporary Europe.643   
The whole discontent of Europe takes this direction.  The deep, strong cry of all 
civilised nations, – a cry which, every one now sees, must and will be answered, is: 
Give us a reform of Government!  A good structure of legislation, a proper check 
upon the executive, a wise arrangement of the judiciary, is all that is wanting for 
human happiness.644   
Political philosophy had taken an exclusively materialist guise.  The problems of the present, 
it was held, could be cured by the implementation of new political machinery.  This led Carlyle 
to conclude that the ‘Philosopher of this age is not a Socrates, a Plato, a Hooker or Taylor’.  
They had inculcated in ‘men the necessity and infinite worth of moral goodness, the great 
truth that our happiness depends on the mind which is within us, and not on the 
circumstances which are without us’. 645 
The doctrines of modern thinkers were exactly opposite.  Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and 
Jean-Louis de Lolme contended, according to Carlyle, ‘that our happiness depends entirely on 
external circumstances; nay, that the strength and dignity of the mind within us is itself the 
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creature and consequence of these.’646  The means suggested for ‘securing this all-sufficient 
perfection of arrangement’ were equally ‘mechanical’.  Reformers concerned themselves 
solely with the external condition of man and not his internal state.  That is, they proceeded 
to attempt to reform him from outside instead of from within.  ‘It is no longer the moral, 
religious, spiritual condition of the people that is our concern,’ Carlyle agonized, ‘but their 
physical, practical, economical condition’.  This led Carlyle to declare, in a now famous phrase, 
that at present ‘the Body-politic’ is ‘worshipped and tendered’ more assiduously than ever 
and ‘the Soul-politic less than ever.’647  ‘Contrive the fabric of the law aright,’ contemporary 
political theorists’ claimed, ‘and without farther effort on your part, that divine spirit of 
Freedom, which all hearts venerate and long for, will of herself come to inhabit it’.648   
Such an approach to politics, as with any other element of human understanding, was 
perverse, Carlyle thought, because human beings were ontologically diverse.  They were not 
material beings alone, but possessed aspects of the transcendental.  Carlyle claimed that he 
was speaking ‘a little pedantically’ when he told his readers that ‘there is a science of 
Dynamics in man’s fortunes and nature, as well as of Mechanics.’649  Unfortunately, modern 
political discourse was grounded on the latter alone.  In other words, the modern urge 
towards democratic constitutionalism was based on a faulty ontology.  Carlyle thought John 
Locke and the ontological implications of the epistemological position he had crafted in his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding lay at the bottom of this.  It was this that was 
washing over the early-nineteenth century and its politics.   
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Locke’s ‘whole doctrine is mechanical,’ Carlyle lamented, ‘in its aim and origin, in its method 
and its results.’  Carlyle disputed the validity of Locke’s understanding of the mind and its 
construction.  In his view, it was not for one minute ‘a philosophy of the mind’.  It was, instead, 
‘a mere discussion concerning the origin of our consciousness, or ideas, or whatever else they 
are called’.  In short, Locke’s Essay set out the means of arriving at ‘a genetic history of what 
we see in the mind.’650  It did not examine any of the fundamental issues sitting beneath the 
mere contents of the mind.   
The grand secrets of Necessity and Freewill, of the Mind’s vital or non-vital 
dependence on Matter, of our mysterious relations to time and space, to God, to 
the Universe, are not, in the faintest degree touched upon in these inquiries; and 
seem not to have the smallest connection with them.651   
Carlyle admitted that the last batch of thinkers produced by the Scottish Enlightenment had 
understood that much of what Locke had claimed about the nature of the human mind was 
incorrect, but they had had no idea ‘how to right it.’652  ‘The school of Reid’ – Thomas Reid – 
‘had also from the first taken a mechanical course, not seeing any other.’  Hume had brought 
this school into being.  Carlyle claimed that it had simply ‘tugged lustily at the logical chain by 
which Hume was so coldly towing them and the world into bottomless abysses of Atheism 
and Fatalism.’653   
The materialization of man did not end here.  David Hartley’s psychology continued via 
another route the Lockean doctrine.  ‘Hartley’s vibrations and vibratiuncles, one would think, 
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were material and mechanical enough’.  But even he could not rival ‘our Continental 
neighbours’.  ‘One of their philosophers has lately discovered,’ Carlyle noted with evident 
irony, ‘that ‘as the liver secretes bile, so does the brain secrete thought’; which astonishing 
discovery Dr. Cabanis, more lately still, in his Rapports du Physique et du Morale de l’Homme, 
has pushed into its minutest developments.’654   
Carlyle revelled in the absurdity of Cabanis’ Rapports.  The latter, the Scotsman chortled, had 
‘fairly’ uncovered ‘our moral structure with his dissecting-knives and real metal probes’.  He 
had exhibited ‘it to the inspection of mankind, by Leuwenhoek microscopes, and inflation 
with the anatomical blowpipe.’  If this was not ridiculous enough, Carlyle lampooned Cabanis’ 
understanding of the genesis of thought, poetry and religion.  ‘Thought, he is inclined to hold, 
is still secreted by the brain; but then Poetry and Religion (and it is really worth knowing) are 
‘a product of the smaller intestines’!’655  Carlyle added the coup de grâce in stating his respect 
for Cabanis.   
We have the greatest admiration for this learned doctor: with what scientific 
stoicism he walks through the land of wonders, unwondering; like a wise man 
through some huge, gaudy, imposing Vauxhall, whose fire-works, cascades and 
symphonies, the vulgar may enjoy and believe in, – but where he finds nothing 
real but the saltpetre, pasteboard and catgut.656   
Joking aside, Carlyle informed his readers of the significance of Cabanis’ work.  ‘His book’, the 
Scot argued, ‘may be regarded as the ultimatum of mechanical metaphysics’.657  In other 
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words, Cabanis’ materialist doctrines represented the most extensive development of Locke’s 
original ideas.658  Locke was coeval with the present; he haunted Carlyle and his 
contemporaries.  The epistemological consequences were clear.   
This condition of the two great departments of knowledge, – the outward, 
cultivated exclusively on mechanical principles; the inward, finally abandoned, 
because, cultivated on such principles, it is found to yield no result, – sufficiently 
indicates the intellectual bias of our time, its all-pervading disposition towards that 
line of inquiry.659 
Carlyle realized the practical consequences of this trend.  Investigation into the sciences was 
now conducted on an entirely mechanical basis.  In the present, ‘there are no true sciences’ 
apart from ‘the external’.  What is more, the inner world of man was probed using the 
methods appropriate to external science.  The road ‘to the inward world’, Carlyle averred, 
was held to be ‘through the outward’, which meant ‘that, in short, what cannot be 
investigated and understood mechanically, cannot be investigated and understood at all.’660  
The externalism of the era could be traced through every current of thought.  It could be seen 
‘in its intellectual aspect, the studies it most favours and its manner of conducting them’.  
More importantly, for the present thesis’ purpose, it was evident ‘in its practical aspects, its 
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politics, arts, religion, morals; in the whole sources, and throughout the whole currents, of its 
spiritual, no less than its material activity.’661   
Faith in the individual and in individual capacity had waned as the emphasis placed on 
mechanism had waxed.  Carlyle thought that this was coterminous with the move towards 
democracy, because it was the political system that accorded most closely with mechanism.  
Without faith in the individual, from where would the lights of progress emerge?  Could the 
progress of society ground to a halt if individual genius came to be subjected to the 
suffocating conformity of institutionalization?  This was exactly what Carlyle was implying.  In 
his work On Heroes eleven years later, he asserted the centrality of the individual to progress 
at the outset of his very first lecture.  ‘Universal History,’ which is ‘the history of what man 
has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked 
here.’  These had been the leaders of mankind in every field and ‘all things that we see 
standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical 
realization and embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world’.662  
Without such men in what state did the world stand?   
Furthermore, Carlyle, as John Morrow recognized, was convinced that ‘Independence is a 
requirement of freedom, and this in turn is necessary for morality’.  In order to be legitimate 
in Carlyle’s eyes human action had to be grounded on ‘voluntary determination of the will.’663  
There are numerous allusions to the importance of the individual and individuality in Sartor.  
‘On the whole, as I have often said,’ Carlyle wrote, ‘a person is ever holy to us’.664  ‘Our Life is 
compassed round with Necessity’, he maintained later in the book, and ‘yet is the meaning of 
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Life itself no other than Freedom, than Voluntary Force’.665  Indeed, freedom was almost his 
primary concern.  Democracy, as we have seen in Carlyle’s comments above, could not fulfil 
this criteria.  Once again, Sartor is where we find the finest example of such a criticism: 
‘FREEDOM heavenborn and leading heavenward, and so vitally essential for us all, cannot 
peradventure be mechanically hatched and brought to light in that same Ballot-Box’.666   
Freedom, individuality and the status of the individual concerned Mill and Tocqueville as 
much as Carlyle.  However, Mill and Tocqueville addressed the individual’s decline from a 
different angle.  Individual sovereignty occupied Mill’s thoughts for over a quarter of a 
century, from the early 1830s to the vital pages of On Liberty.  It was the most important issue 
in the latter.  In it the spectre of Carlyle, not to mention Comte and the Positivists, looms 
large.  In an essay On Genius, written in 1832, Mill bemoaned the inferiority of the Moderns 
compared to the Ancients.  History had shown that ‘ten centuries of England or France cannot 
produce as many illustrious names as the hundred and fifty years of little Greece’.  In truth, 
Mill thought it surprising that the Moderns had produced any examples of genius at all.  
Though he acknowledged that they had had ‘some true philosophers, and a few genuine 
poets’ and that ‘two or three great intellects have revolutionized physical science’, he noted 
that ‘in almost every branch of literature and art we are deplorably behind the earlier ages of 
the world.’667   
Civilization and its progress was at the root of this apparent decline.  Individual endeavour 
had been redirected towards ends other than the pursuit of truth, beauty, or art.  ‘One of the 
effects of a high state of Civilization upon character,’ Mill wrote, ‘is a relaxation of individual 
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energy: or rather the concentration of it within the narrow sphere of the individual’s money-
getting pursuits.’668  The softening of manners throughout society, which was a consequence 
of the move towards political and social pluralization, entailed the rise of the middle classes 
and the utter destruction of those of the higher.  The latter had traditionally pursued those 
aspects of genius highlighted by Mill.  The energies of the former were ‘confined to money-
getting’ only.669  Intellectual decline was bound up with the deterioration of the individual in 
comparison to the mass.  Heroic qualities and devotion to the life of the mind weakened in 
proportion as the power of the majority augmented.  ‘The consequence is that, compared 
with former times,’ Mill thought, ‘there is in the refined classes of modern civilized 
communities much more of the amiable and the humane, and much less of the heroic.’  Mill 
went further.   
The heroic essentially consists in being ready, for a worthy object, to do and to 
suffer, but especially to do, what is painful or disagreeable: and whoever does not 
early learn to do this, will never be a great character.  There has crept over the 
refined classes, over the whole class of gentlemen in England, a moral effeminacy, 
an inaptitude for every kind of struggle.670   
Men of the present, Mill thought, ‘cannot undergo labour, they cannot brave ridicule, they 
cannot stand evil tongues’.671  In every aspect of society, he wrote, ‘the individual falls in 
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comparison with the masses’.672  He ‘becomes so lost in the crowd,’ Mill lamented, ‘that 
though he depends more and more upon opinion, he is apt to depend less and less upon well-
grounded opinion’.673  Society had tried to replace its ‘deficiency of giants by the united efforts 
of a constantly increasing multitude of dwarfs.’674  But this, as Mill’s tone demonstrated, had 
failed.   
Mill returned to the theme of individual decline in the final chapter of his Principles.  At 
‘present’, he thought, ‘civilization tends so strongly to make the power of persons acting in 
masses the only substantial power in society, that there never was more necessity for 
surrounding individual independence of thought, speech, and conduct, with the most 
powerful defences, in order to maintain that originality of mind and individuality of character, 
which are the only source of any real progress’.675   
On Liberty expressed Mill’s concern for the status of the individual in the modern world better 
than any other contemporary work.  In a passage that could have been lifted verbatim out of 
Carlyle’s oeuvre, Mill declared that modern greatness ‘Is now all collective: individuality small, 
we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining; and with this our moral 
and religious philanthropists are perfectly contented.’  He argued that it had been ‘men of 
another stamp’ who had inaugurated the modern world ‘and men of another stamp will be 
needed to prevent its decline.’676   
Mill thought that the progress of civilization, the most important consequence of which had 
been democracy, had weakened individuals.  Firstly, this had taken place through the 
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promotion of a sort of moral effeminacy; secondly, as a result of the rise of the mass to which 
the individual looked in awe.  In light of individual decline, Mill, much like Carlyle, introduced 
the prospect of stagnation.  China offered an example of a great society condemned to decline 
due to intellectual torpor and Mill was afraid that something similar could happen in modern 
democratic societies.677   
Tocqueville was at pains to highlight the perils posed to the individual by modern democratic 
society.  ‘Among democratic peoples,’ he wrote, ‘individuals are very weak; but the State, 
which represents them all and holds them all in its hand, is very strong.’678  Unfortunately, 
Tocqueville thought, nowhere were people more likely to be reduced to inanity than in 
democracies.   
Nowhere do citizens appear smaller than in a democratic nation.  Nowhere does 
the nation itself seem greater and nowhere does the mind more easily form a vast 
picture of it.  In democratic societies, the imagination of men narrows when they 
consider themselves; it expands indefinitely when they think about the State.679   
But why did individuals appear weak in opposition to the agglomerated mass?  In part, it 
resulted from the narrow conformity that constrained the eccentricity of each.  ‘As conditions 
become equal among a people,’ Tocqueville had already seen that ‘individuals appear smaller 
and society seems larger’.  But, in reality, ‘each citizen, having become similar to all others, is 
lost in the crowd, and you no longer notice anything except the vast and magnificent image 
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of the people itself.’680  The death-knell of eccentricity thus signalled the downfall of individual 
agency.   
However, there was an equally powerful structural cause at the root of individual feebleness.  
In a democratic society, Tocqueville argued, ‘all citizens are independent of each other’ and 
this predisposes them to feel a sense of profound weakness.  It is impossible to ‘discover any 
one of them who exercises a very great or, above all, a very enduring power over the mass.’  
‘At first view,’ Tocqueville averred, ‘individuals seem absolutely powerless over the mass, and 
you would say that society moves all by itself by the free and spontaneous participation of all 
the men who compose it.’681  This was a notion favoured by historians in democratic ages 
who, seeing the weakness of individuals, attributed the movement of society to impersonal, 
general forces.  Tocqueville thought this an especially pernicious doctrine because it induced 
a sense of fatality that denied the existence of free will.  Such a ‘doctrine is particularly 
dangerous in this period in which we live; our contemporaries are all too inclined to doubt 
free will, because each of them feels limited on all sides by his weakness, but they still readily 
grant strength and independence to men gathered in a social body.’  More than anything, 
Tocqueville implored his readers to take care ‘not to obscure this idea, for it is a matter of 
lifting up souls and not finally demoralizing them.’682   
Much like Mill, Tocqueville believed that the mildness of modern, democratic mores offered 
a means of explaining the weakened status of the individual.  He acknowledged that this was 
the result of a complicated process, but that the historical movement towards equality of 
conditions was its main cause.  It directed human energies toward new goals that required a 
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new mode of interaction.  ‘Equality of conditions’, as he understood it, ‘leads men toward 
industrial and commercial professions, which need peace in order for men to devote 
themselves to those professions.’  The political and social pluralization that had augmented 
the ranks of the middle classes softened mores and weakened the power of the individual by 
taking away the situations in which powerful magnates could prosper.  ‘Equality of conditions 
suggests to men the taste for material enjoyments; it distances them imperceptibly from war 
and violent revolutions.’683   
Tocqueville discussed the effect of material pleasures on man’s violent tendencies in the 
concluding chapters of the Démocratie.  ‘Commerce’, he maintained, ‘is naturally hostile to 
all violent passions.  It loves moderation, takes pleasure in compromises, very carefully flees 
from anger.  It is patient, flexible, ingratiating, and it resorts to extreme means only when the 
most absolute necessity forces it to do so.’  Tocqueville concluded that he knew ‘of nothing 
more opposed to revolutionary mores than commercial mores.’684  He did not preclude the 
possibility entirely of ‘enterprising and ambitious citizens’ arising from the soil of 
democracy.685  However, he did assert that the natural disposition of democratic nations will 
be, if not hostile, apathetic in regard to their aims.  Great men will thus find it almost 
impossible to assert themselves.   
To his ardour, they [the democracy] secretly oppose their inertia; to his 
revolutionary instincts, their conservative interests; their stay-at-home tastes to 
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his adventurous passions; their good sense to the flights of his genius; to his 
poetry, their prose.686   
Tocqueville could have added another, more telling duality: their mediocrity to his brilliance.  
A distinguished man would ‘exhaust himself,’ Tocqueville claimed, ‘wanting to animate this 
indifferent and inattentive crowd, and he finally sees himself reduced to impotence, not 
because he is vanquished, but because he is alone.’687  If this was the destiny that awaited the 
agency of great individuals, what horrors did democracy have in store for that of ordinary 
souls?  Tocqueville’s reflections on the sort of fatalism induced by le doux commerce reverses 
those his great model, Montesquieu, presented in L’Esprit des lois.  It had the power to 
enslave people as much as to set them at liberty.688   
 
DEMOCRACY: THE CRITIQUE   
In the present and previous chapter I have attempted to trace the areas in which the critiques 
of democracy offered by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle intersected.  I do not claim to have 
exhausted the criticisms each applied to modern democratic politics and society.  Were this 
a study of one of these men, rather than the three in combination, more material could be 
inserted, which would extend and deepen the barbs aimed at democracy by each.  What these 
two chapters do show is the danger democracy posed to progress, both individual and 
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collective.  Practically, it was an inefficient system of politics characterized by poor leaders 
and ineffective legislatures.   
The social pressures introduced by the dominance of commercial values in the wake of the 
fall of the ancien régime, as well as the increasing pressure exerted by the majority in the life 
of the community, prompted the demise of eccentricity.  Stated simply, democracies militated 
in the direction of mediocrity, conformity and decline.  The individual suffered from each of 
these problems.  Indeed, individual strength, energy and freedom relative to the majority was 
in decline in the modern world, where the mass was assuming a dominant position in political, 
social and cultural terms.  Was the individual sovereign any longer?  It was hard to see how.   
Now it is time to turn to the solutions Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle suggested to the problems 
each had identified in the modern world.  It is at this point that the differences that existed 
between their views will become more apparent.  Hitherto, their respective notions on the 
contemporary world’s condition, the import of the French Revolution, the bent of the modern 
world, its antecedent causes, the definition and, finally, the problems of democracy have 
seemed broadly analogous.   
However, Carlyle’s views were clearly anti-democratic, at least in political terms, whereas 
Tocqueville and Mill approached democracy with the intention of mitigating its worst 
excesses.  I have not attempted to disguise this.  ‘Democracy makes rapid progress in these 
latter times,’ Carlyle maintained, ‘and ever more rapid, in a perilous accelerative ratio; 
towards democracy, and that only, the progress of things is everywhere tending as to the final 
goal and winning-post.’  ‘And yet’, Carlyle stated forthrightly, ‘in democracy can lie no 
finality’.689  In his estimation, nothing could be built atop the Golgotha of democratic society.  
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‘Democracy,’ he surmised, ‘is found but as a regulated method of rebellion and abrogation; it 
abrogates the old arrangement of things; and leaves, as we say, zero and vacuity for the 
institution of a new arrangement.’690 
Tocqueville warned his readers at the outset of the second volume of his Démocratie that far 
from accepting the irresistible democratic revolution that he had identified without proper 
consideration, he had ‘often ended up addressing such harsh words…to the democratic 
societies created by this revolution.’  He claimed that this was not because he was ‘an 
adversary of democracy’, but because he ‘wanted to be candid about it.’  ‘Men do not receive 
the truth from their enemies,’ he told his readers, ‘and their friends hardly ever offer the truth 
to them’.691  This sentiment was an appropriate opening to a book that would be rooted firmly 
in reflections on democratic morality.  But, there was a further reason Tocqueville had 
decided to highlight the drawbacks of the democratic social state that was purely pragmatic.  
‘I have thought that many would take it upon themselves to announce the new good things 
that equality promises to men, but that few would dare to point out from a distance the perils 
with which it threatens them.’692   
In the concluding pages of his Autobiography, Mill addressed this subject equally directly.  ‘As 
I had shewn in my political writings that I was aware of the weak points in democratic 
opinions, some Conservatives,’ Mill thought, ‘had not been without hopes of finding me an 
opponent of democracy’.693  ‘Yet’, he continued, ‘if they had really read my writings they 
would have known that after giving full weight to all that appeared to me well grounded in 
the arguments against democracy, I unhesitatingly decided in its favour, while recommending 
                                                          
690 Ibid, p.159.   
691 Tocqueville, Démocratie, p.693.   
692 Ibid.   
693 Mill, Autobiography, p.226.   
200 
 
that it should be accompanied by institutions as were consistent with its principles and 
calculated to ward off its inconveniences’.694   
The differences that existed between Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle in regard to democracy will 
become more apparent in the final three chapters of this thesis: on politics and society, 
religion, and education.  Despite the differences, though, it is striking to remark upon the 
similarities that remain between these men and their proposed solutions to the problems of 
democracy.   
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CHAPTER 6   
RECONFIGURING STATE AND SOCIETY   
The views offered by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle in respect of the challenges facing the 
modern democratic world suggest that they considered the principal problem to be one of 
political culture.  What was required in the modern democratic era was a new political culture 
that was both appropriate to the novel conditions of the age and that could correct the 
imbalances created by democracy.  In their responses to this problem, Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle pursued different avenues in many respects, though important similarities remain 
between their ideas.   
The present chapter will focus on the mechanisms outlined by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle in 
the realm of the state and that of society, which were intended to provide both barriers to 
the excesses of democratic power in such nations and the means of ensuring that government 
was effective in the modern world.  The next chapter will examine the importance 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle placed on religion as a bulwark of the sort of political culture they 
wanted to create.  The final chapter of this thesis will consider how education contributed to 
the sort of political culture Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were eager to foster in the 
contemporary world.   
These were the elemental building blocks required in order to found a new political culture 
appropriate to the modern democratic world.  However, they should not be seen as the 
foundation stones of new and rigorous socio-political systems.  ‘System-building’, according 
to Francis and Morrow, ‘was not a task to which Mill felt drawn and it would be perverse to 
insist, retrospectively, that he ought to have felt that way.’695  The proposals that each of 
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these men directed at democracy were not intended to create complete or ideal political and 
social models.  They were, rather, intended to ameliorate the ills produced by modern 
democracy and were, in this sense, reactive, though not reactionary.   
At the outset, it is necessary to restate a central distinction that existed between Tocqueville 
and Mill, on the one hand, and Carlyle on the other.  For all of the reservations that have been 
described in the previous two chapters, Tocqueville and Mill were in favour of democracy.  
Carlyle was its opponent in all political senses, if not those that were properly social.   
How did these men think democratic society should be reconfigured?  Given their respective 
concerns about the consequences of the rise of democracy, the solutions that Tocqueville, 
Mill and Carlyle suggested for reorganizing the state were different.  Tocqueville and Mill 
wanted to limit government to a considerable degree where Carlyle wanted to increase its 
influence in modern nations.  Equally, in the realm of society, Tocqueville and Mill wanted to 
create barriers to the masses domineering power where Carlyle wanted to ensure the 
interconnectedness of classes through a new form of contract.  Here, their targets were 
different as a result of their respective analyses of the problems facing democratic nations 
and the weight Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle attached to each of these problems.   
For example, as I showed above, Tocqueville and Mill thought that it was very possible that 
central government could amass so much power as to become almost despotic in democratic 
countries.  That is to say, they identified the possibility of the existence of a new, arbitrary 
and absolute authority.  By contrast, Carlyle saw in democracy the potential for chaos.  Both 
of these outcomes were perceived to be individually limiting by their proponents and the 
common basis of their respective remedies was to reverse such a negative consequence.   
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If Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle differed in the way in which they wanted to reconfigure the 
state and society, they were at one in regard to the sorts of people they wanted to see rise to 
the top of governmental institutions.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were eager to ensure that 
the most capable individuals worked the levers of government.  That the particular 
professional or social groups that each thought could fulfil this role differed should not 
obscure the fact that there was a profound agreement between these men in respect to their 
preference for those who could demonstrate their intelligence or experience and, thus, their 
suitability for positions of power.  What remains of this chapter will explore these areas of 
the political thought of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.   
 
REDESIGNING THE STATE   
In 1859, Mill wrote in On Liberty that there were three objections that could be made in 
relation to government interference in the life of the individual other than that it infringed 
upon the liberty of those its actions restricted.  ‘The first is,’ Mill argued, that the object in 
view ‘is likely to be better done by individuals than by governments’.  ‘The second objection’, 
he continued, was that even if a government official were more efficient in the achievement 
of identified objects, ‘it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them [individuals], 
rather than by the government, as a means of their own mental education’.  In undertaking 
such actions, individuals’ ‘active faculties’ and ‘judgment’ would be improved.696  Finally, Mill 
maintained that the ‘most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government, is 
the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power.’697   
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Every function superadded to those already exercised by the government, causes 
its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts, more 
and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the 
government, or of some party which aims at becoming the government.’698   
The problem, as Mill recognized along with Tocqueville, was that in democracies the power 
of central government tended to augment.  In 1861, Mill reinforced his concerns about 
centralization.  He claimed that ‘It is but a small portion of the public business of a country 
which can be well done or safely attempted by the central authorities’.699  The solution to this 
problem, then, was simple in Mill’s view: decentralization.  However, the benefits of 
decentralization had to be balanced against the danger of incompetence it entailed.  
Decentralization was likely to limit central government significantly, but it was also likely to 
place local power into the hands of those who had not received training in the art of 
government.   
The benefits of decentralization were clear.  Mill was explicit in his belief that decentralized 
political institutions were ‘instrumental to the nourishment of public spirit and the 
development of intelligence.’700  By taking part in the life of local political bodies, ‘many 
citizens in turn have the chance of being elected, and many, either by selection or rotation, 
fill one or other of the numerous local executive offices.’701  This fostered the ability of citizens 
‘to act for public interests’, rather than their own, and ‘to think and to speak’.  What is more, 
because such offices go beyond the ‘higher ranks’ in their composition, they ‘carry down the 
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important political education which they are the means of conferring, to a much lower grade 
in society.’702   
The first advantage held out by the localization of governmental administration, in Mill’s view, 
was to improve the populace morally and intellectually.  To this, Mill added the advantage 
local bodies possess with regard to local information: they were better placed than central 
institutions to understand the particulars of any given locality.  Localization promoted the 
development of public spirit, which counteracted the sort of individualism inherent in modern 
democracies; enhanced and widened the pool of individual capacity, which increased the 
overall competence of governmental officials; and facilitated better government through a 
greater understanding of local issues.     
Such advantages were, however, mirrored by a number of disadvantages of, if not equal, 
certainly, significant weight.  In particular, Mill was concerned about the quality of local 
officials.703  Mill reconciled central and local administration through the doctrine of the 
division of labour, which incorporated their different advantages, and saw the efficacious 
operation of government in the co-operation of these two.  ‘In the details of management,’ 
Mill maintained, ‘the local bodies will generally have the advantage, but in comprehension of 
the principles even of purely local management, the superiority of the central 
government…ought to be prodigious’.  Given this recognition, Mill’s prescription seemed 
obvious.  ‘The authority which is most conversant with principles should be supreme over 
principles, while that which is most competent in details should have the details left to it.’  
The result of this arrangement, according to Mill, was that power would be exercised locally 
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whilst knowledge would be held centrally.704  The division enunciated thus was that which 
Mill thought most conducive to good government in a modern democracy.  Mill limited 
central government by diffusing its exercise more widely and, in so doing, prevented 
malignant concentrations of power.   
Tocqueville offered a similar solution, though it was by no means exactly the same.  
Government, Tocqueville believed, was not the complex activity Mill thought it to be.  In an 
extremely short section in the Démocratie, placed immediately after that in which he had 
lauded the American township705, Tocqueville drew attention to the unspectacular 
composition of town districts.  His example was drawn from New England.   
The town in New England falls between the canton and the commune in France.  
Generally it numbers from two to three thousand inhabitants.  So it is not too 
extensive for all its inhabitants to share nearly the same interests; and on the other 
hand, it is populated enough to assure that elements of a good administration are 
always found within it.706   
In other words, any two to three thousand people could govern themselves without 
encountering any particular difficulties.  Townships, as well as the other layers of government 
covered in Tocqueville’s work on America – such as counties and states – provided an 
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essential function in his theory of democracy.  They prevented the rise of administrative 
centralization.   
Tocqueville claimed that there were two varieties of centralization: governmental and 
administrative.  ‘Only the first exists in America’, he noted, ‘the second is almost unknown 
there.’707  Tocqueville expanded on this point.  ‘In none of the American republics has the 
central government ever taken charge of anything other than a small number of objects 
whose importance attracted its attention.  It has never undertaken to regulate the secondary 
things of society.’  What Tocqueville was attempting to show was that ‘The majority, while 
becoming more and more absolute, has not increased the attributions of the central power; 
it has only made it omnipotent in its sphere.’708  This protected the liberty of the individual 
against arbitrary incursions by the government.   
So the municipal bodies and county administrations form like so many hidden 
reefs that slow or divide the tide of popular will.  Were the law oppressive, liberty 
would still find refuge in the way in which the law would be executed; the majority 
cannot get into the details, and, if I dare say so, the puerilities of administrative 
tyranny.709   
Decentralization, then, and self-government in the township, was an essential ingredient in 
Tocqueville’s quest to draw liberty out of democracy.  Tocqueville saw local institutions as 
intermediary powers that mitigated the force of the state.  His advocacy of such bodies has 
been perceived by scholars to be a consequence of his aristocratic heritage.710  In his historical 
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study of the ancien régime, it was the failure of the intermediary institutions of the aristocracy 
that had prepared the way for absolute monarchy and, therefore, servitude.711  Tocqueville 
hoped to prevent a similar occurrence in the democratic era.   
Carlyle’s objective was different to that of Tocqueville and Mill to an extent.  He was eager to 
uncover ‘How, in conjunction with inevitable Democracy, indispensable Sovereignty is to 
exist’.  This, he thought, was ‘the hugest question ever heretofore propounded to 
Mankind!’712  Only this, he thought, could remedy the problems posed by the sort of chaos 
democracy represented if left to itself.  A genuine sovereignty, though, could only be provided 
by an active government in Carlyle’s view.  ‘This that they call ‘Organising of Labour’ is,’ Carlyle 
argued, ‘the Problem of the whole Future, for all who will pretend to govern men.’713  But, 
what did he mean by this phrase?   
Carlyle wanted government to regiment the masses.  ‘It is incalculable’, he believed, ‘what, 
by arranging, commanding and regimenting, you can make of men.’714  Carlyle was eager to 
place the state at the forefront of progress.  The sort of regimentation he imagined would 
create a number of services for citizens that democracy could not offer in his view.  He 
theorized the creation of ‘an Emigration Service, a Teaching Service, considerable varieties of 
United and Separate Services, of the due thousands strong, all effective as this Fighting 
Service is; all doing their work’.715  Under this arrangement, Carlyle conceived of individuals 
as soldiers.  However, Carlyle’s modern soldiers would not be organized into units in order to 
fight any other nation.  Instead, they would be engaged ‘in continual real action and battle 
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against Human Starvation, against Chaos, Necessity, Stupidity, and our real ‘natural 
enemies’’.716   
Where Tocqueville and Mill sought to limit the impact of the state on individuals’ lives, Carlyle 
was eager to increase its claims over them.  This reflected their respective concerns about the 
influence of democracy over the condition of society in the modern world.  Liberty in a 
democracy, Tocqueville and Mill thought, could only be guaranteed in the absence of a large 
and cumbersome central state.  Chaos, Carlyle argued, could only be prevented by the 
presence of such a state.   
However, Carlyle was not solely focused on order and it is necessary to highlight a final area 
of his thought in relation to the state before moving on to the next part of this chapter.  Carlyle 
was concerned about liberty.  ‘Liberty, I am told,’ he informed his readers, ‘is a divine thing.’  
But, such ‘Liberty’, he went on, ‘when it becomes the ‘Liberty to die by starvation’ is not so 
divine!’717  Carlyle expounded a notion of liberty that reflected his concern for the individual 
in the context of the problems presented by a chaotic democracy.   
The true liberty of a man, you would say, consisted in finding out, or being forced 
to find out the right path, and to walk theron.  To learn, or to be taught, what work 
he actually was able for; and then by permission, persuasion, and even 
compulsion, to set about doing the same!718   
It was this, Carlyle argued, that was the individual’s ‘true blessedness, honour, ‘liberty’ and 
maximum of wellbeing’.719  Placed in the context of Carlyle’s proposals for a regimentation of 
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labour, his sentiments on the sort of liberty appropriate for the modern world was no doubt, 
patriarchal in nature when compared to that of Tocqueville and Mill.  However, it was clearly 
engineered in order to facilitate individual development and prevent individual suffering; the 
very same goals aimed at by Tocqueville and Mill.   
 
LEADING THE STATE   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were eager to ensure that appropriate leaders occupied the 
corridors of power in modern countries.  Mill’s approach to this challenge was the most 
complicated and it is with him that our discussion will begin.  This is a feature of his thought 
that has received little attention from scholars, though Mill addressed this subject in his 
Considerations.  Mill set a clear objective for representative government.  ‘The meaning of 
representative government is,’ he argued, ‘that the whole people, or some numerous portion 
of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate 
controlling power, which, in every constitution, must reside somewhere.’720  Mill thought that 
the controlling power in democratic political arrangements should be the popular chamber.   
However, he was quick to point out that a marked difference existed between the controlling 
power in a constitutional arrangement and a body of implementation.721  ‘The same person 
or body may be able to control every thing, but cannot possibly do every thing; and in many 
cases its control over every thing will be more perfect the less it personally attempts to do.’  
Mill addressed this by analogy.  ‘The commander of an army could not direct its movements 
effectually’ he argued, ‘if he himself fought in the ranks or led an assault.’  Mill was convinced 
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that the same applied to elected bodies.  ‘Some things can not be done except by bodies’, he 
contended, ‘other things can not be done well by them.  It is one question, therefore, what a 
popular assembly should control, another what it should itself do.’722  The criticisms that Mill 
aimed at popular assemblies and their leaders, which I addressed in a previous chapter, must 
have been on his mind when he wrote this comment.   
A popular assembly was not fit to lead a democratic nation, according to Mill, but it was an 
appropriate body for controlling those who did so.  Indeed, Mill rejected, according to 
Anscutz, ‘the view that the many should evoke all political questions to their own tribunal and 
decide them according to their own judgement.’723  But, who was capable of leading such 
nations?  Mill’s answer to this question is divided into different segments.  The two principal 
areas of leadership occurred through a Legislative Commission and an English Senate.  Both 
of these institutions attest to the influence of classical history on Mill’s understanding of 
politics and his preoccupation with the science of character.   
Mill believed that it was necessary to engineer a body dedicated solely to the art of law-
making.  This is the Legislative Commission that he presented in the Considerations.  Its task 
was even clearer in Mill’s mind than that of the representative assembly.  It is ‘true’, he 
claimed, ‘that a numerous assembly’ is ‘little fitted for the direct business of legislation’.  This 
was a trade suited to methodical minds.  ‘There is hardly any kind of intellectual work which 
so much needs to be done not only by experienced and exercised minds, but by minds trained 
to the task through long and laborious study, as the business of making laws.’724  Law making 
was, in other words, the domain of the expert who was highly conversant with the branches 
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of political science.  ‘This is a sufficient reason, were there no other, why they can never be 
well made but by a committee of very few persons.'725   
But, there were other reasons Mill opted for such a commission.  Members of Parliament, as 
he explained later in his Considerations, were ordinarily mediocre due to the deficiencies of 
democratic political culture.726  They could not be expected to harbour the sort of knowledge 
and experience required to lead in the construction of legislation.  Another reason for a 
democratic assembly’s inability to lead in this sense related to the complexity of the law itself.  
Throughout this process, ‘every provision of a law requires to be framed with the most 
accurate and long-sighted perception of its effect on all the other provisions; and the law 
when made should be capable of fitting into a consistent whole with the previously existing 
laws.’  This would be ‘impossible’ if each law was ‘voted clause by clause in a miscellaneous 
assembly.’727  It was at this point that Mill introduced a characteristically Utilitarian grievance.   
The incongruity of such a mode of legislating would strike all minds, were it not 
that our laws are already, as to form and construction, such a chaos, that the 
confusion and contradiction seem incapable of being made much greater by any 
addition to the mass.728   
The logistical demands of law-making, in Mill’s understanding, did not suit the nature of 
representative assemblies either.  ‘The mere time necessarily occupied in getting through 
bills, renders Parliament more and more incapable of passing any, except on detached and 
narrow points.’  The time required to properly consider the whole of any subject, which Mill 
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thought obligatory to an effective legislative process, would mean that any bill of importance 
would hang over ‘from session to session through the sheer impossibility of finding time to 
dispose of it.’729   
Finally, if a bill were to make it through ‘the tribunal of ignorance’ successfully, the committee 
process would dismember and disfigure it to the extent that it became unworkable.  ‘Clauses 
omitted which are essential to the working of the rest; incongruous ones inserted to conciliate 
some private interest, or some crotchety member who threatens to delay the bill; articles 
foisted in on the motion of some sciolist with a mere smattering of the subject, leading to 
consequences which the member who introduced or those who supported the bill did not at 
the moment foresee, and which need an amending act in the next session to correct their 
mischiefs.’730   
Mill’s Commission would be connected to the democratic process by an indissoluble link.  In 
legislation ‘the only task to which a representative assembly can possibly be competent is not 
that of doing the work, but of causing it to be done’.  This entailed the democratic body 
‘determining to whom or to what sort of people it shall be confided, and giving or withholding 
the national sanction to it when performed.’731  Parliament would retain the ability to accept 
or reject the proposals put forth by the Commission Mill proposed, but it would not be able 
to amend them.  This was the mark of a government characterised by ‘a high state of 
civilization’.732  Mill offered an example of such a civilization to which he was personally 
committed.   
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The necessity of some provision corresponding to this was felt even in the 
Athenian Democracy, where, in the time of its most complete ascendancy, the 
popular Ecclesia could pass psephisms (mostly decrees on single matters of policy), 
but laws, so called, could only be made or altered by a different and less numerous 
body, renewed annually, called the Nomothetæ, whose duty it also was to revise 
the whole of the laws, and keep them consistent with one another.733   
Thus, legislative leadership in democracy was the domain of a certain variety of person.  The 
qualities that Mill identified as characteristic of such a person are essential to the effective 
construction and situation of laws.  The authority of these legislative officials was to be 
exercised in and through the collective body of which each was a part, the Legislative 
Commission.   
Mill supplemented his Legislative Commission with an English Senate.  His proposal, modelled 
on its Roman forebear, was intended to contribute to individual and collective improvement 
in its own way.  It offered two distinct advantages that Mill valued: the balance it offered to 
the popular chamber and the experience and ability of those who would compose it.   At the 
outset of his chapter ‘Of a Second Chamber’, Mill told readers that he did not see in 
bicameralism the same advantages as many of his contemporaries.  ‘I attach little weight to 
the argument oftenest urged for having two Chambers – to prevent precipitancy, and compel 
a second deliberation’.734   
Tocqueville had claimed this benefit for such institutions in his Démocratie, with which Mill 
was more than familiar.735  However, Mill had little esteem for any form of government that 
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did not impose on ‘established forms of business…many more than two deliberations’ as a 
matter of course.736  If this was not the benefit such bodies offered, then what did they confer 
on democratic government that it otherwise lacked?  Mill answered this challenge swiftly.  
The advantage of a second chamber lay in its ability to present a barrier to the egoism of a 
solitary legislative body.  ‘The consideration which tells most, in my judgment, in favour of 
two Chambers’, he believed, ‘is the evil effect produced upon the mind of any holder of 
power, whether an individual or an assembly, by the consciousness of having only themselves 
to consult.’737  It was for this reason that the Romans had embraced a dual consulship.   
The same reason which induced the Romans to have two consuls makes it 
desirable there should be two Chambers – that neither of them may be exposed 
to the corrupting influence of undivided power even for the space of a single 
year.738   
In a democratic age, it was necessary that this take a particular form.  In every polity, Mill 
thought, a ‘centre of resistance’ is required in order to counteract the ‘predominant power’.  
The contemporary state of civilization demanded a body able to offer ‘resistance to the 
democracy’.739   
At this point Mill introduced two caveats.  Firstly, any assembly constituted so as to place 
some ‘restraint upon the democracy’, in order to be effective, had to command significant 
‘social support’ outside of Parliament.740  Secondly, a body like this had to be ‘composed of 
elements which, without being open to the imputation of class interests adverse to the 
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majority’ was able ‘to oppose itself to the class interests of the majority’.  As such, the House 
of Lords was ill-suited to play this role in contemporary Britain.  It was itself characterized by 
class interest and, given the progress of the people in number and riches, could no longer 
command the sort of social support outside of Parliament needed to fulfil this function 
efficaciously.741   
However, the advantages of Mill’s modern Senate extended to a much wider object than that 
of being a break on the popular assembly, though this last should not be underestimated as 
a motor of progress in Mill’s mind.  The Senate had the happy consequence of introducing 
into democratic legislatures a body of men (and, no doubt, women in Mill’s figuring) able to 
facilitate progress.  Furthermore, the body that Mill envisaged had a clear antecedent in the 
ancient world.  ‘Of all the principles on which a wisely conservative body, destined to 
moderate and regulate democratic ascendancy, could possibly be constructed, the best 
seems to be that exemplified in the Roman Senate, itself the most consistently prudent and 
sagacious body that ever administered public affairs.’742   
Democratic polities’ shortcomings were those of the people themselves, as it represented 
them in its composition, proclivities and actions.  In order to correct its excesses a 
corresponding assembly was required that embodied the features of ‘special training and 
knowledge’ in which it was deficient.  ‘If one House represents popular feeling, the other 
should represent personal merit, tested and guaranteed by actual public service and fortified 
by practical experience.’743  Mill put this another way.   
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If one is the People’s Chamber, the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen – 
a council composed of all living public men who have passed through important 
political office or employment.744   
Evidently, Mill thought that such a Senate would be able to act as a check on the democratic 
body.  It would be able to command support from a sizeable constituency outside of 
Parliament and would not exercise a class interest adverse to that of the majority in the 
manner of an aristocracy.  How could it when it would possess no esprit de corps like that of 
an aristocracy?   
But, Mill enthused, ‘Such a Chamber would be fitted for much more than to be a merely 
moderating body.  It would not be exclusively a check, but also an impelling force.’  As well as 
enjoying ‘the power of holding the people back’, it, by virtue of its composition, would ‘be 
most inclined to lead them forward in any right course.’745  In other words, it was a body of 
proven leaders that would be able to direct the majority in the path of progress.  Mill stated 
this directly.  ‘The council to whom the task would be intrusted of rectifying the people’s 
mistakes’, he believed, ‘would not represent a class believed to be opposed to their interest, 
but would consist of their own natural leaders in the path of progress.746   
No other assembly could match one composed thus ‘in giving weight and efficacy’ to its 
function as a moderating force.  More significantly, though, it would be ‘foremost in 
promoting improvements’, Mill claimed, due to the quality of its members.  He gave his 
readers an overview of the sort of people such a body might contain in modern Britain.   
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All who were or had been members of the Legislative Commission described in a 
former chapter, and which I regard as an indispensable ingredient in a well 
constituted popular government.  All who were or had been chief justices, or 
heads of any of the superior courts of law or equity.  All who had for five years 
filled the office of puisne judge.  All who had held for two years any cabinet office; 
but these should also be eligible to the House of Commons, and, if elected 
members of it, their peerage or senatorial office should be held in suspense…All 
who had filled the office of commander-in-chief; and all who, having commanded 
an army or a fleet, had been thanked by Parliament for military or naval successes.  
All governors general of India or British America, and all who had held for ten years 
any colonial governorships.  The permanent civil service should also be 
represented; all should be senators who had filled, during ten years, the important 
offices of under-secretary to the Treasury, permanent under-secretary of State, or 
any others equally high and responsible.747   
The proposals that Mill made for a Legislative Commission and an English Senate reflected 
the criticisms he levelled at democratic political arrangements.  The Commission would 
ensure that laws were made in the public interest and with long term consequences in mind.  
The Senate would balance the popular chamber’s naivety with concrete experience.  It would 
also act as a check on the ambitions of the democratic chamber, thus furthering liberty.  
Finally, as a result of the calibre of persons appointed to it, the Senate would be an engine of 
progress at the heart of the modern democratic polity.   
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Mill’s devices for facilitating appropriate political leadership in democracies were thus 
intended to correct the deficiencies of democratic political culture: inexperience, mediocrity, 
indecisiveness and tyrannical domination.  Of course, Mill did not impose any social criteria 
on the leaders he identified.  They were to be selected according to their talent and 
experience alone.748  Their aim was to ensure continued progressive development in the 
contemporary world.   
Tocqueville located democracy’s natural leaders in the judiciary.749  ‘There is hardly any 
political question in the United States’, Tocqueville argued, ‘that sooner or later does not turn 
into a judicial question.’  Cheryl Welch argued that Tocqueville situated the legal profession 
in neither political nor civil life, but somewhere in between.750  A cynic might claim that 
Tocqueville was preaching for his own church: he was a jurist by training and longed to enter 
politics.  However, the legal profession offered a means of attaining Tocqueville’s central goal: 
freedom.  Paul Carrese argued that the legal profession and judicial arena provided ‘an 
indispensable means of maintaining human liberty in the modern world’ because of the habits 
of mind a common law spirit induced in both the populace and the public arena.751   
Tocqueville saw in the United States that most public men had been jurists at some stage in 
their career and this experience ensured that the ‘habits and the turn of ideas that belong to 
                                                          
748 This is evident from the sorts of people he chose to comprise his English Senate already described.  It is also 
borne out in the strictures he placed on civil service recruitment in his Considerations.  See CW XIX, pp.528-533.   
749 F.G. Wilson argued that Tocqueville was interested in discovering the means of producing great men in the 
modern world.  ‘Great men’, Wilson states in channelling Tocqueville’s opinion, ‘may be able to check the 
dangers involved in social power’, by which is meant the power of democracy.  See F.G. Wilson, ‘Tocqueville’s 
Conception of the Elite’, in The Review of Politics, Vol.4, Issue 3 (July, 1942), p.274.  Were jurists Tocqueville’s 
great men?  Certainly, they had the capacity to be greater, at least, than their peers.   
750 Welch, Tocqueville, p.68.   
751 P.O. Carrese, ‘Judicial Statesmanship, the Jurisprudence of Individualism, and Tocqueville’s Common Law 
Spirit’, The Review of Politics, Vol.60, No.3 (Summer, 1998), pp.481-482.  The legal system is the one element of 
aristocracy that Seymour Drescher accepts Tocqueville promoted.  And it had a distinct utility.  ‘In the American 
case at lease,’ he states, ‘the common-law tradition survived the Revolutionary War.  Its federal courts were well 
positioned to moderate majoritarian tides.’  See Drescher, ‘Who Need Ancienneté’, p.629.   
220 
 
jurists pass into the handling of public affairs.’  Judicial language entered the agora; the jurist’s 
spirit had spread beyond the confines of the courtroom and infiltrated politics and society.  
Finally, ‘the entire people finishes by acquiring a part of the habits and tastes of the 
magistrate.’752   
But what characterized this all-pervasive spirit of the jurist?  Tocqueville was eager to 
enlighten his audience.  In the United States, judges were ‘irremovable’.  This in itself bore 
important consequences.  ‘From the moment when a public official is vested with an office 
for life, he takes a personal interest in society remaining immobile.’  Henceforth, if he is not 
the ‘enemy of progress’, he is certainly the ‘enemy of revolutions’.  By education, the legal 
man had acquired the taste for ‘stability and he becomes attached to stability by inclination.’  
In short, Tocqueville claimed, ‘in what could be called the spirit of the jurist there is something 
singularly aristocratic.’753   
Jurists were possessed of a philosophical mentality.  They did not allow themselves ‘to be 
preoccupied by a fact but by the ensemble of facts, not by a particular period but by the 
succession of times’.754  They were the natural governors of democratic society.  They were 
those who had been ‘called upon to play the first role in the political society trying to be born.’  
They possessed ‘a certain taste for forms’, Tocqueville thought, and ‘a sort of instinctive love 
for the regular succession of ideas’.  Naturally, they were ‘strongly opposed to the 
revolutionary spirit and to the unthinking passions of democracy.’755  The highly specialist 
knowledge that jurists acquired in the course of their education and training made them ‘a 
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separate rank in society.’  These men ‘form a sort of privileged class among intelligent 
people.’756 
Each day they rediscover the idea of this superiority in the exercise of their 
profession; they are masters of a necessary science, the knowledge of which is not 
widespread; they serve as arbiters among citizens, and the habit of leading the 
blind passions of the litigants toward the goal gives them a certain contempt for 
the judgment of the crowd.757   
The links that form between them, through their access to the privileged knowledge of the 
law, and the spirit that it induces in them leads them, quite naturally, to ‘form a corps.’  Their 
aristocratic status was thus completed.  ‘Like the aristocracy,’ Tocqueville noted, ‘they have 
an instinctive propensity for order, a natural love of forms; like the aristocracy, they conceive 
a great distaste for the actions of the multitude and secretly despise the government of the 
people.’758   
Tocqueville was even clearer about the status of jurists as this chapter progressed.  ‘If you ask 
me where I place the American aristocracy, I would answer without hesitating that it is not 
among the rich who have no common bond that gathers them together.’  On the contrary, it 
‘is at the lawyers’ bar and on the judges’ bench.’759  Jurists were a body through which a novel 
variety of authority could be exercised.  This manifested itself in at least three distinct ways.  
First, in the United States, every political question was ultimately modified and changed into 
a legal question.  This gave judges the power to apply their authority to political matters.  
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Second, most political actors – seemingly at both a national and local level in Tocqueville’s 
view – were or had once been lawyers.  This gave the legal corps a dominance over the 
machinery of government.  Finally, and as a result of the preceding factors, the spirit of the 
jurist extended from the courtroom and into society as a whole.  The mentality and habits of 
the courtroom came to dominate even the meanest individual’s existence.   
Tocqueville seems to have had little issue with jurists acquiring such power.  Perhaps it was 
because he considered them to be ‘the sole counterweight of democracy.’760  Or, perhaps it 
was because the ‘jurist belongs to the people by his interest and by his birth’ despite having 
the ‘habits’ and ‘tastes’ of an aristocrat.761  Certainly both of these loomed large in 
Tocqueville’s thought.  The jurist was the medium through which the traits of aristocracy 
could be transposed onto the patchwork of democratic society.  And, like any aristocracy, a 
juridical one operated politically.  Tocqueville’s notes to this chapter attest to his 
understanding of its political potential. 
When you examine political society in the United States, you notice at first glance 
only a single principle that seems to bind all the parts strongly together: the people 
appear as the sole power.  Nothing seems able to oppose their will or to thwart 
their designs. 
But here is a man who appears in a way above the people; he does not get his 
mandate from them; he has, so to speak, nothing to fear from their anger, nor 
anything to hope from their favour.  He is vested, however, with more power than 
                                                          
760 Ibid.   
761 Ibid, p.436.   
223 
 
any one of the representatives of the people; for, with a single blow, he can strike 
with sterility the work emanating from the common will.762 
The legal power that the United States had consecrated in the jurist made him perhaps the 
most powerful individual in the country.  Did Tocqueville approve of jurists’ newfound 
eminence?  Certainly, his commentary on their status was adulatory.  As much as he knew 
democracy was the only social and political state possible in the modern world he did not like 
it particularly.  A note Tocqueville wrote in November 1841 in clarification of his political 
opinions confirms this reading.  ‘I have for democratic institutions a reasonable taste, but I 
am aristocratic by instinct, that is to say I fear and despise the crowd.’763  The most telling 
passage in regard to Tocqueville’s view of this new aristocracy of sorts emphasized its 
importance to the maintenance of modern democracy.   
The body of jurists forms the only aristocratic element that can mingle with the 
natural elements of democracy without effort and combine with them in a happy 
and enduring way.  I am not unaware of the faults inherent in the spirit of jurists; 
without this mixture of the spirit of jurists with the democratic spirit, I doubt, 
however, that democracy could govern society for long, and I cannot believe that 
today a republic could hope to maintain its existence, if the influence of jurists in 
public affairs did not increase in proportion to the power of the people.764   
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Tocqueville was thus content to acknowledge the claims of jurists to exercise political power.  
It was the sole force by which the genuine aristocratic spirit – as opposed to a false one – 
could be maintained.   
However, it was an aristocratic spirit grounded on the successful rise of capable individuals.  
It was not a caste defined by birth or wealth; it was an aristocracy of talent.  Tocqueville was 
content to replace the leaders of the ancien régime with a new variety of aristocrat, the jurist, 
arrived at via a novel mechanism, la carrière ouverte aux talents.765  Wilson claimed that 
Tocqueville was ‘like Aristotle’ as a result of this tendency in his thought.  The Frenchman, 
Wilson argued, ‘wanted a polity which would be a combination of democracy and 
oligarchy’.766  This is too strong.  However, what is certain is that Tocqueville was searching 
for a means to incorporate the spirit of aristocracy within the heart of democracy.  This would 
dilute democratic political culture and, in so doing, help to facilitate liberty by erecting 
barriers to popular power.   
The leaders of modern democratic society that Tocqueville and Mill identified offered a 
means of correcting the excesses of democratic political culture via liberal means.  They 
sought to acquire new leaders, not through the ballot box, but through the self-selecting 
mechanism of talent.  Carlyle intended that the leaders he championed would be discovered 
by the same mechanism.  However, they were supposed to correct the problems inherent in 
democratic political arrangements by the effective abolition of such institutions and not by 
subtly balancing them with a form of leadership based on a contrary principle.   
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The propositions Carlyle tendered were grounded on the portion of democratic dogma he 
found convincing: equal access to careers.  As I outlined above, Carlyle was a proponent of la 
carrière ouverte aux talents and this underpinned his notion of modern political mechanisms 
and institutions.  Indeed, Levin recognized this feature of Carlyle’s political thought.  In it, 
according to Levin, there lies, ‘a kind of social rather than political democracy’ inasmuch as 
‘the ablest man might come from any part of society and should not have his path blocked by 
anachronistic and dysfunctional social attitudes.’767 
In Carlyle’s view, the apparatus of government should be engineered so as to elicit talented 
governors from all sections of the populace.  I gave ample evidence of this in the third chapter 
of this thesis.  However, it bears restating with fresh evidence.  In the fourth of his Latter-Day 
Pamphlets. ‘The New Downing Street’, Carlyle made this case anew.  ‘Who’ he asked, ‘are 
available to your offices in Downing Street?’  ‘All the gifted souls, of every rank, who are born 
to you in this generation.’  Moreover, Carlyle felt so strongly about the claim to power and 
influence possessed by these people that he grounded it in an idiosyncratic variety of natural 
law.  Such individuals had been ‘appointed, by the true eternal ‘divine right’ which will never 
become obsolete, to be your governors and administrators’.  The manner in which modern 
governments chose to ‘employ them, or neglect to employ them,’ would determine whether 
a ‘State be favoured by Heaven or disfavoured.’768   
Carlyle utilized the language of the prophet to emphasize a point he had expressed previously, 
in other places, in secular terms.  He returned to more moderate language in the paragraph 
immediately after his prophetic outburst: ‘To promote men of talent, to search and sift the 
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whole society in every class for men of talent, and joyfully promote them, has not always 
been found impossible.  In many forms of polity they have done it, and still do it, to a certain 
degree.’769   
Carlyle had addressed two examples of such a political system in earlier works, On Heroes and 
Past and Present.770  In this case, his thoughts turned towards the example he had proposed 
in the latter.  ‘Think, for example, of the old Catholic Church,’ Carlyle noted, ‘in its merely 
terrestrial relations to the State’.771  The ensuing paragraph outlined Carlyle’s thoughts on the 
beneficial character of the medieval Catholic Church in promoting the social mobility of 
talented individuals in a polity in stark contrast to that which Carlyle saw around him.772  
Ecclefechan’s most famous son had been committed to social mobility for a considerable 
time.  Some of his earliest writings hint at it, but his clearest statement comes in On Heroes, 
in which he declared it consonant with progress.   
There is clear truth in the idea that a struggle from the lower classes of society, 
towards the upper regions and rewards of society, must ever continue.  Strong 
men are born there, who ought to stand elsewhere than there.  The manifold, 
inextricably complex, universal struggle of these constitutes, and must constitute, 
what is called the progress of society.773   
What was required in the modern world, Carlyle thought, was a similar means of ensuring 
that talented individuals – from whatever social background – could rise to the head of affairs.  
The Scotsman advocated the creation of a new aristocracy of talent, as he called it.  ‘We must 
                                                          
769 Ibid, p.131.   
770 See Carlyle, On Heroes, p.208 & Carlyle, Past and Present, pp.81-95.   
771 CE XX, p.131.   
772 Ibid, pp.131-132.   
773 Carlyle, On Heroes, p.144.   
227 
 
have more Wisdom to govern us,’ he maintained in Past and Present, ‘we must be governed 
by the Wisest, we must have an Aristocracy of Talent!’774   
In the absence of such a system of government, society was exposed to all of the problems 
that could be expected from the leadership of the incapable or, at the very least, those of 
mediocre capacities.  This had become apparent in the contemporary world.  ‘Indisputable 
enough to all mortals now,’ Carlyle declared, ‘the guidance of this country has not been 
sufficiently wise; men too foolish have been set to the guiding and governing of it, and have 
guided it hither; we must find wiser, – wiser, or else we perish!’775   
A new aristocracy of talent or meritocracy had to be constructed in the wake of the fall of the 
former aristocracy of birth.  Democracy had cleared the decks for its arrival Carlyle thought; 
it was in this that he located its primary service to the world.  Meritocracy itself, Carlyle 
contended, was the only form of government that accorded with the tenets of natural law.  
Democracy, which he thought contravened the principles enunciated by natural law – to the 
extent that it abrogated the very notion of hierarchy – was, paradoxically, the means by which 
political arrangements could be placed in accordance with its precepts once more.  It had laid 
the foundations for a new hierarchy.   
But, how to achieve it?  Carlyle is often criticized for his impracticality.  The shrill of many 
voices has announced his mastery of criticism; far fewer recognize the gravity of his proposals’ 
constructiveness.  And yet, in a number of places Carlyle offered a route back to meritocracy 
through the apparatus of democracy.  The first appeared in Past and Present.  It was here that 
the Scotsman proclaimed to the world his vision of a modern aristocracy, fit to meet the 
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challenges presented by the new democratic age.  It was populated by the eponymous 
Captains of Industry.   
Carlyle drew a distinction between two types of aristocrat, each of which existed in the 
contemporary world: the unworking aristocracy and the working aristocracy.  The former, he 
continued, was that ‘class of men’ who ‘live sumptuously on the marrow of the earth; 
permitted simply, nay entreated, and as yet entreated in vain, to do nothing at all in return’.  
Such a body ‘was never heretofore seen on the face of this Planet’, Carlyle maintained, and 
its very existence in the contemporary era had to be ‘transitory’.776  He was disgusted by a 
corporate body in this mould: possessed of power, wealth and position, but concerned only 
with luxury.  This was the state into which the landed aristocracy of birth had fallen.   
Its contrary was the working aristocracy.  Populated by ‘Mill-owners, Manufacturers, 
Commanders of Working Men’, it did contribute to the order and prosperity of the country.  
Carlyle granted that it required reform – it ‘must strike into a new path; must understand that 
money alone is not the representative either of man’s success in the world, or of man’s duties 
to man’ – but, nonetheless, this was an aristocracy he thought admirable.777  These 
industrialists, in Carlyle’s opinion, ‘are virtually the Captains of the World; if there be no 
nobleness in them, there will never be an Aristocracy more.’778  Their job, however, was not 
to imitate ‘the old Captains of Slaughter’, but to combat the ‘Chaos’ inherent in the modern 
world and the ‘Necessity’ it implied.779   
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Carlyle did not consign the individual to the vagaries of fatalism.  Indeed, this was one of the 
many things he complained about in the contemporary political order.  He endeavoured to 
liberate man from these shackles.  In order to be free, though, Carlyle contended that one 
must subordinate oneself to a recognized superior.  In other words, to one who had proven 
himself meritorious.  ‘To order, to just subordination’, Carlyle announced, ‘noble loyalty in 
return for noble guidance.’  In this way, society would no longer represent ‘a bewildered 
bewildering mob’, but ‘a firm regimented mass’.780  The Scotsman’s proposal represented, in 
many respects, a contract: loyal obedience in return for genuine leadership.  But such 
submission, in his understanding, was due only to those genuine leaders who led the fight 
against chaos and necessity.  All others were doomed to disappear.   
Captains of Industry represented the obvious repository of talent and energy in Carlyle’s era.  
They were the class that was leading the way in the marvels of industrial enterprise and were 
gradually coming to eclipse their landed forebears in wealth and power.  It is unsurprising that 
Carlyle chose such men as the standard bearers for his new conception of leadership.  
However, they were not the only people he plumbed for.  In ‘Downing Street’, another of his 
Latter-Day Pamphlets, Carlyle suggested the present political system be reformed so as to 
enable any talented person to be selected for office.781   
He recognized that ‘whatever be the uses and duties, real or supposed, of a Secretary in 
Parliament, his faculty to accomplish these is a point entirely unconnected with his ability to 
get elected into Parliament’.782  Money or status was no indication of talent.  ‘Lord Tommy 
and the Honourable John’, Carlyle continued, ‘are not a whit better qualified for 
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Parliamentary duties, to say nothing of Secretary duties, than plain Tom and Jack; they are 
merely better qualified, as matters stand, for getting admitted to try them.’  This state of 
affairs, the Scotsman thought, ‘a reforming Premier, much in want of abler men to help him,’ 
would alter.783  Carlyle’s proposal for remedying this affront to talent resembled the modern 
House of Lords.   
The Proposal is, That Secretaries under and upper, that all manner of changeable 
or permanent servants in the Government Offices shall be selected without 
reference to their power of getting into Parliament; – that, in short, the Queen 
shall have the power of nominating the half-dozen or half-score Officers of the 
Administration, whose presence is thought necessary in Parliament, to official 
seats there, without reference to any constituency but her own only, which of 
course will mean her Prime Minister’s.784   
Carlyle believed this proposition a ‘very small encroachment on the present constitution of 
Parliament’, which offered ‘the minimum of change in present methods, and I almost think a 
maximum in results to be derived therefrom.’785  Carlyle had thus presented two types of 
leader and, what is more, complimentary social and political means of organization that were 
appropriate for the modern era.  In the social sphere, this manifested itself in his theory of 
the Captains of Industry; in the narrowly political, it showed itself in his desire to select any 
individual who demonstrated a talent for governing and raise him to a position of authority.  
It was via these mechanisms – industry and progressive politics – that Carlyle sought to 
remedy the acute problems of leadership he had identified in the contemporary world.  Only 
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in finding such new leaders could competence be ensured in the management of society’s 
affairs.   
 
REWORKING SOCIETY   
Thus far, this chapter has outlined the manner in which Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle sought 
to re-engineer political institutions in order to correct the problems of democracy and create 
a liberal, in the case of Tocqueville and Mill, or stable, for Carlyle, political culture with 
appropriate leaders exercising governmental authority.  What remains of the present chapter 
will examine how Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle sought to achieve these goals in the domain of 
society.   
Mill desired to see discredited established authorities replaced.  This is clear from his earliest 
writings and reflects his Utilitarian upbringing.  His rejection of the prevailing aristocracy of 
birth and his discovery of Coleridge led him to consider the sort of cultural leadership that 
could be offered by a reconstituted clergy or, in Coleridgean terms, clerisy.  Mill honoured 
Coleridge for his advocacy of a clerisy and for having rescued the notion of a leisured class, 
endowed by the state, from the criticisms of ‘Bentham and Adam Smith and the whole 
eighteenth century’.  Contrary to Bentham and Smith, Mill valued this sort of spiritual body 
because he considered it to be the means through which progress could be achieved.  ‘That 
such a class is likely to be behind, instead of before, the progress of knowledge, is an induction 
erroneously drawn from the peculiar circumstances of the last two centuries, and in 
contradiction to all the rest of modern history.’786   
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How could such a body facilitate progress?  In the earliest essay in which he addressed this 
subject, on Corporation and Church Property, Mill suggested that the redirection of means 
from institutions, such as the church and universities, that had been useful formerly, to the 
new clerisy he proposed was a mechanism through which resources could be allocated to 
those most likely to make productive use of them.  He claimed that it was in the public interest 
to reassign monies of this kind, especially in light of prevailing political developments, to a 
new corporation.  ‘For no one can help seeing that one of the most pressing of the duties 
which Parliamentary Reform has devolved upon our public men, is that of deciding what 
honestly may, and, supposing this determined, what should, be done with the property of the 
Church, and of the various Public Corporations.’787  Despite protestations from his opponents, 
Mill held that such a redirection was perfectly legitimate and would not amount to theft 
because ‘there is no fear of robbing a dead man; and no reasonable man who gave his money 
when living, for the benefit of the community, would have desired that his mode of benefiting 
the community should be adhered to when a better could be found.’788   
Mill maintained that Coleridge had proposed a means by which these funds could be 
employed more usefully.  Church officials, both thought, could have no complaints.  He 
reminded contemporaries that in ‘the minds of our ancestors they presented themselves, not 
solely as ministers for going through the ceremonial of religion, nor even solely as religious 
teachers in the narrow sense, but as the lettered class; the clerici or clerks’.  They had been 
‘appointed generally to prosecute all those studies, and diffuse all those impressions, which 
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constituted mental culture, as then understood; which fitted the mind of man for his 
condition, destiny, and duty, as a human being’.789  Mill went on:  
A national clerisy or clergy, as Mr. Coleridge conceives it, would be a grand 
institution for the education of the whole people: not their school education 
merely, though that would be included in the scheme; but for training and rearing 
them, by systematic culture continued throughout life, to the highest perfection 
of their mental and spiritual nature.790   
These were themes that he restated in his paean to Coleridge seven years later.791   
Mill’s clerisy, though, was not simply a mode of maintaining progress in new conditions.   In 
the second review he authored on Tocqueville’s Démocratie, Mill advised the Frenchman that 
such a Coleridgean scheme could provide a locus of authoritative leadership, which would be 
at the head of public opinion.  This could offset the problems posed by the reign of democracy.  
‘What is requisite in politics’, Mill argued, ‘is not that public opinion should not be, what it is 
and must be, the ruling power; but that, in order to the formation of the best public opinion, 
there should exist somewhere a great social support for opinions and sentiments different 
from those of the mass.’  Mill was typically historicist.  ‘The shape which that support may 
best assume is a question of time, place, and circumstance’, he believed, but, in the new era 
that had dawned ‘there can be no doubt about the elements which must compose it: they 
are, an agricultural class, a leisured class, and a learned class.’792   
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These elements of society would counterbalance the excesses of public opinion and offer a 
counterweight to the prevailing commercial spirit.  In Mill’s mind, they were of substantial 
importance to his world’s chances.  Their existence offered one of the ‘greatest advantages 
of this country over America’, Mill contended, ‘and we believe that the interests of the time 
to come are greatly dependent upon preserving them; and upon their being rendered, as they 
much require to be, better and better qualified for their important functions.’793  The prospect 
of a better future rested on the combined talent of the landed, leisured and learned elites; 
that of property, wealth and intelligence in other words.   
Comte had proposed something similar as a component part of the Religion of Humanity.  
Initially, Mill had been enthusiastic about Comte’s pouvoir spirituel, but later distanced 
himself from the Frenchman’s conception of a national spiritual power.  By 1844, he had 
begun to see the cracks in Comte’s and, therefore, probably Coleridge’s, clerical bodies.  ‘It is, 
no doubt, the characteristic evil incident to a corporation of priests, that the exaltation of 
their order becomes, in and for itself, a primary object, to which the ends of the institution 
are often sacrificed.’  The obvious historical example was ‘the Romish Church’.  It was through 
this sort of ‘exaltation’ that its members had attempted to attain their ends.794  Writing to his 
wife, Harriet, from Rome in 1855 Mill argued that Comte’s system of social reform amounted 
– more than any other – to ‘liberticide’.795   
On Liberty preached in similar terms.  Comte’s Système de Politique Positive recommended 
nothing other than ‘a despotism over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the 
political ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers.’796  Comte 
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rejected all such charges in an exchange of letters.797  Mill persisted regardless.  In his review 
of the Frenchman’s philosophy late in life, Mill charged that Comte’s notion of the pouvoir 
spirituel amounted to ‘nothing less than a spiritual despotism’.798  In spite of his vitriol, Mill 
did not reject the spiritual authority of the educated to the degree suggested by, among 
others, Gregory Claeys.799  He allowed that it was desirable that a body of eminent men should 
exist in order to exercise influence over prevailing opinions.  Ultimately, all he rejected was 
the idea that they should be affiliated and incorporated into a centralized body.800  
Hamburger expressed this feature of Mill’s thought most precisely.801  Mill believed ‘that in 
order that this salutary ascendancy over opinion should be exercised by the most eminent 
thinkers, it is not necessary that they should be associated and organized.  The ascendancy 
will come of itself when the unanimity is attained’.802   
Tocqueville had no wish to endow a modern clerical establishment with cultural influence or 
to rely on a dispersed variety of this sort of entity.  His musings on the sort of barriers that 
could be erected against democracy were far more practical and less utopian that Mill’s 
clerisy.  He saw in associations of individuals a powerful bulwark to the dominance of the 
majority in democratic societies.  In the second volume of his Démocratie, Tocqueville argued 
that it was ‘clear that, if each citizen, as he becomes individually weaker and therefore more 
incapable of preserving his liberty by himself alone, did not learn the art of uniting with his 
fellows to defend his liberty, tyranny would necessarily grow with equality.’803   
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Tocqueville was building on those comments he had made in regard to associations in the 
1835 volume of Démocratie.  In this instance, he claimed that ‘Of all the countries in the world, 
America has taken greatest advantage of association and has applied this powerful means of 
action to the greatest variety of objectives.’  Already, as I showed above, Tocqueville had 
alluded to those political associations that diluted the power of the state.  But, civil 
associations were different.  ‘Apart from permanent associations created by the law, known 
as towns, cities and counties,’ Tocqueville wrote, ‘a multitude of others owe their birth and 
development only to individual wills.’804   
What sort of advantages did civil associations confer on a democracy?  Tocqueville saw in 
them another means of preventing majority tyranny in democratic countries.  ‘In our time,’ 
he argued, ‘freedom of association has become a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of 
the majority.’805  Associations were able to do this because they provided a shelter for those 
individuals, distinguished or otherwise, who did not find themselves in agreement with mass 
opinion.  By associating, such individuals could establish an effective bulwark against the 
majority’s claims.   
In the United States, once a party has become dominant, all public power passes 
into its hands; its particular friends hold all posts and have the use of all organized 
forces.  Not able to break through the barrier that separates them from power, 
the most distinguished men of the opposite party must be able to establish 
themselves outside of it; with its whole moral strength, the minority must resist 
the material power that oppresses it.806   
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Tocqueville accepted that civil associations could be dangerous in themselves, but thought 
such organizations the lesser of two evils.  ‘The omnipotence of the majority appears to me 
to be such a great peril for the American republics’, he maintained, ‘that the dangerous means 
used to limit it still seem good to me.’807   
Tocqueville compared the influence of associations to those of towns, which he had lauded, 
and, more interestingly, to aristocracies.  ‘Here I will express a thought that will recall what I 
said elsewhere about town liberties’, he noted.  Towns, Tocqueville had already told his 
readers, provided a powerful check on the intentions of the popular will in democratic 
countries.  Aristocracies had performed a very similar function in regard to the will of the 
monarch in former ages.  Tocqueville’s words on the necessity of secondary bodies to correct 
the abuses of absolute power recall to mind the work of Montesquieu.808   
There are no countries where associations are more necessary, to prevent the 
despotism of parties or the arbitrariness of the prince, than those where the social 
state is democratic.  Among aristocratic nations, secondary bodies form natural 
associations that stop the abuses of power.  In countries where such associations 
do not exist, if individuals cannot artificially and temporarily create something that 
resembles those natural associations, I no longer see any dike against any sort of 
tyranny; and a great people can be oppressed with impunity by a factious handful 
of individuals or by a man.809   
Similarities existed between Mill’s clerisy and Tocqueville’s associations.  Both were intended 
to act as a bulwark against the majority’s dominance of democratic society.  However, there 
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were clear differences.  Tocqueville did not present his associations as a means of collecting 
eminent men for the purpose of defining national culture.  He perceived them simply as 
combinations of individuals opposed to majority opinion.  This was a very different type of 
institution to the one suggested by Mill.   
Carlyle, for his part, also suggested new variety of social institution that could remedy some 
of the problems presented by democratic society.  His proposal, though, was very different to 
those offered by Tocqueville and Mill.  In many respects, the organization of labour that 
Carlyle suggested, which is discussed above, was as much a means of reworking society as it 
was of redesigning the state.  The reason for this was simple.  The regimentation of labour 
that Carlyle proposed was to be grounded on a novel form of social contract.  This would 
enshrine the ‘principle of Permanent Contract instead of Temporary.’810   
The principle of permanence in the formation of contracts was a means by which Carlyle 
determined to counter the chaotic nature of democracy and, alongside this, reinstitute the 
bonds of attachment that were sorely lacking in the modern democratic world.  Carlyle 
expressed the first of these through metaphor.   
The ‘tendency to persevere,’ to persist in spite of hindrances, discouragements 
and ‘impossibiliities:’ it is this that in all things distinguishes the strong soul from 
the weak; the civilised burgher from the nomadic savage, – the Species Man from 
the Genus Ape!  The Nomad has his very house set on wheels; the Nomad, and in 
a still higher degree the Ape, are all for ‘liberty;’ the privilege to flit continually is 
indispensable for them.  Alas, in how many ways, does our humour, in this swift-
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rolling, self-abrading Time, show itself nomadic, apelike; mournful enough to him 
that looks on it with eyes!811   
Life in modern democratic Britain resembled that of nomadic tribes.  Carlyle thought that this 
was morally debasing.  He wanted to tie individuals together for long periods of time to 
encourage stability and moral development.  ‘Month-long contracts please me little,’ he 
stated, ‘in any province where there can by possibility be found virtue enough for more.’  Such 
contracts, he thought, ‘do not answer well even with your house-servants; the liberty on both 
sides to change every month is growing very apelike, nomadic’.812   
Carlyle saw signs of progress around him.  ‘Some Permanence of Contract is already almost 
possible’, he maintained, ‘the principle of Permanence, year by year, better seen into and 
elaborated, may enlarge itself, expand gradually on every side into a system.’813  Carlyle saw 
in the sort of permanence he outlined the harbinger of moral progress.  It would facilitate the 
emergence of individual constancy as well as improved social relations.  ‘Once permanent,’ 
he argued, ‘you do not quarrel with the first difficulty on your path, and quit it in weak disgust; 
you reflect that it cannot be quitted, that it must be conquered, a wise arrangement fallen on 
with regard to it.’814  Such was the consequence of permanence for the development of 
constancy.  Carlyle used an equine metaphor to express the result of this new contract for 
social relations.  ‘The very horse that is permanent,’ he noted, ‘how much kindlier do his rider 
and he work, than the temporary one, hired on any hack principle yet known!’815   
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In his tract on the Nigger Question, Carlyle addressed this issue once more.  In fact, it is one 
of the fundamental bases of his argument in this essay.  ‘In all human relations’, Carlyle 
emphasized in this essay, ‘permanency is what I advocate; nomadism, continual change, is 
what I perceive to be prohibitory of any good whatsoever.’816  Carlyle compared the fleeting 
nature of contemporary relations to a system of ‘Marriage by the month’ in a passage 
suffused with irony.817  Carlyle reinforced this line of argument with gusto.   
I am prepared to maintain against all comers, That in every human relation, from 
that of husband and wife down to that of master and servant, nomadism is the 
bad plan, and continuance the good.  A thousand times, since I first had servants, 
it has occurred to me, How much better had I servants that were bound to me, 
and to whom I were bound!818   
This was the half-truth Carlyle recognized in slavery.  The question that remained Carlyle saw 
with clarity.  ‘How to abolish the abuses of slavery,’ Carlyle wrote, ‘and save the precious thing 
in it: alas, I do not pretend that this is easy, that it can be done in a day, or a single generation, 
or a single century: but I do surmise or perceive that it will, by straight methods or buy 
circuitous, need to be done’.819   
 
A NEW STATE OF POLITICS AND SOCIETY   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle sought to incorporate principles opposite to that of democracy 
into the modern polity.  They were intended to counteract a number of the undesirable 
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consequences of democratic society.  Tocqueville and Mill proposed means of counteracting 
the dominance of majority opinion and set up counterweights that would allow for the 
existence of minority views.  This was essential for the maintenance of human freedom in the 
modern world.  Carlyle was also an advocate of freedom and recognized the need to rework 
modern democratic government and society in order to promote it.  However, his conception 
of freedom was quite different to that held forth by Tocqueville and Mill.  Principally, Carlyle’s 
proposed reforms were intended to ensure that the state’s authority could facilitate stability.  
The sort of stability his reforms promoted would enable individuals to free themselves from 
the deprivations of poverty and the horror of uncertainty.  Ultimately, it would empower 
them.   
These reforms attacked the problems that each perceived in democracy.  Supplementary to 
them were new conceptions of the types of leader appropriate in the modern democratic 
world.  Mill thought that democratic states required leaders who possessed demonstrable 
competence in order to offset the mediocrity of the conventional democratic chiefs.  The 
leaders that he theorized were intended to supply popular governments with competent 
leadership.  Tocqueville, on the other hand, wanted to ensure that democratic leaders were 
possessed by an aristocratic spirit.  Unlike Mill, Tocqueville did not believe government to be 
a particularly difficult business.  However, he did think that those who rose to the top of 
democratic politics were often very mediocre.  They were also possessed by democratic 
culture.   
Tocqueville’s solution was to locate democracy’s natural aristocrats and proclaim their 
suitability as leaders.  Carlyle, for his part, stressed the necessity of finding capable leaders in 
the modern world.  In his view, the only measure by which a government official should be 
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chosen was talent.  He saw talented individuals all around him and championed their cause.  
Unlike Tocqueville and Mill, he did not require his leaders to have undergone a particular sort 
of training or to have had specific experience.  For Carlyle, talent was all that was required.  
Those who were already governing men (the Captains of Industry) were obvious candidates 
for leadership, but he did not restrict his pool to these men.   
Society itself was reconsidered by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  The suggestions made by 
Tocqueville and Mill in this domain were, once again, intended to limit the influence of the 
majority in democratic society.  Carlyle’s concern was different.  He intended to ensure that 
social bonds were maintained in an age that seemed destined to break them.  By instituting 
a new form of social contract, which was in direct contradiction to that proposed by the 
philosophes of the eighteenth-century, Carlyle thought he had discovered a mechanism to 
effect this end.   
The proposals made by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle in regard to the state and society were 
important parts of their respective quests to mitigate the problems inherent in democracy.  
However, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle realised that material changes to the institutions of the 
state and society would be of limited effectiveness on their own.  ‘Government can do much,’ 
Carlyle wrote in Past and Present, ‘but it can in no wise do all.’820  Carlyle was acutely aware 
of the limitations of material changes in the apparatus of government or society.   
Government, as the most conspicuous object in Society, is called upon to give 
signal of what shall be done; and, in many ways, to preside over, further, and 
command the doing of it.  But the Government cannot do, by all its signalling and 
commanding, what the Society is radically indisposed to do.  In the long-run every 
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Government is the exact symbol of its People, with their wisdom and unwisdom; 
we have to say, Like People like Government.821   
Mill made a similar point.  Good government was defined by its ability to facilitate progress.  
‘Conduciveness to Progress,’ Mill argued, ‘includes the whole excellence of a government.’  In 
the sense in which he used the term in this instance, he told his readers, ‘Progress is the idea 
of moving onward’.822  But, Mill conceived of progress in particular terms.  The cause and 
condition that ‘transcends all others’ as a basis for good government, he thought, ‘is the 
qualities of the human beings composing the society over which the government is 
exercised.’823   
Any regime that claimed to be tolerably good, then, had to improve those situated beneath 
it.  Mill stated this directly.  ‘The first element of good government,’ he noted, ‘being the 
virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most important 
point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and 
intelligence of the people themselves.’824  In other words, good government had to ‘increase 
the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually’.825  Mill thought this 
because he believed that the quality of any government reflected the capacity of its people.   
Tocqueville told his readers at an early stage in the Démocratie that he thought that American 
‘mores’ were ‘one of the great general causes to which maintaining the democratic republic 
in the United States can be attributed.’  He qualified what he meant by this phrase.  ‘I 
understand the expression mores’, he wrote, ‘in the sense that the ancients attached to the 
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word mores; I apply it not only to mores strictly speaking, which could be called habits of the 
heart, but to the different notions that men possess, to the diverse opinions that are current 
among them, and to the ensemble of ideas from which the habits of the mind are formed.’  
He concluded by noting that ‘by this word I understand the whole moral and intellectual state 
of a people.’826  Political and social machinery was important for mitigating the ill effects of 
modern democracy.  But, what was more important was the mental and moral condition of 
the individual.  In this, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were united.  It is to these themes that we 
will now turn.   
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CHAPTER 7   
SECURING SOCIETY: THE UTILITY OF RELIGION   
‘In the aftermath of the French Revolution,’ Martha Nussbaum argued, ‘the search for new 
forms of fraternity became almost an obsession.’827  How could society be held together in 
the novel conditions of a post-revolutionary world in which the traditional bonds of faith and 
honour had been irremediably shattered?  Much of nineteenth-century political thought, 
Nussbaum continued, was intended to answer this question.  ‘It was widely agreed that 
people are possessed by egoism; the task of building decent and stable democracies depends 
on combating their narcissism, extending sympathy.’828   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle perceived the elements of a new social bond in religion.  Religion 
offered several benefits to society that would be difficult to realize in its absence.  This does 
not mean that Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle attempted to reinforce creeds and religious 
structures that had prevailed over European peoples and polities for centuries.  In fact, each 
had an unconventional relationship with religion in the abstract and Christianity in particular.  
The religious beliefs espoused by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle have been adequately covered 
by other authors and my intention in this chapter is not recapitulate their work.829   
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Instead, the present chapter will concentrate on what Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle thought 
about the political and social utility of religion.  Indeed, their belief in the usefulness of religion 
in this regard formed an eminent part of their political thought.  Religion provided 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle with a powerful means of rectifying many of the problems they 
had identified in modern democracy.  It was an important mechanism by which society could 
be maintained.  The bonds of a common morality could be furthered through the common 
ideas religion inculcated.  This would unite all individuals within society.  The shared moral 
outlook religion offered also provided the basis for some notion of the individual’s duty 
towards other members of the social body.  In encouraging the development of a common 
moral outlook, which suggested particular duties to individuals, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle 
considered religion an aid to virtue in the modern world.   
Religion’s ability to provide a shared moral outlook and some conception of reciprocal duties 
was dependent on the widespread acceptance of an authoritative creed.  This is the final 
instance in which Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were united in their notion of the place of 
religion in the modern world: it had to provide a widely accepted, and therefore authoritative, 
doctrine.  Despite this, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle advocated different religious outlooks.  
Certainly, each understood that traditional creeds could no longer offer the sort of benefits 
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they thought religion in general could, but their suggestions regarding replacements for 
outmoded beliefs were entirely different.   
 
A COMMON MORALITY   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were committed to the idea that a common morality was a 
necessary basis for all types of society, democratic or otherwise.  In the modern era it was 
particularly important, given the nature of the problems that each had identified in 
democracy.  Democratic society, as I highlighted in a previous chapter, was fissiparous.  It had 
abnegated the ties that once held people together and was increasingly alienating individuals 
from one another.  Democratic peoples required a set of shared values on which all – or, at 
least, most – could agree in order to maintain cohesion and sociability.  Religion, according to 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle, could offer such a set of values.   
Indeed, Jack Lively argued that ‘One of Tocqueville’s firmest beliefs was that a general 
religious faith was a necessary foundation of society’.830  In the second volume of the 
Frenchman’s work on American democracy he led his readers to this conclusion.  Tocqueville 
started by asserting the necessity of secure ideas.  Dogmatic beliefs, which he defined in his 
notes as opinions ‘that you have not had the time to examine yourself and that you accept on 
trust’, are both necessary and inescapable in any form of society.  Knowledge is limitless and 
if ‘each person undertook to form all his opinions for himself and to pursue truth in isolation, 
along paths opened up by himself alone, it is improbable that a great number of men would 
ever unite together in any common belief.’831   
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Common ideas were necessary for the maintenance of society and Tocqueville was eager to 
demonstrate this to his readers.  He argued that ‘it is easy to see that no society is able to 
prosper without similar beliefs, or rather none can continue to exist in such a way’.  To his 
mind it was clear that ‘without common ideas, there is no common action, and, without 
common action, there are still men, but not a social body.’  ‘So,’ he concluded, ‘for society to 
exist, and, with even more reason, for this society to prosper, all the minds of the citizens 
must always be brought and held together by some principal ideas’.832   
The fundamental problem in democratic ages was to find the source of such common 
opinions in order to counter the innate separatism of the modern psyche.  Tocqueville saw in 
religion an antidote to this problem.  Indeed, he maintained that ‘among all dogmatic beliefs, 
the most desirable seem to me to be dogmatic beliefs in the matter of religion.’833  ‘Religion’ 
offered the democratic mind ‘a clear and precise solution to a great number of metaphysical 
and moral questions as important as they are difficult to resolve.’  No longer having to settle 
questions about the other world for himself, man’s mind was left ‘the strength and the leisure 
to proceed with calmness and with energy in the whole area that religion abandons to it’.  It 
was this settlement between ontological spheres that had enabled ‘the human mind’ to do 
‘such great things in the centuries of faith.’834   
This last comment provides another window through which to look into Tocqueville’s political 
mind.  By sparing man the time and energy required to investigate each and every opinion he 
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held, dogmatic beliefs facilitated the development of intellectual grandeur.  Despite having 
to rely on the authority of some other force for many opinions, which weakened the 
intelligence in one domain, the fact that this left room for deep consideration of particular 
subjects allowed the individual to be strong and independent in another.  ‘So, among the 
various subjects of human opinions, he must make a choice and adopt beliefs without 
discussing them, in order to go more deeply into a small number that he has reserved to 
examine for himself.’835  Dogmatism in this sense preserved the individual’s liberty.  
Tocqueville revelled in the reconciliation of paradoxical ideas and this is a prime example of 
that tendency.  ‘It is true that every man who receives an opinion on the word of others puts 
his mind into slavery’, he noted, ‘but it is a salutary servitude that allows making a good use 
of liberty.’836   
Tocqueville had seen this theory enacted first hand in the United States.  In the first volume 
of the Démocratie he recounted all of the benefits of religion he had seen without stating the 
general theory he had arrived at by the time he wrote the 1840 edition.  Despite the 
‘innumerable multitude of sects’ present in America, each subscribed to a common 
morality.837  ‘All differ in the worship that must be given to the Creator,’ Tocqueville noted, 
‘but all agree on the duties of men toward one another.’838  ‘So each sect worships God in its 
way,’ he continued, ‘but all sects preach the same morality in the name of God.’839  This led 
Tocqueville to reflect on the social utility of religious belief.   
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If it is useful to a man as an individual that his religion be true, it is not the same 
for society.  Society has nothing either to fear or to hope concerning the other life; 
and what is most important for society is not so much that all citizens profess the 
true religion but that they profess a religion.840   
Common ideas or, to speak in a little more detail, a recognizable, easily comprehensible and 
widespread public morality, provided the ground on which Americans could act in common.  
But, where was such a common morality to be found?  Tocqueville told readers of his 
Démocratie that only in a reformed Catholicism could modern democratic society find an 
appropriate moral foundation.  ‘America is the most democratic country on earth,’ 
Tocqueville stated, ‘and at the same time the country where, according to trustworthy 
reports, the Catholic religion is making the most progress.’841  Tocqueville thought that the 
Catholic religion held a secret charm for democratic peoples.  ‘Several of the doctrines and 
practices of the Roman Church astonish them; but they experience a secret admiration for its 
government, and its great unity attracts them.’842   
Part of the reason for this was related to the psychological disposition of democratic peoples.  
‘Equality’, Tocqueville restated, ‘disposes men to want to judge by themselves’.  Oddly, 
though, he thought that this same cause gave democratic peoples ‘the taste and the idea of 
a single social power, simple and the same for all.’  The consequence of this was clear.  In 
democratic centuries religious authorities will be rare.  ‘But,’ Tocqueville continued, if such 
an authority were to be endowed with the consent of democratic peoples, ‘they at least want 
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it to be unitary and uniform’.  That is to say, ‘religious powers that do not all lead to the same 
centre (or in other words national churches) are naturally shocking to their intelligence, and 
they imagine almost as easily that there is no religion as that there are several.’843   
Catholicism offered a democratic people precisely the sort of unified, centralized spiritual 
power that was attractive to them.  But, Tocqueville did not present the spiritual power he 
advocated uncritically.  He recognized that democratic peoples’ disdained ‘forms’.  They were 
accustomed to relying on their own reason and this ‘leads them to scorn forms, which they 
consider useless and inconvenient veils placed between them and the truth.’844  Tocqueville 
maintained ‘that nothing revolts the human mind more in times of equality than the idea of 
submitting to forms.’  Such peoples will ‘endure representations impatiently; symbols seem 
to them puerile artifices that you use to veil or keep from their eyes truths that it would be 
more natural to show them entirely naked and in full light of day’.  This had dramatic 
consequences for religion.  In short, ‘the trappings of ceremonies leave them cold, and they 
are naturally led to attach only a secondary importance to the details of worship.’  The 
consequence of this mentality for the present was clear: ‘religions must attend less to external 
practices in democratic times than in all others.’845  A Catholicism fit for democracy had to 
heed these words.   
Tocqueville added a qualification.  He did not think religious belief could be sustained in the 
absence of some forms.  ‘I do not imagine that it is possible to maintain a religion without 
external practices’.  Nevertheless, in the modern era ‘it would be particularly dangerous to 
multiply them inordinately’.  Tocqueville brokered a compromise.  Forms ‘must be restricted’; 
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churches ‘should retain only those that are absolutely necessary for the perpetuation of the 
dogma itself, which is the substance of religions’.846   
A religion that would become more minutely detailed, more inflexible and more 
burdened by small observances at the same time that men are becoming more 
equal, would soon see itself reduced to a troop of passionate zealots in the middle 
of an unbelieving multitude.847   
In democratic eras, religion would have to make forms subservient to the truth, otherwise 
they risked oblivion.  Catholicism needed to reform itself in order to ensure its continued 
success in democratic centuries.  This was one of Tocqueville’s deepest reflections on religion.  
It was also one of his most mature, coming in the second volume of his Démocratie.   
Tocqueville outlined another area in which Catholicism had to change if it was to maintain its 
influence in the present.  Religion had to be disestablished: it could not ally itself with the 
state.  In 1835, he outlined the benefits religion would secure from independence.  
Democracies suffered from the insecurity of constantly changing political leaders and ideals.  
In such countries, ‘power will pass from hand to hand’ and ‘political theories will succeed one 
another’; ‘men, laws, constitutions themselves will disappear or change each day, and not for 
a time, but constantly.’  Connecting any doctrine, religious or otherwise, with such a political 
form aligned its fate with that of the natural perambulation of democratic whim.  In this sense, 
it was simply ‘dangerous to unite religion with authority’.848   
Tocqueville admitted that the separation of Church and State made religion ‘less powerful 
than it has been in certain times and among certain peoples’ but, crucially, it made religion’s 
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‘influence…more durable.’849  Tocqueville believed that European experience confirmed his 
view.   
In Europe, Christianity allowed itself to be intimately united with the powers of 
the earth.  Today these powers are failing and Christianity is as though buried 
beneath their debris.  It is a living thing that someone wanted to bind to the dead: 
cut the ties that hold it and it will rise again.850   
Thus, Tocqueville reflected in the second volume of his Démocratie: ‘If Catholicism succeeded 
finally in escaping from the political hatreds to which it gave birth, I hardly doubt that this 
very spirit of the century, which seems so contrary to it, would become very favourable to it, 
and that it would suddenly make great conquests.’851  This led him to a conclusion that would 
have filled his French readers with either hope or gloom, depending on their political bent.  ‘I 
am led to believe’, Tocqueville declared, ‘that our descendants will tend more and more to 
divide into only two parts, some leaving Christianity entirely, others going into the Roman 
Church.’852   
Carlyle addressed the significance of religion to politics in idiosyncratic terms.  At this stage, 
his singularity should come as little surprise.  ‘Church-Clothes’, by which Carlyle meant the 
forms and vestures under which men had at various periods embodied and represented to 
themselves the principles of the spiritual, were, in his words, ‘unspeakably the most 
important of all the vestures and garnitures of Human Existence.’853  But why were they of 
such significance in Carlyle’s view?  He was remarkably clear.  In Sartor he argued that ‘Society 
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is founded upon Cloth’ and ‘sails through the infinitude on Cloth, as on Faust’s Mantle’.  In 
the absence of ‘such Sheet or Mantle,’ he went on, society ‘would sink to endless depths, or 
mount to inane limbos, and in either case be no more.’854   
Church-Clothes were the pre-eminent form of apparel, according to Carlyle, because they 
were the garb that made society possible.  Religion and society operated in a sort of double 
hermeneutic in his view: society, through association, begot religion, and religion helped to 
foster society.  ‘Church-Clothes’, he emphasized, ‘are first spun and woven by Society; 
outward Religion originates by Society, Society becomes possible by Religion.’855  It was only 
by the light of religion that society could be constituted: ‘only in looking heavenward, take it 
in what sense you may, not in looking earthward, does what we call Union, mutual Love, 
Society, begin to be possible.’856   
Society originated in religion and could do so only via the common ideas and mutual affection 
religious belief fostered.  The consequences for an irreligious people were dramatic.   
I remark, fearlessly enough, that without such Vestures and Sacred Tissues Society 
has not existed, and will not exist.  For as Government is, so to speak, the outward 
SKIN of the Body Politic, holding the whole together and protecting it; and all your 
Craft-Guilds, and Associations for Industry, of hand or of head, are the Fleshy 
Clothes, the muscular and osseous Tissues (lying under such SKIN), whereby 
Society stands and works; - then is Religion the inmost Pericardial and Nervous 
Tissue, which ministers Life and warm Circulation to the whole.857   
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Religion was the animating force that gave life to the body of society.  Without it, the ‘Bone 
and Muscles’ would be ‘inert’; ‘the SKIN would become a shrivelled pelt, or fast-rotting raw-
hide; and Society itself a dead carcass’.  In such a state men would no longer be ‘Social, but 
Gregarious’ creatures, ‘which latter state also could not continue, but must gradually issue in 
universal selfish discord, hatred, savage isolation, and dispersion’.  Without religious belief, 
society would be ‘abolished.’858   
Life was the first benefit religion held out to society in Carlyle’s estimation.  Carlyle 
emphasized this in the imagery he used to express the importance of religious belief.  Society 
was an organism with a definable body.  It was composed of bones, tissues, muscles, a heart, 
a nervous system, and was animated by circulation.  Like any living organism, society could 
exist in either a state of health or one of illness.  A healthful state required the existence and 
appropriate balance of each of the parts of the body Carlyle identified.   
He addressed this notion in an 1831 essay, Characteristics.  The doctrines of ‘corporeal 
therapeutics’, Carlyle told readers, hold in circles as diverse as ‘moral, intellectual, political’, 
and even ‘poetical’ fields.  What is more, the proper balance of forces – one could almost say 
humours, for the metaphor seems peculiarly Greco-Roman – was essential to a healthy 
disposition in any of these.  Carlyle articulated this with characteristic panache.   
In the Body, for example, as all doctors are agreed, the first condition of complete 
health is, that each organ perform its function unconsciously, unheeded; let but 
any organ announce its separate existence, were it even boastfully, and for 
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pleasure, not for pain, then already has one of those unfortunate ‘false centres of 
sensibility’ established itself, already is derangement there.859   
Balance in the various parts of corporeal entities was essential to preventing an undesirable 
state of disease, decline, and, ultimately, death.  The problems of the contemporary world 
resulted from the palpable imbalance between the material and immaterial that existed 
within European societies, which had infected politics as much as any other domain of 
European culture.860  Religion was required in order to restore the balance between these 
forces.   
Carlyle located the foundation of a modern moral disposition in a peculiar religious outlook.  
He offered his contemporaries a creed grounded on the divine nature of work.861  He was 
convinced that ‘there is a perennial nobleness, and even sacredness, in Work.’  Work provided 
individuals with a means of comprehending nature’s laws.  ‘Work,’ Carlyle argued, ‘is in 
communication with Nature’ and ‘the real desire to get Work done will itself lead one more 
and more to truth, to Nature’s appointments and regulations, which are truth.’862  In other 
words, it enabled the individual to understand the tenets of natural law.   
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Kathleen Blake maintained that Carlyle’s message was that to pursue one’s ‘vocation’, in 
other words, ‘to work…in the face of constraint, amounts to the realization of freedom.’863  
This was borne out in Carlyle’s own words.  ‘Doubt, Desire, Sorrow, Remorse, Indignation, 
Despair itself,’ he remarked, ‘all these like helldogs lie beleaguering the soul of the poor 
dayworker, as of every man: but he bends himself with free valour against his task, and all 
these are stilled, all these shrink murmuring far off into their caves.’  The result was moral 
confirmation and independence: ‘The man is now a man.’864  ‘Carlyle’s work ethic’, Blake 
argued, was, therefore, ‘oriented towards realization of personal welfare.’865  However, in the 
context of the modern world that Carlyle had so criticized, it seems equally likely that he 
perceived in the spiritual nature of work a means of redressing the materialism of his era.  
Work, therefore, offered Carlyle’s contemporaries a common moral perspective that enjoined 
freedom and independence as well as an instruction in the precepts of natural law.   
Mill’ essay on The Utility of Religion, published soon after his death, was his most direct 
contribution to this subject.  In it, he surveyed religion and its utility with a typically critical 
eye.  Mill was more direct than Carlyle, but he was far more sceptical about religion’s specific 
claim to be able to provide a common morality to citizens.  His ‘inquiry’ divided itself into two 
parts, ‘corresponding to the double aspect of the subject; its social, and its individual aspect.’  
Mill wanted to understand what religion gave society and what it did for the individual.  This 
took a particular tack.  ‘What amount of benefit to social interests, in the ordinary sense of 
the phrase, arises from religious belief?  And what influence has it in improving and ennobling 
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individual human nature?866  ‘It has sometimes been remarked’, he claimed, ‘how much has 
been written, both by friends and enemies, concerning the truth of religion, and how little, at 
least in the way of discussion or controversy, concerning its usefulness.’867   
Of course, the truth of a religion and its usefulness were intrinsically linked in one respect.  ‘If 
religion, or any particular form of it, is true,’ Mill opined, ‘its usefulness follows without proof.  
If to know authentically in what order of things, under what government of the universe it is 
our destiny to live, were not useful, it is difficult to imagine what could be considered so.’  In 
such a situation, Mill continued, ‘to ask the use of believing could not possibly occur’ to 
people.  To pursue this line of enquiry any further would be fruitless.   
Mill thought that questions on this subject were, in fact, really appeals to those who did not 
place their faith in a dogma.  They were asked not to disclose their doubts for fear of 
disturbing the benefits accrued from such a belief.868  This was an intellectually credible claim 
in Mill’s view.  It was ‘perfectly conceivable’, he maintained, ‘that religion may be morally 
useful without being intellectually sustainable’.  Indeed, ‘it would be a proof of great prejudice 
in any unbeliever to deny, that there have been ages, and that there are still both nations and 
individuals, with regard to whom this is actually the case.’869   
However, Mill believed that morality could be inculcated in individuals through means other 
than religion.  As such, he beseeched his readers to consider ‘how tremendous is the power 
of education; how unspeakable is the effect of bringing people up from infancy in a belief, 
and in habits founded on it.’870  He understood its power better than most.  Any ‘system of 
                                                          
866 CW X, p.406.   
867 Ibid, p.403.   
868 Ibid, p.403.   
869 Ibid, p.405.   
870 Ibid, p.408.   
259 
 
social duty’ taught to children would have equal advantages.  It is especially powerful at this 
stage of life because it is here that it obtains ‘command over the feelings’ as well as the 
intellect.  Sparta, Mill thought, was the most obvious example in history of this truth.871  
Similarly, patriotism – ‘love of country’ – was a sort of secular religion and it, Mill thought, 
offered similar benefits to those that had formerly been provided by conventional religions, 
such as a common morality.872   
Ultimately, though, ‘Mill,’ Ryan contended, ‘was happy to agree that morality would be the 
better and more effective for being embedded in a religion’ and he thought that in Auguste 
Comte’s Religion of Humanity he had discovered ‘the essential elements of a secular creed.’873  
Mill was clear about this in his writings on both Comte and religion.  The ‘Religion of 
Humanity’, he claimed, was equal, indeed superior, to ‘supernatural religions even in their 
best manifestations’.874   
What was the Religion of Humanity exactly?  In his essay on Auguste Comte and Positivism, 
Mill told his readers that Comte’s religion was ‘without a God’ and this presented no obstacle 
to its status as a religion.  In stating this so directly, Mill thought he ‘had done enough to 
induce nine-tenths of all readers…to avert their faces and close their ears.’  Such a claim, Mill 
believed, was widely held to be ludicrous.  Nevertheless, Mill asserted that although he was 
‘conscious of being in an extremely small minority,’ he was certain ‘that a religion may exist 
without belief in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, an 
instructive and profitable object of contemplation.’875   
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Given the Religion of Humanity’s evident peculiarity to the majority of Mill’s audience, not to 
mention its dubious status as a religion, he attempted to return his readers to first principles 
in the domain of religion.  This strategy was intended to demonstrate to them the validity of 
Comte’s creed as a genuine religion.  Mill posed a pressing question: ‘What, in truth, are the 
conditions necessary to constitute a religion?’  The answer he offered was seemingly 
uncontroversial.  In any religion, he argued, there ‘must be a creed, or conviction, claiming 
authority over the whole of human life’.  Attached to this must be ‘a belief, or set of beliefs, 
deliberately adopted, respecting human destiny and duty, to which the believer inwardly 
acknowledges that all his actions ought to be subordinate.’  Alongside a particular morality 
any religion required ‘a sentiment’, Mill contended, powerful enough to enable it to exert 
‘authority over human conduct to which it lays claim in theory.’  Finally, Mill told his readers 
that religious beliefs gained even greater advantage from such a sentiment if it was 
crystallized ‘round a concrete object; if possible a really existing one, though, in all the more 
important cases, only ideally present.’876   
Mill proceeded to discuss the ways in which the Religion of Humanity accorded with this 
definition.  It provided a system of morality, with corresponding ‘obligations of duty’ and 
‘sentiments of devotion’.  Comte had developed these in reference ‘to a concrete object, at 
once ideal and real’, Mill proclaimed: ‘the Human Race’.  Humanity bore the hallmarks of 
eternity, because it was ‘conceived as a continuous whole, including the past, the present, 
and the future.’  Mill summarized these arguments in a fashion intended to convince as much 
as to conclude.  ‘Candid persons of all creeds’, he wrote, ‘may be willing to admit, that if a 
person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense of duty towards which are able to 
                                                          
876 Ibid.   
261 
 
control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities, and prescribe to him a rule of 
life, that person has a religion’.877 
Mill continued in this vein in his essay on The Utility of Religion.  He argued that a love of that 
wider constituency – ‘the world’ – could offer a similar locus of ‘strength’ as the God of 
conventional religions, ‘both as a source of elevated emotion and as a principle of duty.’878  
That is to say, it could provide at once the individual and the social benefits claimed for 
supernatural religions.  It could offer both a settled morality applicable to the entirety of 
society and an aid to individual development.  Mill expressed this in a long passage that 
deserves to be quoted in full.   
A morality grounded on large and wise views of the good of the whole, neither 
sacrificing the individual to the aggregate not the aggregate to the individual, but 
giving to duty on the one hand and to freedom and spontaneity on the other their 
proper province, would derive its power in the superior natures from sympathy 
and benevolence and the passion for ideal excellence: in the inferior, from the 
same feelings cultivated up to the measure of their capacity, with the superadded 
force of shame.  This exalted morality would not depend for its ascendancy on any 
hope of reward; but the reward which might be looked for, and the thought of 
which would be a consolation in suffering, and a support in moments of weakness, 
would not be a problematical future existence, but the approbation, in this, of 
those whom we respect, and ideally of all those, dead or living, whom we admire 
or venerate.879   
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It is passages such as the one above that led Hamburger to the view that Mill proposed a sort 
of ‘moral education that shaped character and instilled the ethos of a new religion of 
humanity.’880  Where Tocqueville saw in a reformed Catholicism the foundations for a new 
and viable popular morality and Carlyle perceived these in his doctrine of work, Mill believed 
that Comte’s Religion of Humanity could offer a similar outcome.   
 
RECIPROCAL DUTIES   
Religion provided a basis on which a system of interpersonal relations could be built.  This was 
because religions in general imposed a series of reciprocal duties between individuals.  In the 
modern era, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle thought, this could provide the basis for the sorts of 
sociable impulses that democracy lacked.  Clearly, given their ample criticisms of the 
individualizing nature of democratic society, any force that could counteract this tendency 
was important.   
Evidently, Mill did not believe that the basis for reciprocal duties between members of 
modern societies could be provided by conventional religions.  In fact, he stated this directly.  
‘It is usual to credit religion as such with the whole of the power inherent in any system of 
moral duties inculcated by education and enforced by opinion.’  Religion was commonly held 
to be responsible for ‘precepts of justice, veracity, beneficence’ as well as for the repression 
of ‘the opposite vices’.  But, Mill thought that this was facile.  Certainly, religion had been 
active in teaching morality, but it could equally well have been taught via ‘any generally 
accepted system of rules for the guidance and government of human life.’  Any ‘doctrine’ that 
                                                          
880 Hamburger, Mill on Liberty and Authority, p.135.  However, it must be restated here that Mill did not accept 
Comte’s views uncritically.  I showed in the previous chapter that Mill was forthright in his rejection of the 
pouvoir spirituel, which was a fundamental feature of Comte’s Religion of Humanity.   
263 
 
is generally accepted to be true can be inculcated in a people so long as it is ‘impressed on 
the mind from the earliest childhood’.881   
Such comments demonstrate that Mill had returned to some of his earliest concerns about 
the nature and constitution of authority in the social world.  Indeed, the language of authority 
suffused the passages of his essays dedicated to religious subjects.  In discussing Comte’s 
Religion of Humanity in his assessment of the Frenchman’s broader philosophical works, Mill 
argued that it was, ‘without doubt, the necessary condition of mankind to receive most of 
their opinions on the authority of those who have specifically studied the matters to which 
they relate.’882  Once more, in a posthumously published piece on Theism, Mill contended 
that ‘it is by authority that the opinions of the bulk of mankind are principally and not 
unnaturally governed.’883   
In the Utility of Religion, Mill stated that any ‘rule of life and duty’, whether founded on 
religion or not, obtains a hold over the popular mind when it has ‘conspicuously received the 
general assent’.884  In other words, the sort of authority to which Mill’s Religion of Humanity 
was subject was that of widespread consent.  ‘This is the power of public opinion’, Mill averred 
later in the essay, ‘of the praise and blame, the favour and disfavour, of their fellow creatures’.  
It was this that was the ‘source of strength inherent in any system of moral belief which is 
generally adopted’.885  As evidence, Mill cited a quotation from Novalis that he had found in 
Carlyle’s On Heroes.  ‘My belief has gained infinitely to me from the moment when one other 
human being has begun to believe the same’.886  These reflections led Mill to conclude that 
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any system of reciprocal duties was the result of unified public opinion instilled in the 
individual from an early age rather than a religious perspective per se.   
What sort of reciprocal duties could Mill’s modern religion encourage?  Mill gave his readers 
a brief summary of his thoughts in the concluding pages of Theism.  The ‘Religion of 
Humanity’, he noted, was sometimes referred to as the religion of ‘Duty.’  This was because 
it cultivated ‘a religious devotion to the welfare of our fellow-creatures as an obligatory limit 
to every selfish aim’.  In pursuing this end, according to the Religion of Humanity, ‘no sacrifice 
can be too great’.887  Mill addressed this feature of his preferred religion in his essays on 
Auguste Comte and Positivism.  ‘M. Comte’, Mill surmised, ‘infers that the good of others is 
the only inducement on which we should allow ourselves to act; and that we should 
endeavour to starve the whole of the desires which point to our personal satisfaction’.888   
In order to engender such a feeling of duty, the entirety of ‘education and all moral discipline’, 
Mill wrote of Comte’s proposals, ‘should have but one object, to make altruism…predominate 
over egoism.’  Mill thought this object valid and endorsed it to an extent.  ‘If by this were 
meant only that egoism is bound,’ he wrote, ‘and should be taught, always to give way to the 
well-understood interests of enlarged altruism, no one who acknowledges any moral 
authority would object to the proposition.’  However, Comte wanted to exclude all individual 
impulses that were not directed toward the good of the social body in order to ensure the 
fuller development of personal feelings of altruism, which he thought would be hindered by 
the existence of all desires egoistic in nature.889   
                                                          
887 Ibid, p.488.   
888 Ibid, p.335.   
889 Ibid.   
265 
 
Mill could not go as far as Comte in this path.  He perceived in Comte’s arguments a logical 
fallacy that undermined the extreme nature of the altruism he proposed.  In Mill’s estimation, 
‘the notion of a happiness for all, procured by the self-sacrifice of each…is a contradiction.’  
Any system of ‘self-devotion’, by which Mill meant individual devotion to others and not 
individual devotion to the self, had to be made ‘pleasant’ and not, as in Comte’s system, 
‘painful.’890  Nevertheless, Mill agreed with Comte’s broad outline of the nature of duty.  ‘It is 
as much a part of our scheme as of M. Comte’s,’ Mill affirmed, ‘that the direct cultivation of 
altruism, and the subordination of egoism to it, far beyond the point of absolute moral duty, 
should be one of the chief aims of education, both individual and collective.’891   
Tocqueville disagreed with Mill on one vital feature in regard to reciprocal duties.  He 
contended that religion was the only form of dogmatic belief that could provide a source of 
authority outside of man himself.  Tocqueville thought that religion was unique in this sense 
because ‘Fixed ideas on God and human nature are necessary to all men and every day to 
each man, and it is found that there are only a few, if any, men who are capable by themselves 
of fixing their ideas on these matters.’  For this reason, Tocqueville continued, ‘there is the 
most to gain and the least to lose by having dogmatic beliefs’ in these matters.892 
This combatted the twin spectres of materialism and individualism.  ‘The greatest advantage 
of religions is to inspire entirely opposite instincts.’  In fact, Tocqueville claimed that there 
was ‘no religion that does not place the object of the desires of men above and beyond the 
good things of the earth, and that does not naturally elevate his soul toward realms very 
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superior to those of the senses.’893  This counteracted democratic man’s propensity to gaze 
at his own navel.  In acting thus religion countered democracy’s stunting of human 
development.   
Allied to this Tocqueville found a specifically sociable impulse in religion, which further offset 
the democratic individual’s tendency to withdraw from his fellows.  Every religion imposed 
‘on each man some duties toward the human species or in common with it’.  In this way such 
doctrines ‘drag him, from time to time, out of contemplation of himself.’  This could even be 
seen, Tocqueville thought, ‘in the most false and most dangerous religions.’894  Tocqueville’s 
words on the conception of reciprocal duty religion promoted were not as extensive as Mill’s.  
However, they were directed towards more pragmatic ends.   
Carlyle championed the role of religion in maintaining reciprocal duties for the first time in 
Characteristics.  He declared that society, which, as we have seen, resulted directly from 
religion in his view, bred ‘an altogether new set of spiritual activities’ and that these were 
superadded to those already existing in the individual, which are themselves ‘immeasurably 
quickened and strengthened.’  Having describing society’s broad effects upon the individual, 
Carlyle contrasted the sociable with the ‘solitary man’.  In the latter condition, in which man 
is ‘folded in’ and ‘stunted’ so as to appear ‘only half alive’, the individual was ‘but a small 
portion of himself’.895   
Religion, the agent that fostered society and brought man out of his solitary sphere, improved 
the man himself.  Carlyle developed this analysis even further, clearly using religious language 
to reinforce the point he was trying to make.  ‘The Duties of Man to himself,’ he wrote, ‘to 
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what is Highest in himself, make but the First Table of the Law’.  On top of this is placed ‘a 
Second’: ‘the Duties of Man to his Neighbour’.  It was in the interaction of the latter with the 
former that the former realized its true importance.  ‘Man has joined himself with man’, 
Carlyle proclaimed, and in so doing, ‘Life, in all its elements, has become intensated, 
consecrated.’896   
Crucially, the spiritual union that inaugurated society resulted in the interconnection of minds 
and the reactive interchange of ideas.  This had the further benefit of producing not only new 
intellectual realities but, even more significantly for Carlyle, new modes of action.  ‘The 
lightening-spark of Thought’, he averred, ‘reverberated from mind to mind, fed also with fresh 
fuel in each...acquires incalculable new light as Thought, incalculable new heat as converted 
into Action.’897  Communities, in this way, had produced all that was valued by philosophers 
and ordinary men alike.898   
The principal outcomes of the sorts of reciprocal duties religion fostered were similar for 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  The bonds of sympathy and sociability that religion enabled 
counteracted individualizing forces in the modern world.  However, there was a further 
dimension to the reflections of these men.  Religion offered a means of individual 
development; it was an elevating force in the contemporary world.  This could be seen most 
clearly in the manner in which it facilitated the development of virtue.   
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VIRTUE   
Norbert Campagna argued that Tocqueville followed Montesquieu in believing virtue 
necessary to the maintenance of freedom in democratic countries.899  Tocqueville realized 
that the sort of virtue extant in ancient republics could not be replicated in modern 
democracies, nor could it have the same foundation.900  Virtue, in the present, had to rely on 
faith because only religion promoted self-sacrifice in the modern era.901  But, what sort of 
virtues did religion encourage and how did they help to mitigate the problems posed by 
democracy?   
Tocqueville had seen that America was perhaps the only country in the contemporary world 
where Christianity ‘retained true power over souls’.  No other experience had been as 
effective in showing him ‘how useful and natural religion is to man, since the country where 
today it exercises the most dominion is at the same time the most enlightened and the most 
free.’902  Vitally, in America, religion had introduced into democratic man’s habits a level of 
order and restraint, which was beneficial to society as a whole.  This resulted from the 
relationship between religion, the family and society in the United States.   
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Tocqueville illustrated this by contrasting America with Europe.  There, ‘nearly all of the 
disorders of society are born around the domestic hearth and not far from the marital bed.  
That was where men first conceived scorn for natural bonds and permitted pleasures, taste 
for disorder, restlessness of heart, instability of desires.’  The troubles of the private sphere 
translated into public disorder.  The European begrudgingly and with difficulty submits ‘to the 
legislative powers of the State.’903   
The United States presented a different spectacle.  In America, where ‘the marriage bond is 
most respected’, the family was ‘the image of order and peace.’  Surrounded by ‘innocent and 
tranquil’ pleasures ‘he achieves happiness by the regularity of life, he easily gets used to 
regulating his opinions as well as his tastes.’904  In other words, the family prepared American 
citizens to submit to the claims of order.  ‘While the European seeks to escape his domestic 
sorrows by troubling society’ Tocqueville maintained, ‘the American draws from his home the 
love of order that he then carries off into the affairs of the State.’905   
Tocqueville acknowledged that some members of American communities were not sincere in 
their adherence to Christianity.  Others undoubtedly were.  Politically, though, what was so 
striking was that despite the varied levels of devotion present in America ‘Christianity rules 
without obstacles, with the consent of all’.  This facilitated the sort of certainty and fixity in 
the moral world that the political world lacked.  Religion was important because it limited the 
extent to which innovation could be carried.  The ‘human mind’, Tocqueville wrote, ‘never 
sees a limitless field before it; whatever its audacity, it feels from time to time that it must 
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stop before insurmountable barriers.  Before innovating, it is forced to accept certain primary 
givens, and to subject its bolder conceptions to certain forms that retard and stop it.’906   
In constraining the horizon of the human mind religion prevented democracy from becoming 
revolutionary as it had in France.  As with so much in the Démocratie, Tocqueville hesitated 
to say this directly.   
These habits of restraint are found in political society and singularly favour the 
tranquillity of the people, as well as the continued existence of the institutions 
that the people have given themselves….If the mind of the Americans were free 
of all hindrances, you would soon find among them the boldest innovators and the 
most implacable logicians in the world.  But the revolutionaries of America are 
obliged to profess publicly a certain respect for Christian morality and equity that 
does not allow them to violate laws easily when the laws are opposed to the 
execution of their designs.907   
The common morality afforded by religion guided the Americans in their handling of 
democracy by providing them with the virtues of restraint and orderliness required to avert 
disaster.   
Tocqueville went even further.  He is famous for proclaiming his horror at the three great 
maladies of life: death, disease and religious doubt.  Of the three the last was the worst in his 
view.908  The emotional difficulty this posed to a man as sensitive as Tocqueville was doubtless 
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severe.  However, in the Démocratie the political problem presented by doubt is clear.  Doubt 
promoted only inaction.   
So men have an immense interest in forming very fixed ideas about God, their 
soul, their general duties toward their creator and toward their fellows; for doubt 
about these first points would leave all their actions to chance and would condemn 
them in a way to disorder and impotence.909   
Tocqueville was even more explicit about this a few pages later.   
When religion is destroyed among a people, doubt takes hold of the highest 
portions of the intellect and half paralyzes all the others.  Each person gets 
accustomed to having only confused and changing notions about the matters that 
most interest his fellows and himself.  You defend your opinions badly or you 
abandon them, and, since you despair of being able, by yourself, to solve the 
greatest problems that human destiny presents, you are reduced like a coward to 
not thinking about them.910   
Why was this problematic?  How was it related to politics?  Caught in the midst of trying to 
fashion some ideas on fundamental values; unable to dedicate the necessary time to 
considering political and social principles; and discouraged from acting in the social sphere by 
an overwhelming sense of inadequacy, doubt ‘prepares citizens for servitude.’911  The 
psychological and social effects of religious doubt end by extinguishing liberty because of the 
                                                          
909 Tocqueville, Démocratie, p.743.   
910 Ibid, pp.744-745.   
911 Ibid, p.745.   
272 
 
consequences they entail for individual confidence and, as a result, the vita activa.  Action 
itself, therefore, was raised to the status of a virtue in Tocqueville’s democratic theory.   
Tocqueville concluded his thoughts on religion with the contentious assertion that man can 
never ‘bear complete religious independence and full political liberty at the same time’.  ‘I am 
led to think that, if he does not have faith, he must serve, and, if he is free, he must believe.’  
This was, in his words, ‘the great utility of religions’.912  In making this claim, Tocqueville was 
trying to ally religion and liberty, something that Benjamin Constant had tried to do before 
him.913  Constant, however, was not the only point of reference.   
Tocqueville’s ideas were also in accordance with those of Rousseau.  According to Philip Knee, 
Rousseau made strong claims for the social utility of religion’s authority, particularly its role 
in repelling democratic man’s inward-looking nature and his preference for material 
pleasures.914  That Tocqueville conceived of a role for religion in modern politics was – and 
remains – very controversial in France.  Antoine described how this has influenced the 
reception Tocqueville has been accorded in France.  ‘In the French cultural context,’ Antoine 
argued, ‘long marked by an anti-religious tendency amongst the laity, Tocqueville’s analysis 
of religion has often been neglected, indeed hidden or criticized, insofar as it has come to 
taint the modernity of the thinker of egalitarian conditions and his specifics.’915 
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Mill recognized the importance of religion’s utility as a restraining influence on individuals in 
the modern world in 1840.  In his essay on Coleridge he showed how the philosophers of the 
previous century had wanted nothing more than to ‘tear away’ from all that they saw in 
existence around them.  Their ‘millennium,’ Mill continued, would be free of ‘superstition, 
priestcraft, error and prejudice of every kind’.   
In abolishing religion, they had destroyed the contemporary system of practical education, 
which had instilled a ‘restraining discipline’ in the individual that fostered ‘the habit, and 
thence the power, of subordinating his personal impulses and aims, to what were considered 
the ends of society’.  Mill was not dogmatic about this.  He acknowledged that such discipline 
could be upheld through different means in differing eras.  ‘The entire civil and military policy 
of the ancient commonwealths’, for example, ‘was such a system of training’.  It was just that 
it happened to be the case that ‘in modern nations its place has been attempted to be 
supplied principally through religious teaching.’916   
Mill referred to this feature of the ancient commonwealths again in Auguste Comte and 
Positivism and he treated it in equally approving terms.  ‘We recognize the value’, he told his 
readers, ‘of ascetic discipline in the original Greek sense of the word.’  What is more, he stated 
that he agreed with ‘Dr. Johnson’ in as much as he thought ‘that he who has never denied 
himself anything which is not wrong, cannot be fully trusted for denying himself everything 
which is so.’  The sort of virtues that had been present in the military nations of the ancient 
world – individuals’ ability ‘to control their appetites, to brave dangers, and submit voluntarily 
to pain’ – were absent in the contemporary world.  It was this realization that led Mill to assert 
that ‘Something has been lost as well as gained by no longer giving to every citizen the training 
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necessary for a soldier.’917  These virtues of self-denial, bravery and fortitude were 
supplemented by another: the concept of duty.  No expedient could be too onerous that 
aimed ‘to form the habit, and develop the desire, of being useful to others and to the world, 
by the practice, independently of reward and of every personal consideration, of positive 
virtue beyond the bound of prescribed duty.’918   
Mill did not contradict himself in 1874, when his posthumous essays on religion were 
published, despite the fact that he was revolted by the claims of those who saw religion as a 
means of maintaining order.   
The value of religion as a supplement to human laws, a more cunning sort of 
police, an auxiliary to the thief-catcher and the hangman, is not that part of its 
claims which the more highminded of its votaries are fondest of insisting on: and 
they would probably be as ready to admit, that if the nobler offices of religion in 
the soul could be dispensed with, a substitute might be found for so coarse and 
selfish a social instrument as the fear of hell.919   
He knew, as he demonstrated in Theism, that this had been the case heretofore in the history 
of humanity.  Mill was well aware that ‘rulers and instructors’ had ‘at all times…encouraged 
to the utmost of their power the belief that there is a life after death, in which pleasures and 
sufferings far greater than on earth, depend on our doing or leaving undone while alive, what 
we are commanded to do in the name of the unseen power.’  Such authorities had acted thus 
‘with the view of giving greater effect to their mandates whether from selfish or from public 
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motives’.920  That he recoiled at the idea that religion was useful as a supplement to the law 
did not mean that he no longer recognized its value as a means of fostering the common good 
vis-à-vis individual egoism.   
In fact, in his essay on the Utility of Religion, Mill extended his thoughts on the potential of 
religion to endow individuals with virtuous characteristics.  Mill claimed that the ‘value’ of 
religious belief ‘to the individual, both in the past and present,’ was ‘as a source of personal 
satisfaction and elevated feelings’.  This he did not dispute.921  Religion addressed itself to ‘the 
same part of the human constitution’ as poetry.  Both offered the individual a source ‘of ideal 
conceptions grander and more beautiful than we see realized in the prose of human life.’922  
Conceptions of the ideal encouraged individual aspiration and this was an important virtue.  
Mill stated this directly in Theism.   
To me it seems that human life, small and confined as it is, and as, considered 
merely in the present, it is likely to remain even when the progress of material and 
moral improvement may have freed it from the greater part of its present 
calamities, stands greatly in need of any wider range and greater height of 
aspiration for itself and its destination, which the exercise of imagination can yield 
to it without running counter to the evidence of fact; and that it is a part of wisdom 
to make the most of any, even small, probabilities on this subject, which furnish 
imagination with any footing to support itself upon.923   
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Mill’s view of religious belief, in this passage at least, took the form of a choix Pascalien.  We 
have already seen that Mill believed that the benefits of religion did not have to be explained 
to anyone who had faith.  In the passage immediately above, though, he implied that true or 
not, belief in the ideal rendered a service to the individual.  It was important, therefore, to 
have a faith for this reason if not for that of genuine worship.   
Other than encouraging individual aspiration to gravitate towards the ideal, Mill thought the 
Religion of Humanity in particular bore the potential to diffuse particular virtues across 
society.  It could inculcate disinterestedness where conventional religions encouraged 
selfishness; it could emphasize the importance of intellectual endeavour where traditional 
religions demanded torpid conformity; and it could anoint sincerity where its forebears had 
required hypocrisy.  Moreover, Mill believed that this could have as much of an effect on 
‘common minds’ as on those that were exceptional.924  In other words, Mill’s preferred faith 
would promote the impartial pursuit of truth, untrammelled by the dogmatism of traditional 
religions.   
Carlyle promoted religion’s utility as an aid to political stability.  ‘Polities are formed’, in which, 
according to Carlyle, ‘the weak’ submit ‘to the strong’ or, expressed in better terms, ‘the 
ignorant’ submit ‘to the wise’.925  This was true in even the most backward communities 
because, in Carlyle’s view, ‘man never yields himself wholly to brute Force’ – though, he 
allowed that man may partially yield to force – ‘but always to moral Greatness’, which was 
far superior in his mind.926  However, religion offered a deeper advantage: it was an aid to the 
pursuit of truth and righteousness.   
                                                          
924 Ibid, pp.422-423.   
925 CE XXVIII, p.11.   
926 Ibid, p.12.   
277 
 
In concluding his fourth lecture On Heroes, ‘The Hero as Priest’, which considered the 
importance of Luther, the Reformation, John Knox and Puritanism, Carlyle assessed Knox’s 
desire to establish a theocratic state.  This was the ‘unforgiveable offence’ with which he had 
been charged.  But what had he really meant by it?  Carlyle was quick to answer.  Knox had 
striven ‘to set up Priests over the head of Kings.’  However, this was not a Machiavellian 
compromise, in Carlyle’s estimation, a means of one segment of society acquiring power at 
the expense of another.   
On the contrary, Carlyle thought Knox had sought to establish a veritable ‘Government of 
God.’  This meant simply that ‘Kings and Prime Ministers’, in their public and private dealings, 
‘should walk according to the Gospel of Christ, and understand that this was their Law, 
supreme over all laws.’  Knox had wished to see the Kingdom of Heaven established here 
below.  He grieved when he saw political figures taking hold of Church property and diverting 
it away from its ‘true churchly uses, education, schools, worship’.  Knox had not attempted to 
assert the political hegemony of the clergy, according to Carlyle, but its ability to direct the 
morality of rulers into a virtuous path.  He had offered a ‘scheme of right and truth’, Carlyle 
thought.927   
If we think his scheme of truth was too narrow, was not true; we may rejoice that 
he could not realise it; that it remained, after two centuries of effort, unrealisable, 
and is a ‘devout imagination’ still.  But how shall we blame him for struggling to 
realise it?  Theocracy, Government of God, is precisely the thing to be struggled 
for!928   
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There was nothing incongruous about wanting to shape society and its rulers along these 
lines.  ‘God’s Law’, which, in Carlyle’s understanding, amounted to the quest for ‘right and 
truth…is the Heavenly Ideal…towards which the Reformer will insist that all be more and more 
approximated.’929  This was what Carlyle understood in Knox’s desire to realize a theocracy 
and it was the ideal after which he himself strove.   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle saw in religion a means of uniting their contemporaries around 
a set of values.  A common morality was an essential ingredient of a cohesive society.  It 
outlined a series of reciprocal duties that forced individuals to embrace the public sphere and 
not remain hidden from public life behind the veil of individual interest.  In using religion in 
this fashion they attempted to endow it with a political and social significance that many of 
their co-travellers in the early nineteenth-century denied.   
Religion was not only useful as a mechanism by which the individualizing tendencies of the 
modern world could be combatted.  It was an aid to the development of individual virtue.  Of 
course this had beneficial social consequences, but this should not obscure the advantages 
that accrued to the individual as a result of a firmly held faith.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle, 
as we have seen, promoted widely different creeds.  However, what they shared was a belief 
in the utility of religion to modern democratic society.  Its usefulness lay in its ability to foster 
the sort of public and private goods I have just described.  However, individual development 
in particular could be stimulated more effectively via another mechanism: education.  It is to 
this, and the advantageous political and social consequences it entailed, that the final chapter 
of this thesis is dedicated.   
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CHAPTER 8 
REFORMNING THE INDIVIDUAL: THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION   
Concern for human improvement was a hallmark of the thought of Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle.930  No longer was it possible for the vast majority of the populace to be excluded from 
instruction.  Both the dictates of justice and the characteristic features of modern democratic 
politics demanded popular enlightenment.  Individual human growth was the means by which 
stability could be ensured in the modern era.  What is more, it held out the route to progress 
through the maturation of an increased amount of talent.   
Morrow argued this in relation to Carlyle.  The system of state-sponsored education that 
Carlyle advocated was envisaged ‘as a means for developing the intellectual capacities of the 
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‘education directed at the individual’s relationship with society’.  Kahan claims that the text of Tocqueville’s 
Démocratie was intended as a lesson in itself.  In many respects it was a user manual that showed how 
democracy could be led to a desirable end.  See Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism, p.131.  The problem was, as 
Sheldon Wolin has demonstrated, that this sort of education was the most difficult to achieve.  ‘The traditional 
problem had been to each restraint’ to rulers, Wolin claims; it was now to ‘arouse the politically indifferent.’  
The task in the modern world was to convince the dominant middle classes to prefer public duty to private 
interest.  See Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, p.413.  Brian Danoff authored a recent study on the 
respective political educations offered by Tocqueville and Hannah Arendt, which is enlightening on both 
accounts.  See B. Danoff, ‘A School or a Stage?  Tocqueville and Arendt on Politics and Education’, in Perspectives 
on Political Science, Vol.41, Issue 3, 2012, pp.117-124.   
Carlyle’s views on education have received almost no attention.  I. Campbell essayed lately on Carlyle’s notion 
of education.  It was as liberal as any could be.  See Campbell, ‘Carlyle and Education’, in Kerry and Hill Thomas 
Carlyle Resartus, pp.51-52.   
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entire population, not merely as an instrument for reconciling the lower classes with their lot, 
or facilitating social control.’  Morrow maintains that Carlyle’s remarks on ‘popular education’ 
were the result of ‘a humanistic, and, in this sense, classless and egalitarian, perspective’.931  
Despite Morrow’s brief analysis, no commentator has alerted readers to the political 
significance Carlyle saw in education.  His humanistic focus was genuine, but it carried with it 
political consequences.   
F.W. Garforth claimed something similar in relation to Mill: he was unquestionably one of 
‘few Englishmen who have given themselves so unreservedly…to the task of improving the 
intellectual, moral, political, economic, and cultural life of his own country, especially among 
the ‘labouring classes’.’932  No similar quotation exists for Tocqueville.  However, he was 
equally committed to human development.  Below, I shall investigate the extent to which 
their humanistic commitment to individual development was designed to ameliorate some of 
the problems presented by modern democracy.  This represents the final instalment in the 
attempts made by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle to reform contemporary political and social 
practices.   
 
THE POLITICS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   
In the opening chapters of his Considerations, Mil told his readers that the ultimate object of 
any political system was to ensure good government.  The prime feature of good government 
was, in Mill’s view, highly specific: the improvement of the people themselves.  The 
promotion of ‘the virtue and intelligence of the people’, he argued, is ‘the most important 
                                                          
931 Morrow, Thomas Carlyle, p.100.   
932 F.W. Garforth, Educative Democracy: John Stuart Mill on Education in Society (Oxford, 1980), p.3.  This work 
is supplementary to Garforth’s first book on the subject: John Stuart Mill’s Theory of Education (Oxford, 1979). 
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point of excellence which any form of government can possess’.933  That is to say, any polity 
could be judged according to the extent it tended ‘to foster in the members of the community 
the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual, or rather…moral, intellectual, and 
active.’  Anshutz argued that this accorded with Mill’s perception of the object of life in 
general: ‘the end of life is self-development’ and, as such, ‘the prime duty of government for 
him is to assist self-development.’934   
Indeed, Mill was interested, as he had stated in On Liberty, in promoting ‘the permanent 
interests of man as a progressive being’.935  Any government that served this end, he believed, 
‘has every likelihood of being the best in all other respects, since it is on these qualities, so far 
as they exist in the people, that all possibility of goodness in the practical operations of 
government depends.’936  Ryan maintains that Mill’s notion of the relationship between 
education and government ‘is not quite a pedagogical view of the political process, but not 
far from it.’937   
Mill was an enthusiastic follower of the educational debates that infused his era.  His 
correspondence shows that he was conscious of the nationwide debate taking place on 
education, which reached its climax with John Arthur Roebuck’s proposals that all children 
between six and twelve should have access to schooling.  In a letter to Carlyle, in 1833, Mill 
                                                          
933 CW XIX, p.390.   
934 Anschutz, Philosophy of J.S. Mill, p.46.   
935 Mill, ‘On Liberty’, p.14.   
936 CW XIX, p.390.   
937 Ryan, ‘Mill on Education’, p.654.  Robson is even more emphatic in his analysis of the importance Mill accords 
to education.  ‘The grand project for the civilization of humankind’, he claims of Mill’s view, ‘comes down finally 
to education, to teachers and taught, to those who know and those who need to know, and to the means of 
getting the knowledge from one to the others.’  Education, then, was not only a feature of good government, it 
was also indispensable to progress.  See. J. Robson, ‘’Civilization and Culture as Moral Concepts’ in Skorupski 
eds., Cambridge Companion, p.362.   
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advised him to ‘read Roebuck’s paper on National Education938 in Tait’s last number’.939  Mill 
was among those Utilitarians who helped to secure the foundation of University College, 
London in 1828.940  His interest in university establishments extended further than this.  Mill 
eagerly received news about the emergence of other institutions, such as New College in 
Manchester.941  Reeves stated that from a very early point in his career as a nomadic 
intellectual, Mill increasingly recognized the dangers an ill-educated, ill-informed democratic 
electorate posed to society.942  Indeed, this was an important motivation in his campaign for 
popular education.  For example, writing to William Lovett, the London Chartist leader, in 
1842, Mill told him that he could not recommend universal suffrage due to ‘the present state 
of civilization’.943   
However, he did not restrict this diagnosis to the lower classes alone.  Writing to Edward 
Hereford in early 1850, Mill opined that progress in all fields of endeavour, politics included, 
‘is coming to a halt, by reason of the low intellectual and moral state of all classes: of the rich 
as much as of the poorer classes.’  ‘Great improvements in education’, Mill continued, ‘are 
the only thing to which I should look for permanent good.’944  Individual coarseness had 
political consequences.  In 1859, whilst giving his Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, Mill 
contended that ‘None are so illiberal, none so bigoted in their hostility to improvement, none 
so superstitiously attached to the stupidest and worst old forms and usages, as the 
uneducated.’  ‘None are so unscrupulous,’ he continued, ‘none so eager to clutch at whatever 
                                                          
938 J. Roebuck, ‘National Education’, in Tait's Magazine, II (London, 1833), pp.755–65, in which Roebuck said that 
one of the first duties of a reformed Parliament should be to see how “a comprehensive national, or universal 
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939 CW XII, p.145.   
940 Garforth, Educative Democracy, p.2.   
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942 Reeves, p.110.   
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they have not and others have, as the uneducated in the possession of power.  An uneducated 
mind is almost incapable of clearly conceiving the rights of others.’  Though Mill admitted that 
there had been a general weakening in the dread felt by property contra democracy in recent 
years, modern history demonstrated the danger posed by the universal enfranchisement of a 
coarse populace.  ‘Recent example’, he claimed, probably in relation to Louis Napoleon’s 
seizure of power in France, ‘has shown that, if it [universal suffrage] subverts a constitution, 
it is as likely to do so in favour of despotism as of democracy.’945   
It was a theme he returned to in the Considerations.  One of his major concerns about the 
democratic polity was the danger posed by ‘a low grade of intelligence in the representative 
body’.946  Without skilled, competent citizens, from whence could effective governors be 
drawn?  In the absence of an educated populace, society would be exposed to the sort of 
problems Mill thought natural to democracy (which I highlighted in a previous chapter), 
namely: mediocre rulers; despotic, uninformed public opinion; and class legislation.  It was 
for this reason, Mill claimed in his Autobiography, that he and his wife Harriet had turned 
away from democracy to some extent.  ‘We were now much less democrats than I had been,’ 
Mill remembered, ‘because so long as education continues to be so wretchedly imperfect, we 
dreaded the ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass.’947  He was 
very clear in his Considerations that those without at least a basic education should not be 
admitted to the franchise.   
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I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage 
without being able to read, write, and, I will add, perform the common operations 
of arithmetic.948 
On this he could not compromise.  ‘If society has neglected to discharge two solemn 
obligations,’ he maintained, ‘the more important and more fundamental of the two must be 
fulfilled first; universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement.’  Education was far 
more important to Mill than widening political access.  In fact, it was the means by which 
political pluralization had to proceed.  He argued that the ability to hold power over others, 
particularly where it concerned ‘the whole community,’ must not ‘be imparted to people who 
have not acquired the commonest and most essential requisites for taking care of 
themselves’.949  But, what else must an elementary education contain?  Mill offered his 
thoughts willingly.   
It would be eminently desirable that other things besides reading, writing, and 
arithmetic could be made necessary to the suffrage; that some knowledge of the 
conformation of the earth, its natural and political divisions, the elements of 
general history, and of the history and institutions of their own country, could be 
required from all electors.950   
Ideally, Mill wanted to offer each and every individual a broad-based education, though he 
was sceptical about the viability of such a project.951 Ryan described this tendency in Mill’s 
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thought.  The Englishman’s views on education were ‘complex’, Ryan contended, but the main 
point was simple.  ‘Since the progressiveness of the age largely depended on the progress of 
opinion, he was anxious to see a high level of intellectual attainment’.952   
Mill’s views on this subject changed substantially in the 13 years between his writing the 
Principles and the Considerations.  In the former, Mill suggested an educational experience 
that was considerably more limited.  Oddly placed, in a wide-ranging discussion on some 
remedies for low wages in the second book on ‘Distribution’, Mill argued that ‘it may be 
asserted without scruple, that the aim of all intellectual training for the mass of the people, 
should be to cultivate common sense; to qualify them for forming a sound practical judgment 
of the circumstances by which they are surrounded.’  Somewhat surprisingly, considering his 
declaration in 1861, Mill maintained that ‘Whatever, in the intellectual department, can be 
superadded to this, is chiefly ornamental’.953  By the time he came to write his Considerations, 
Mill’s commitment to education rested as much on the grounds of humanism as political 
utility.  It was unjust to deny instruction to the multitude.  ‘Justice demands,’ Mill declared, 
‘that the means of attaining these elementary acquirements should be within the reach of 
every person, either gratuitously, or at an expense not exceeding what the poorest, who can 
earn their own living, can afford.’954   
Mill highlighted one final problem held out to society by a lack of popular education.  Other 
than the horrors it implied for political management and individual justice, Mill thought it 
equivalent to liberticide.  ‘There cannot be a combination of circumstances more dangerous 
to human welfare,’ he argued in the Principles, ‘than that in which intelligence and talent are 
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maintained at a high standard within a governing corporation, but starved and discouraged 
outside the pale.  Such a system, more completely than any other, embodies the idea of 
despotism, by arming with intellectual superiority as an additional weapon, those who have 
already legal power.’955  There was only one ‘security’, Mill thought, against this outcome: 
‘the diffusion of intelligence, activity, and public spirit among the governed.’956   
Carlyle’s understanding of the place of education within the polity was little different to that 
of Mill’s.  The Scotsman revered wisdom to an extraordinary degree.  In his inaugural address 
to students at the University of Edinburgh, on being elected Rector, he told them: ‘Great is 
wisdom; infinite is the value of wisdom.  It cannot be exaggerated; it is the highest 
achievement of Man’.957  In 1840, lecturing on The Hero as Man of Letters, which focused on 
the lives of Samuel Johnson, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Robert Burns, Carlyle wrote that 
‘Light is the one thing wanted for the world.  Put wisdom in the head of the world, the world 
will fight its battle victoriously, and be the best world man can make it.’958  His esteem for 
wisdom was nothing new, nor was his thought on the subject burdened by elitism.   
Carlyle thought that it was the duty of government to impart wisdom to those without it.  In 
1839, in writing about the problems afflicting the working-classes, Carlyle announced: ‘To 
impart the gift of thinking to those who cannot think, and yet who could in that case think; 
this, one would imagine, was the first function a government had to set about discharging.’959  
Only a few years later Carlyle made a similar point in Past and Present with even greater 
urgency.  One ‘Bill’, he noted, ‘lies yet unenacted, a right Education Bill’.  This in itself would 
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be ‘the sure parent of innumerable wise Bills, – wise regulations, practical methods and 
proposals, gradually ripening towards the state of Bills’.960  Education was synonymous with 
Carlyle’s preferred political end, the objective that underscored all of his musings on politics: 
order.  ‘To irradiate with intelligence,’ Carlyle argued, ‘that is to say, with order, arrangement 
and all blessedness, the Chaotic, Unintelligent: how, except by educating, can you accomplish 
this?’961  Carlyle sought to deepen his reader’s appreciation for education by demonstrating 
its political and social utility.   
That thought, reflection, articulate utterance and understanding be awakened in 
these individual million heads, which are the atoms of your Chaos: there is no 
other way of illuminating any Chaos!  The sum-total of intelligence that is found in 
it, determines the extent of order that is possible for your Chaos,—the feasibility 
and rationality of what your Chaos will dimly demand from you, and will gladly 
obey when proposed by you!  It is an exact equation; the one accurately measures 
the other. – If the whole English People, during these 'twenty years of respite,' be 
not educated, with at least schoolmaster's educating, a tremendous responsibility, 
before God and men, will rest somewhere!962   
Carlyle’s experiences as a tutor and a student percolated through his mind early in his 
consideration of political and social questions.  His notion of the contours of contemporary 
education was reinforced by the very same debate on national education that Mill was 
involved in.  Responding to Mill’s insistence that he read Roebuck’s article on National 
Education in April 1833, Carlyle told him that he agreed in principle with the suggestions 
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offered there but disputed the detail.  ‘Roebuck has a conviction, a true one, but alm[ost] 
hopelessly mechanical and narrow’.  Carlyle thought Roebuck was possessed of ‘a lean, 
perseverant, unappeasable nature’, which reminded him ‘somewhat of Robespierre’.  This 
meant, Carlyle told Mill, that Roebuck ‘wins respect from me but not love, almost the 
reverse.’963   
Nonetheless, Carlyle was determined to be involved in a scheme whose purpose was to 
further education.  At the beginning of June 1835 he told his mother that it was the sort of 
useful work of which ‘my conscience greatly approves’.964  In another letter to his mother at 
the end of the same month, he wrote that it was the activity ‘I ought perhaps to covet more 
than any other in the world.’965  Finally, he wrote to Mill to solicit his help in gaining a place 
on Roebuck’s Education Committee, which was just taking shape.   
You are not ignorant I think of my individual views as to that matter; my great wish 
to be employed in such a business; my feeling that it is almost the only business I 
could with perfect heartiness and any considerable appliance of faculty employ 
myself on here.966   
Carlyle’s desire to play a role in the politics of contemporary educational reform was never 
realized.  However, this did not prevent him from writing at length on the subject.   
His most extensive commentary on education can be found in an unpublished 1835 tract on 
National Education.  Here, Carlyle claimed that it was ‘evident to all men that Education, in 
this country, both as to quantity and kind, is in the miserablest condition’.  It was an 
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unfortunate truism that ‘generation after generation’ the ‘great mass of the community 
grows up, and works out its existence, in a semi-barbarous state’.967  These men, that is the 
majority, were consistently ‘shut out from participating in the common inheritance of 
mankind’.  Carlyle could not have been clearer in this instance.  Education was not a preserve 
of the few, to be extended with parsimony.  Rather, ‘the Skill and Wisdom accumulated from 
the Past and existing in the Present is the sole possession of the Family of Man’.  At present, 
though the lights of intellect lit the path, most people were blind to its rays.  The sun was 
shining, but they could gain no enlightenment from it.  ‘Such a state of matters,’ Carlyle 
maintained, ‘were we not used to see it daily, would fill us with sorrow and amazement.  For 
each untaught individual is a tragedy.  His life passes, and will not return, and he has never 
lived.’  A more stunting supplice was difficult to imagine, for educational dearth curbed more 
than material prosperity; it hampered the growth of the spirit itself.   
To mutilate his body, to annihilate half the strength of his body, were small matter: 
but his soul has never opened her eyes; on him the spiritual life never dawned, no 
faculty was unfolded but animal instincts and some mechanic ingenuity as of 
beavers…968 
Carlyle’s humanist sensibilities were offended by more than merely the size of the problem – 
that is, the number of people who laboured in ignorance.  He could not bear the harm done 
to the individual.  Though literally ‘millions’ suffered this sort of torture, he thought, their 
faces hid ‘from us what a suffering it is for the individual’.969   
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The educational stunting produced by the lack of contemporary instruction created a political 
nightmare out of individual tragedy.  The problem posed by an uneducated mass was more 
pressing than ever.  These men and women were becoming political creatures and ‘can no 
longer grope darkly along as their fathers did’.  With the rise of trades and political unions, 
not to mention other ‘blind convulsive movements’, the claims of the many were bodying 
themselves forth.  But they were an ignorant many.  The mass had discarded its former 
leaders, its ‘old guides and commanders’, because it felt increasingly ‘that it can trust only to 
its own guidance, that all other guidances mistake the griefs it labours under…and refuse any 
answer but coercion.’  The great ‘Democratic force’, Carlyle argued, had arisen and the degree 
to which it would act in a ‘wise and beneficent’ or an ‘unwise, false and ruinous’ manner 
would ‘depend simply on what wisdom is in the people, or what want of wisdom.’970  Thus, 
Carlyle placed education at the centre of the community’s prospects.  He reinforced this 
sentiment in some of his major works in the following decades.   
In Past and Present, Carlyle claimed that a ‘People’s electoral methods are, in the long-run, 
the express image of its electoral talent; tending and gravitating perpetually, irresistibly, to a 
conformity with that: and are, at all stages, very significant of the People.’971  In Latter-Day 
Pamphlets, he fulminated against the dire political consequences of allowing a class to remain 
ignorant.  His humanistic focus remained on both the collective and the individual.  ‘For 
empires or individuals there is but one class of men to be trembled at; and that is the Stupid 
Class, the class that cannot see’.  ‘Stupidity,’ Carlyle continued, is ‘the one enemy we have in 
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this Universe’.  The tragedy for contemporary Britain was that ‘Darkness of mind, in every 
kind and variety, does to a really tragic extent abound’.972   
Moreover, intellect was synonymous with value in Carlyle’s opinion.  Increasing individual 
intellect would augment individual human value accordingly.  A higher level of individual 
human value could not fail to have positive consequences for national government.  ‘To 
secure an increased supply of Human Intellect to Downing Street,’ Carlyle wrote, ‘there will 
evidently be no quite effectual ‘method’ but that of increasing the supply of Human Intellect, 
otherwise definable as Human Worth, in society generally; increasing the supply of sacred 
reverence for it, of loyalty to it, and of life-and-death desire and pursuit of it, among all 
classes’.973   
Returning to Carlyle’s tract on National Education, he determined that the universal 
corrective to the problems posed by modern democracy was to ‘have such wisdom as exists 
universally imparted’.  In other words, but still those of Carlyle, his earnest desire was ‘to have 
the people taught and well taught’.  This was presently ‘the most important task of all.’974  The 
choice placed before his contemporaries was clear: either wisdom or absurdity would reign 
in the modern world.   
This new time will be born: the just Thought or else the malignant Absurdity must 
and will embody itself into Reality, for great good, or for incalculable evil; there is 
no other alternative.975   
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But, government was not best-placed to originate a scheme of education, Carlyle thought, 
because it was beset by a sea of sectarian party political squabbles.  It must be at least 
designed by ‘unofficial exertions’ and, ‘once matured in the community at large…doubtless 
an honest government would thankfully sanction it, and set resolutely about executing it.’976   
Carlyle had already set out, in accordance with Mill and Tocqueville, one of the main problems 
of democracy: the best people did not occupy the most important governmental positions.  
Part of the reason for this was systemic.  But, another very clear reason for this was striking 
in its simplicity: there was a shortage of educated people in the contemporary period.  
Education, as Carlyle’s words demonstrated, was crucial to the community’s hopes and no 
serious commentator thought it preferable to deny enlightenment to a particular class or 
person.   
It is not asserted by any reasonable person, in these days, that the poor should be 
kept ignorant in order to be governed by the rich: of that inhuman thesis (crueller 
than if we proposed to keep the poor always sickly that they might be governable) 
the world may consider itself delivered forever.977   
At the heart of Carlyle’s desire to democratize and pluralize knowledge lay his 1835 essay on 
National Education, which provided the reasoning.  Enlightenment had to be shared if the 
politics of the day were to be stable and good as opposed to revolutionary and evil.  Only in 
developing the individual’s capacities could this end be attained.   
Just how individual intellect was to be improved was the final pertinent question to which 
Carlyle addressed himself on this issue.  At first, he approached it with evident irony in order 
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to emphasize the comicality of the present’s tragic dearth of education.  Certainly, any basic 
instruction should teach people to read and write.  In 1839, he saw that the ‘four-and-twenty 
letters of the Alphabet are still Runic enigmas’ to the poor man.978  ‘The miraculous art of 
reading and writing,’ Carlyle averred, is ‘the first corner-stone of whatever foundation soever 
could be laid for what edifice soever, in the teaching kind.’979  He added ‘arithmetic’ as an 
essential feature of this foundation in a subsequent letter.980  Carlyle recognized the value of 
religious education.  In his pamphlet on National Education he wrote as much.  ‘To train up 
the child in devout submission to the Laws whereby its unseen Author has appointed it to 
live; in a word, to make the child religious: this surely is the essence of Education, the spirit in 
which all true Education must be conducted.”981  Carlyle reinforced this message in Chartism.  
‘For, in very truth,’ he wrote, ‘how can religion be divorced from Education?’982   
An irreverent knowledge is no knowledge; may be a development of the logical or 
other handicraft faculty inward or outward; but is not culture of the soul of a man.  
A knowledge that ends in barren self-worship, comparative indifference or 
contempt for all God’s Universe except one insignificant item thereof, what is it?983   
Despite his commitment to some sort of religious education, Carlyle’s attitude to this was 
ambiguous.  He told H.R. Forrest in 1848 that he favoured a policy ‘of excluding all religious 
teaching but what is unsectarian’.984  Such ambiguity in regard to religion was a staple of 
Carlyle’s work.  Contradictions like this led the Victorian poet Arthur Hugh Clough to remark 
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to Ralph Waldo Emerson that in respect of religion ‘Carlyle has led us all out into the desert, 
and he has left us there.’985   
Tocqueville was quick to recognize the political importance of education.  It provided a 
particular service in modern societies, which could not be delivered by anything else.  Initially, 
the Frenchman relayed the opinions on education common to many Americans he had 
interviewed during his time in the United States in a letter to his friend Louis de Kergorlay.  
‘You know how often we in France (and we are far from being alone) have wracked our brains 
over the desirability or danger of educating every rank in society.’  This, which was a ‘matter 
so difficult of resolution’ in France, had never even crossed the minds of the Americans.  
‘Enlightenment, they say, is the only safeguard we have against the waywardness of the 
multitude.’986   
Tocqueville understood the political import of his American interlocutors’ protestations, for 
included in the final text of his Démocratie is a warning that echoes their sentiments.  In the 
first volume Tocqueville emphasized the importance of education in the United States to the 
maintenance of its institutions.  He found it difficult to overestimate the effect ‘the 
enlightenment and habits of the Americans exercised on maintaining their political 
institutions’.987  Certainly, Tocqueville continued, the United States was not defined by its 
‘notable writers’, its ‘great historians’ or its unrivalled poets.  It did not possess such 
luminaries.  Literature, he observed, was greeted with a kind of ‘disfavour’ and any ‘third-rank 
city in Europe publishes more literary works each year than the twenty-four states of the 
Union taken altogether.’  Despite the fact that ‘new laws are made constantly’, no ‘great 
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writers are…found to seek out the general principles of laws.’  Inventors were almost 
unexampled in spite of the industriousness extant within the nation.  Americans, Tocqueville 
noted, unlike Europeans, possessed ‘none of those great intellectual centres from which fire 
and light burst forth at the same time’.988   
Despite all of this, he noted that the value to be derived from education in the modern world 
did not rest on its extraordinariness but, rather, on its extensiveness.  The United States 
demonstrated this aptly.  Tocqueville expressed this sentiment via a juxtaposition, which 
illustrated a seminal distinction between Europe and America.  If the American observer ‘pays 
attention only to the learned, he will be astonished by their small number; and if he counts 
the ignorant, the American people will seem to him the most enlightened on earth.’  The 
populace inhabited an intellectual space in between ‘two extremes’.  It displayed neither 
remarkable talent nor disgraceful ignorance.  ‘There scientific and literary genius is as rare as 
ability is common, and if you do not find great writers, everyone knows how to write.’  What, 
in aristocratic countries, had been ‘the state of a few minds’, in American democracy, ‘seems 
to have been divided equally among all.’989   
Tocqueville allowed that in America enlightenment was imparted unevenly.  Nevertheless, 
basic education was evident across the continent: in its towns, cities, and even its backwoods.  
In the wilderness of that vast continent, where everything ‘is primitive and savage’, the 
pioneer stands tall as ‘the result of eighteen centuries of efforts and experience.’  He was no 
savage, but the product of civilization in its finest guise.  ‘He wears city clothing, speaks the 
language of the city, knows the past, is curious about the future, argues about the present’.  
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In short, he was an engaging character with a vivacious mind.  The American was a ‘civilised 
man…who plunges into the wilderness of the New World with the Bible, an axe and some 
newspapers.’990   
Tocqueville argued that the verve and flexibility of the mind produced by the circulation of 
thought in the very heart of this continental wilderness was matched by no similar movement 
in France.991  This was exemplified by the fact that in America the word ‘peasant’ did not form 
a part of common parlance.  Any notion of ‘the ignorance of the first ages, the simplicity of 
the fields, the rusticity of the village,’ was alien to the American people because it had been 
civilized literally for ages.  Throughout the continent, Tocqueville told his readers, ‘you would 
seek in vain for a single district that was plunged into ignorance.’992  The extent of education 
present in the United States, Tocqueville concluded, offered a distinct political advantage.  
‘You cannot doubt’, he argued, ‘that in the United States the instruction of the people serves 
powerfully to maintain the democratic republic.’993   
Tocqueville reprised this theme in the second volume of his treatise on democracy.  Here, 
education is cited in relation to the doctrine of self-interest well understood, one of the 
central planks of Tocqueville’s prescription for his era.  It was a concept he found imbedded 
in French literary tradition.  Montaigne had proposed this doctrine centuries before and, in 
one of the few instances where Tocqueville named his source, the sixteenth-century 
litterateur was quoted here in order to illustrate the meaning of self-interest well understood.  
In his Essais, Tocqueville noted, Montaigne had stated: ‘When I would not follow the right 
road because of rectitude, I would follow it because I found by experience that in the end it 
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is usually the happiest and most useful path.’994  This was the principle that lay at the root of 
the doctrine of self-interest well understood.  ‘The Americans,’ Tocqueville continued, ‘take 
pleasure in explaining almost all the actions of their life with the aid of interest well 
understood’.  They had demonstrated at every opportunity ‘how enlightened love of 
themselves leads them constantly to help each other and disposes them willingly to sacrifice 
for the good of the State a portion of their time and their wealth.’   
Tocqueville admitted that this was not a ‘very lofty’ doctrine, but it was ‘clear and sure.’  Its 
utility lay in the fact that it ‘turns personal interest back against itself’, thus counteracting the 
force of individualism.995  ‘Each American’, Tocqueville maintained, ‘knows how to sacrifice a 
portion of his particular interests in order to save the rest.’996  It was a modest, effective 
doctrine, perfectly attuned to the age.  However, it could not work in the absence of 
civilization; in fact, it could only exist given a high state of civilization.  ‘If citizens, while 
becoming equal, remained ignorant and coarse,’ Tocqueville averred, ‘it is difficult to say to 
what stupid excess their egoism could be led, and you cannot say in advance into what 
shameful miseries they would plunge themselves, out of fear of sacrificing something of their 
well-being to the prosperity of their fellows.’  But, he continued, ‘it is enough to enlighten 
men in order for them to see’ the truth of this doctrine.997  If popular education was required 
to facilitate the triumph of interest well understood, only one course of action seemed 
appropriate to Tocqueville:  
…enlighten them at all cost, for the century of blind devotions and instinctive 
virtues is already fleeing far from us, and I see the time drawing near when liberty, 
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the public peace and the social order itself will not be able to do without 
enlightenment.998   
Tocqueville followed this statement with a qualification.  Stability within a democratic 
republic could be maintained only if the superior intellectual ability of a people was matched 
by an equally advanced cultivation of its habits and conventions.  In other words, a democracy 
could only be sustained where ‘the instruction that enlightens the mind is not separated from 
the education that regulates mores.’999   
The question remained: how did Tocqueville propose to enlighten the multitude?  What 
would he have them taught?  As an absolute minimum, he thought, it was necessary that 
‘each citizen receives the elementary notions of human knowledge’.  He was less forthcoming 
on what these were, but probably meant basic literary and numerical skills.  It was also 
important, in Tocqueville’s view, that the citizen ‘learns the doctrines and the proofs of his 
religion’ as well as ‘the history of his country and the principal features of the Constitution 
that governs it.’  He had seen all of these on display in the United States or, at least, in 
‘Connecticut and Massachusetts,’ which he cited specifically.1000   
The development of human capacities, then, offered a means of assuaging the political 
problems that beset the modern era.  For Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle this was a realization 
of fundamental significance.  Enlightenment had to be dispersed as the people en masse 
assumed a greater role in the politics of the day.  In the absence of such an educational 
process, society would be exposed to all of the dangers that result from the triumph of 
ignorance over wisdom.  Moreover, it is clear, for Mill and Carlyle at least, that the necessity 
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of education went deeper than the purely political.  For both, enlightenment was equated 
with justice: they felt it entirely unjust to keep any individual in the dark when the light 
beyond the confines of the cave was so near at hand.   
 
AN EDUCATION IN INDEPENDENCE   
At this point, the concerns of Tocqueville and Mill, on the one hand, and Carlyle, on the other, 
diverge.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle, as outlined above, were convinced of the advantages 
education could offer in the contemporary world.  It provided a means of individual human 
development that would facilitate the overall improvement of the people as a whole.  The 
outcome of this process was political stability, for Carlyle, and political liberty, for Tocqueville 
and Mill.  These were the primary consequences.  There were, of course, a host of other 
outcomes that have already been discussed.   
However, Tocqueville and Mill identified another means of educating citizens en masse in the 
democratic world that held little charm for Carlyle.  Tocqueville and Mill divined mechanisms 
for increasing citizens’ independence that would help them to behave appropriately in the 
new political society that was taking shape around them.  Mill’s suggestions addressed the 
individual in both the private and public sphere; Tocqueville’s proposals concerned the 
individual in the public sphere alone.  Both were interested in fostering habits that could 
counteract the problems inherent in the modern world.  Through these habits, Tocqueville 
and Mill intended to provide the mass of the people with a moral education that was 
conducive to securing the best possible outcomes from democracy.   
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 ‘I am still far from believing, as a great number of people in Europe do,’ Tocqueville 
maintained, ‘that it is sufficient to teach men to read and write to make them citizens 
immediately.’1001  It was simply not enough for education to be restricted to formal 
instruction, to the mere recognition of alphabetic characters, grammatical rules and 
arithmetical processes.  Tocqueville thought practical education necessary to the smooth 
functioning of modern democracies.  His considerations on the sort of instruction required 
were more overtly political than those of Mill.  ‘I do not consider elementary knowledge as 
the most potent means to educate the people’.  This sort of understanding merely ‘facilitates 
the study of liberty’, Tocqueville argued, and not what was required: ‘the art of being free.’1002  
At a relatively early stage in his two volume work on Démocratie he concluded that the 
Americans had achieved exactly what he sought.   
True enlightenment arises principally from experience, and if the Americans had 
not been accustomed little by little to governing themselves, the book learning 
that they possess would not be a great help today in succeeding to do so.1003   
Democrats in the United Sates had been prepared incrementally for the practice of their 
republic.  They had been trained in the practicalities of administrative and political life.  
Tocqueville admired this civic education.  The ‘best corrective’, Tocqueville wrote, ‘is to make 
them concern themselves with it every day and in a practical way; then it will be very 
necessary for them to enter into details, and the details will make them see the weak aspects 
of the theory.’1004   
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Tocqueville thought that it was for this reason that American legislators, during the founding 
moments of the Constitution of the United States, had multiplied and layered political 
institutions throughout the country.  In giving a portion of political life to every part of the 
nation, he argued, these men had infinitely multiplied ‘for citizens the occasions to act 
together, and to make the citizens feel every day that they depend on each other.’  This 
provided a means of countering individualism, on the one hand, and the claims of an 
overweening central government on the other.  Common action was a means of maintaining 
independence.  But, this relied on the civic education decentralization provided.   
Decentralization fostered public spirit amongst people at a local level by making them 
coordinate in order to attain the benefits of political society.  Tocqueville declared that ‘when 
it is a matter of having the particular affairs of a district regulated by the men who live there, 
the same individuals are always in contact, and they are in a way forced to know each other 
and to please each other.’1005  ‘So’, the Frenchman told his readers, ‘it is by charging citizens 
with the administration of small affairs, much more than by giving them the government of 
great ones, that you interest them in the public good and make them see the need that they 
constantly have for each other in order to produce that good.’1006  As a means of maintaining 
sociability in modern communities and thus of combatting the impetus towards alienation 
through individualism, local political bodies were essential.   
So local liberties, which make a great number of citizens put value on the affection 
of their neighbours and of those nearby, constantly bring men back towards each 
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other despite the instincts that separate them, and force them to help each 
other.1007   
This was one of the most important lessons he drew from the United States.  In order to 
interest people in one another in modern societies it was necessary to multiply the instances 
in which they will come to regard their fellow citizens.  Decentralization served this end and 
local institutions confirmed it.   
If the experience derived from decentralization and local engagement enabled the Americans 
to assuage the problems posed by alienation and instability in modern countries, it taught 
them equally the habits of independence.  One other institution confirmed this disposition.  
‘The jury’, Tocqueville argued, ‘is before all else a political institution’.  In fact, ‘it should be 
considered as a mode of sovereignty of the people’ that ‘must be entirely rejected when you 
rule out the sovereignty of the people, or must be put in harmony with the other laws that 
establish sovereignty.’1008  The jury offered an education in politics.  It ‘teaches each man not 
to retreat from responsibility for his own actions’.  This was ‘a manly disposition,’ Tocqueville 
thought, ‘without which there is no political virtue.’  It inculcated in every individual a notion 
of ‘magistracy’; ‘it makes all feel that they have duties to fulfil toward society and that they 
enter into its government.’  This, much like local institutions, ’combats individual egoism’.1009  
More than for any other reason, though, the jury was valuable for the extent to which it 
formed the peoples’ ‘judgment’ and augmented their ‘natural enlightenment’.1010  Awestruck, 
Tocqueville declaimed that:  
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You must consider it as a free school, always open, where each juror comes to be 
instructed about his rights, where he enters into daily communication with the 
most learned and most enlightened members of the upper classes, where the laws 
are taught to him in a practical way, and are put within the reach of his intelligence 
by the efforts of the lawyers, the advice of the judge and the very passions of the 
parties.1011   
Tocqueville attributed the ‘practical intelligence and good political sense’ that he had seen 
among the Americans to this institution in particular.  He maintained that it was the single 
‘most effective means that a society can use for the education of the people.’1012  In his 
Souvenirs, written two decades later, Tocqueville highlighted the difference between the 
institutional arrangements the Americans made for the education of the multitude and those 
that had been repeatedly employed in France (though this comparison was not drawn 
directly, clearly the American example weighed on his mind).  Where the jury in America 
taught its democratic people to govern moderately, inculcated a notion of rights and another 
of duties amongst the populace, and tutored them in the peculiarities of lawful conduct, the 
democracy in France had received its practical instruction from a very different national 
organisation: the army.  The ‘military education’ that ‘most of the common people have 
received’, supplemented by their ‘experience of insurrections’, had shown the French a very 
different route to change.  ‘Half of the Parisian workers’, Tocqueville lamented, ‘have served 
in our armies, and they always gladly take to arms again.  Plenty of old soldiers usually take 
part in riots.’1013  This was the gulf that existed between the world’s two foremost democratic 
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nations.  Tocqueville’s conclusion in the Démocratie was clear and his words in the Souvenirs 
confirmed it.  ‘Thus the jury, which is the most energetic means to make the people rule, is 
also the most effective means to teach them to rule.’1014  It was the essential educational 
institution in a modern nation.   
Mill drew the same contrast that Tocqueville’s works implied: French military education was 
the equivalent of American civic training.  In On Liberty he noted that in ‘France, a large part 
of the people having been engaged in military service, many of whom have held at least the 
rank of non-commissioned officers, there are in every popular insurrection several persons 
competent to take the lead, and improvise some tolerable plan of action.’1015  The contrast 
with the United States could not have been starker.   
What the French are in military affairs, the Americans are in every kind of civil 
business; let them be left without a government, every body of Americans is able 
to improvise one, and to carry on that or any other public business with sufficient 
amount of intelligence, order, and decision.1016   
But, how could one foster the sort of practical intelligence required to avoid the French 
example and embrace that of America?  Individuals had to become accustomed to managing 
their own affairs in both the private and public realms of life.  In short, it was necessary to 
force them to embrace independence.  Land ownership and participation in public affairs 
facilitated this end.  Landowners were subject to the many vicissitudes attendant on property 
ownership.  The cares and anxieties such proprietors faced were far from debasing; they were 
mentally uplifting.  Continental European experience demonstrated this and Mill went to 
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great pains to depict to his readers the significant advantages such an arrangement of 
landholding offered.  He presented testimony from sources on peasant proprietorship in his 
Principles, which he drew from six different settings: Switzerland, Norway, Germany, Belgium, 
the Channel Islands, and France.  Mill channelled the political economist and historian Jean 
Charles Léonard de Sismondi in discussing the first of these countries.   
Sismondi claimed that, despite the inconsistencies of the Swiss environment, of its harsh 
seasons and poor soil fertility, peasant proprietors were well-fed and lived in well-
constructed, spacious houses.  Agriculture was in a state of constant improvement.  They 
were secure in their landholding and could easily defend against the vagaries of commercial 
downturns.  What is more, these peasants worked with a far-sighted ardour for the long term 
and were a stimulant to commerce and industry because of their relative prosperity in 
comparison to other types of agricultural worker.  Perhaps most important of all for Mill, 
Sismondi noted that over and above their wellbeing, Swiss peasant proprietors were 
possessed of a noticeable independence of character.1017   
In summarising Sismondi’s evidence on Switzerland, Mill claimed that since the dawn of the 
nineteenth century ‘and concurrently with the subdivision of many great estates…there has 
been a striking and rapid improvement in almost every department of agriculture, as well as 
in the houses, the habits, and the food of the people.’1018  Evidence from the other European 
countries Mill presented applied this conclusion to the continent as a whole.1019  Based on 
this evidence, Mill surmised that the sorts of ‘anxieties’ felt by the peasant proprietor were 
nothing other than ‘the ordinary vicissitudes of more or less’.  He was only troubled to ensure 
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‘that he takes his fair share of the business of life’ and ‘that he is a free human being, and not 
perpetually a child’.1020  In short, the peasant as proprietor was forced to take an active 
interest in his own life and that of the community (the Norwegian example suggested that 
the energy and activity displayed by peasant landholders extended to the common interest 
as well as their own1021) and he valued this more than any other consequence.   
If there is a first principle in intellectual education, it is this – that the discipline 
which does good to the mind is that in which the mind is active, not that in which 
it is passive.1022   
By itself, this made such landholding valuable as ‘an instrument of popular education.’1023  
But, apart from the boon to the moral self, which resulted from the feeling of independence 
landholding bestowed, peasant proprietorship offered other related advantages.  ‘It is no less 
propitious to the moral virtues of prudence, temperance, and self-control.’  Compared to day-
labourers, who were often irresponsible with their wages, peasant proprietors gravitated 
towards the opposite extreme; they were parsimonious and tended to economize, saving as 
much as possible.  This made them totally independent, a fact that Mill clearly appreciated.  
Self-dependence, he averred, is ‘a virtue which is one of the first conditions of excellence in 
the human character – the stock on which if the other virtues are not grafted, they have 
seldom any firm root’.1024  The prudence and self-control that peasant landholding promoted 
resulted in one final consequence.  It reduced the rate of expansion in the population and 
thus helped to solve the Malthusian riddle.1025  Mill admitted that the ‘possession of property 
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will not prevent the peasant from being coarse, selfish, and narrow-minded.’  Things such as 
these, he thought, ‘depend on other influences, and other kinds of instruction.’1026   
The education of the citizen was related to but distinct from that of the individual.  
Government bore responsibility for ensuring the quality of the citizenry in Mill’s view.  I 
outlined this above.  But, how could any form of government practically foster citizens of 
quality other than through the education system?  Mill’s answer was explicit.  Governments 
could invite individuals to participate in the management of public affairs.  Understanding the 
management of public affairs promoted independence in the public sphere equivalent to that 
which could be learned in the private sphere through land ownership.   
Among the foremost benefits of free government is that education of the 
intelligence and of the sentiments which is carried down to the very lowest ranks 
of the people when they are called to take a part in acts which directly affect the 
great interests of their country.1027   
Mill cited Tocqueville in support of this notion and argued that the latter had demonstrated 
in his great work on America that political life could become an effective tool in a citizen’s 
education, were it only to be organized aright.  It was, in essence, a school of government.  
‘For political life is indeed in America a most valuable school,’ Mill wrote, though it was true 
that the ‘ablest teachers’ were often excluded from national representation.1028  Participation 
in administrative functions was equally important to a citizen’s education.  Citizens ought to 
be encouraged to take part ‘in the details of judicial and administrative business’.  This 
included partaking in the exercise of a ‘jury-trial, admission to municipal offices, and, above 
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all, by the utmost possible publicity and liberty of discussion, whereby…the whole public, are 
made, to a certain extent, participants in the government, and sharers in the instruction and 
mental exercise derived from it.’1029   
The last of these three, free discussion, was the most important.  Mill thought that it was only 
through ‘political discussion that the manual labourer, whose employment is routine, and 
whose way on life brings him in contact with no variety of impressions, circumstances, or 
ideas, is taught that remote causes, and events…have a most sensible effect on his personal 
interests’.  Other than extending the purview of the individual’s gaze, or perhaps by dint of it, 
free discussion enabled him ‘to feel for and with his fellow-citizens’, and it was only through 
this act that he could become ‘a member of a great community.’1030  In other words, free 
discussion facilitated – on a popular level – the sort of aesthetic cultivation that Mill would 
later set out in his inaugural address as Rector to students at the University of St. Andrews.1031   
The effect of practical engagement with the political life of the community was to train 
individuals in the art of citizenship.  Empathy was clearly an important constituent in this but 
it was merely an aspect.  Mill’s approach to the education of citizens was holistic and it relied 
on a notion of balanced personal development.  This was the only efficacious means of raising 
humans from the status of brutes to free men.  Mill expressed this pointedly in his famous 
endorsement of freedom, On Liberty.  The cultivation of human character was the sole means 
of confronting the debilitating tendencies of democracy, and Mill was clear about the sort of 
character that was necessary to achieve this object.  ‘The mental and moral, like the muscular 
powers, are improved only by being used.  The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a 
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thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others 
believe it.’1032  An active character was required to meet that challenges of the age head on.   
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has 
no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.  He who chooses 
his plan for himself, employs all his faculties.  He must use observation to see, 
reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, 
discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to 
hold to his deliberate decision.1033   
Independence was the prime quality necessary to leading a good and happy life; it was 
essential to freedom; and relied on individual development for its attainment.  No doubt, Mill 
thought, this sort of active and engaging character could be turned to ‘bad uses’, but an 
‘indolent and impassive one’ could certainly not be turned toward the good.1034   
Education was an essential component of modern political training, according to Tocqueville, 
Mill and Carlyle.  Individual development was, of course, important to personal improvement 
as well, but it took on a political significance in the modern democratic era that was hitherto 
unknown.   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle perceived in education the means by which particular democratic 
evils could be combated.  If mass mediocrity was a contingent part of democratic life in 
Tocqueville’s view, then education could, at the very least, provide broad, if basic, instruction 
to the people en masse.  This would enable them to operate the levers of government 
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responsibly.  In other words, it would facilitate stability.  This was the principal benefit Carlyle 
saw in widespread education and it was equally apparent to Mill.   
However, Tocqueville and Mill located other political benefits in education that Carlyle did 
not.  Individualism, Tocqueville believed, was threatened by education, as individuals – 
through their enlightenment – became better able to look beyond their own navels.  This was 
a boon to freedom.  Freedom, Mill thought, was a by-product of mass education, as it 
prevented knowledge from being hoarded by a ruling elite.  Both Tocqueville and Mill believed 
that the sort of moral development practical engagement with political and civic institutions 
provided could not be replicated in the classroom.  This sort of educational experience was 
certainly unconventional.  However, the civic humanist mentality it relied on fostered 
desirable individual qualities that had political consequences – namely independence and, 
with it, freedom.   
In their views on education, we can see the fundamental concerns of Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle in microcosm.  Tocqueville and Mill were concerned with freedom principally, Carlyle 
with order and stability.  Education could be used to foster one or both of these.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
311 
 
CONCLUSION   
In concluding this thesis, it is important to address two principal questions that the above 
discussion has raised.  Firstly, the comparison of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle in this thesis has 
emphasised those elements of each man’s thought that relate to democracy.  Clearly, this is 
the result of the nature of the exercise that is set out in the Introduction.  Nevertheless, the 
views that Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle held on democracy were clearly suggestive of 
dispositions within their broader political outlook.  How does the present thesis, which, as I 
have said, focused on their views on democracy, influence the broader understanding of the 
political thought of these men?   
Secondly, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were significant figures in their own right in the 
contemporary period.  They were three of the most widely read authors in contemporary 
Britain – as well as in continental Europe.  The present thesis has attempted to illustrate the 
cross-border influence of continental ideas on contemporary British political thought.  It has 
done so by comparing the views of Mill and Carlyle on democracy with those of Tocqueville.  
But what, if anything, is the wider significance of this comparison?  Was the cross-border 
influence of European ideas on Mill and Carlyle isolated from the broader stream of 
contemporary British political discourse?  Were Mill and Carlyle mediators of continental 
European ideas or did authors like Tocqueville exert an impact on other British political 
commentators in their own right?   
Prior to addressing these questions, I would like to summarize the broad elements of this 
thesis in order to inform the wider discussion below.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were 
profound analysts of the modern world’s turn towards democracy.  However, their analysis 
was not purely academic: they were interested in analysing the meaning, heritage and 
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problems of democracy in order to find a practical means of securing the modern era and 
exploiting the advantages it presented.   
 
ANALYSING DEMOCRACY   
As analysts of the modern democratic world that was emerging out of the struggles of the 
French revolutionary period in the early-to-mid nineteenth century, Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle were second to no other commentators in the depth of their understanding.  The 
ructions of the contemporary era forced Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle to reassess their 
surroundings and reinterpret the history that had created them.   
Jaume argued that Tocqueville’s thought was ‘curious’ inasmuch as in it ‘past and present 
came together and perhaps achieved a kind of reconciliation in the consciousness, as well as 
the unconsciousness, of the author’.1035  In it, as in that of Mill and Carlyle, past, present and 
future were aligned.  In their respective understandings, the contemporary era was an 
historical moment in which the transition from the ancien régime to democratic society was 
taking place.  Past and future were juxtaposed in a revolutionary present.   
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle speculated about the historical processes that had brought 
democracy into being.  European history had progressed through distinct periods, each of 
which was characterized by a dominant principle.  For Tocqueville and Mill, democracy was 
the final end towards which history had been intractably moving; for Carlyle, it was another 
stage in human development, but would inevitably breakdown as all others had.  Despite their 
differing views on the finality or otherwise of modern democracy, history itself lay at its 
                                                          
1035 L. Jaume, Tocqueville: The Aristocratic Sources of Liberty (Paris, 2008), p.292.   
313 
 
foundation.  This historical perspective was a constitutive feature of the political thought of 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.   
The conceptions Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle generated regarding the historicity of the 
modern democratic age impinged on their political perspectives.  Not only was democracy 
inevitable, it was desirable in some respects.  Its utility was different for each of these men, 
but all three of them discovered in democracy something of value.   
In broad terms, it would be no misunderstanding of their political ideas to see both a negative 
and a positive dimension to modern democracy’s value.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle saw in 
the rise of democracy the end of a corrupt, outmoded and indefensible organization of politics 
and society.  Democracy, in this sense, enabled modern Europeans to enjoy freedom from the 
untenable tyranny of an unshakeable caste politics that pre-revolutionary France had 
embodied.  This achievement represented an important negative freedom and one that 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle could all embrace.   
The positive, or constructive, dimension to modern democracy lay in different places for 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle.  Tocqueville drew attention to the justness of equality and 
described its consequences.  Mill extolled the liberty it promoted, which enabled individual 
freedom of expression and personal development.  Carlyle championed the freedom it 
provided for each to work diligently in order to attain the maximum his ability allowed for.   
The positive features of democracy identified by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle cannot be 
erased by the problems each recognized in its triumph.  Nonetheless, the democratic age was 
problematic for a variety of reasons.  The criticisms each levelled at democracy were launched 
from the vantage point of concern for the individual for the most part.  It was not the 
development or otherwise of the collective, per se, that attracted their gaze, but the agency, 
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sovereignty and growth of the individual.  Of course, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle recognized 
that the overall state of the social body was important, but that was subordinate to their fear 
of the consequences democracy entailed for the individual.  This reflects, in broad measure, 
the humanism implicit in their respective outlooks and approaches to politics.   
It was, therefore, first and foremost, as analysts of the modern democratic world that 
Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle were united.  Their political thought was built atop a recognition 
of the unavoidable existence of democracy in the contemporary era.  This united them and 
made them stand out from their contemporaries.  Others, like Guizot, were principally 
interested in the French Revolution and its historical causes.  Still others, like Bentham, were 
committed to the reform of institutions along democratic lines, though their starting position 
did not recognize in the modern world the necessary victory of democracy.  Tocqueville, Mill 
and Carlyle, on the other hand, began their reflections on the basis of an extant democratic 
age and progressed from that point.   
 
TEMPERING DEMOCRACY   
For all of their insightful analysis, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle did not stop at analysing 
democracy, its causes and its challenges.  They were ambitious enough to attempt to divine 
solutions that could be applied to the problems democracy posed.  Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle each looked to the past for guidance in the present.  Tocqueville championed the 
values of aristocracy and attempted to transpose what he thought positive and useful in them 
onto the tapestry of democratic modernity.  Mill, equally imbued with the literal meaning of 
aristocracy – the rule of the best – attempted to engineer a democratic political settlement 
that would facilitate the rise of those most able to govern in the modern world.  Carlyle, for 
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his part, was a keen advocate of the same doctrine as Mill: he was a firm proponent of 
meritocracy.  Certainly, he saw echoes of this in the past and eagerly demonstrated to his 
readers their value.   
The principal difference between Carlyle, on the one hand, and Mill and Tocqueville, on the 
other, was that Carlyle saw no need to preserve a tumultuous, inefficient, outdated 
Parliament in the modern era where Mill and Tocqueville wanted to preserve and extend its 
importance.  Carlyle thought that the press was the primary means of mass political 
engagement in the democratic world; representative bodies merely contained and promoted 
a multitude of vested interests.  Mill and Tocqueville saw representative assemblies, as well 
as the mechanisms that determined their composition, as the principal means of mass 
political engagement in democratic countries.  The goods that this offered could not be 
secured via another route.   
Carlyle was primarily interested in regaining stability in the modern era where Tocqueville 
and Mill were eager to ensure the maintenance of freedom.  Nowhere can these concerns be 
seen more clearly than in their differing conceptions of the state and the sort of leaders that 
were appropriate for the modern democratic world.  Carlyle promoted an increasingly active 
state where Tocqueville and Mill sought to fragment its power.  Carlyle wanted to develop a 
clear hierarchy that reflected the talents of those who aspired to govern.  Mill, on the other 
hand, though elitist in many respects, possessed an attitude to leadership that can be 
described best as the doctrine of first among equals.  Tocqueville’s concept of leadership in 
democratic society was similar to that of Mill.  His natural aristocrats emanated from the 
democratic body and were not placed in a defined hierarchy in the manner of Carlyle’s 
Captains of Industry.   
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Material changes in the state of politics or the organization of society, though, could do only 
so much.  Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle sought to supplement institutional and societal reform 
with individual moral improvement.  This was two-sided.  Education offered one avenue 
where religion presented another.   
Education was a means by which each and every human being could be readied for modern 
democracy.  The thoughts of Tocqueville and Mill extended further than those of Carlyle.  
They suggested that it was as important to train the individual in the art of citizenship as it 
was to make him a rational creature.  Conversely, Carlyle believed that it was sufficient to give 
the individual a basic education in order for him to be able understand the world and thus 
contribute to its stability.  Tocqueville and Mill wanted to ensure that the individual could 
actively pursue politics and, through such engagement, learn the art of being free.  Nowhere 
better can the humanist tendencies inherent in the thought of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle 
be seen than in their desire to ensure the intellectual development of the individual.  Carlyle’s 
humanism, though, was more Christian; Tocqueville’s and Mill’s, civic.   
The political thought of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle was not ontologically one-dimensional.  
That is to say, it was not concerned solely with one sphere of human being.  This should be 
apparent already from what has been discussed.  They were concerned for both the 
materiality of politics and the political implications of immaterial – intellectual, in the case 
already discussed – development.  But, the political ontology of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle 
extended further, into the transcendental realm of human existence.  A viable political 
settlement in the modern democratic world, Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle thought, had to 
satisfy each of these realms.   
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It is for this reason that religion and its utility was accorded a place in politics by Tocqueville, 
Mill and Carlyle.  However, this was perceived differently by each of them.  Carlyle saw its 
principal social utility in its ability to regiment morality and order the social world through the 
inculcation of a notion of duty and virtuous behaviour.  Carlyle thought that religion, in this 
sense, was one of the foundations of progress.  Tocqueville and Mill approached religion’s 
utility in a similar fashion, though in a manner far less pronounced.  Certainly, religion could 
and had formerly provided the basis of a common morality that was useful for the 
maintenance of social order.  However, it was at least as useful in maintaining sociability and 
encouraging an interest in the wellbeing of others.  In this sense, religion promoted liberty 
because it encouraged interaction with the social body and individual development.   
 
UNDERSTANDING TOCQUEVILLE, MILL AND CARLYLE   
Incredibly diverse interpretations have arisen regarding the political thought of Tocqueville, 
Mill and Carlyle.  Tocqueville’s political thought has been the subject of a great deal of scrutiny 
in recent years.  His work has been claimed by different political camps, which seems to 
confirm rather than deny Tocqueville’s stated intention at the conclusion of the ‘Introduction’ 
to his Démocratie.  He was, he claimed, uninterested in furthering the agenda of any political 
party.1036  However, this has led to very real confusion about his position on the political 
spectrum.  Was Tocqueville a liberal, democrat, or a conservative?  Could it be that he 
managed to elide these distinctions and alloy what was best in all three of these positions?  
Lucien Jaume claimed that there has been and remains ‘a Tocqueville enigma’.1037  At times, 
Jaume asserted, Tocqueville was clearly in favour of democracy; at others, he found its 
                                                          
1036 Tocqueville, Démocratie, p.32.   
1037 Jaume, Tocqueville, p.1.   
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consequences eminently worrying and was unhesitating in his criticism of it.1038  ‘The problem 
is’, Sanford Lakoff contended, ‘that Tocqueville does not fit neatly into the conventional 
categories.’1039  One possibility, according to Lakoff, can be definitively ruled out: Tocqueville 
was never for a single second a socialist.1040  Lakoff placed Tocqueville alongside Edmund 
Burke as the progenitor of liberal conservatism.1041   
Judith Shklar understood Tocqueville as a cautious, though upbeat, liberal.1042  Roger 
Boesche, on the other hand, thought the Frenchman a ‘strange liberal’, but a liberal 
nonetheless.1043  Jaume, along with Kahan, suggested that Tocqueville approached 
democracy from the perspective of an aristocratic liberal.1044  Annelien De Dijn asserted much 
the same.  She found a certain ‘royalist bequest’ in Tocqueville’s writings that was a remnant 
of pre-1830 French society.1045   
Jean-Patrice Lacam saw a prominent monarchism is Tocqueville’s thought, particularly as it 
related to France.  In his words, Tocqueville ‘dreamed of a constitutional monarchy associated 
to a parliamentary regime’ holding power in France.1046  Sheldon Wolin offered the strongest 
argument in favour of this view in his assessment of Tocqueville's political thought.  He 
insisted that the Frenchman was ‘engaged in a lifelong task of retrieving a receding 
                                                          
1038 Ibid, p.2.   
1039 S. Lakoff, ‘Tocqueville, Burke, and the Origins of Liberal Conservatism’, in The Review of Politics 
Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer, 1998), p.437.   
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1041 Ibid, pp.460-464.   
1042 J. N. Shklar, After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith (Princeton, 1969), p.226.   
1043 R. Boesche, The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville (New York, 1987).   
1044 See Jaume, Tocqueville and Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism.   
1045 A. de Dijn, ‘ARISTOCRATIC LIBERALISM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE’, in The Historical Journal, 48, 3 
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1046 J.-P. Lacam, ‘Tocqueville, un monarchist au secours de la République’, in La revue Tocqueville, Vol.30, No.1, 
2009, p.186.   
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aristocratic past in order to counteract the new forms of despotism’.1047  Subsequently, 
Seymour Drescher challenged this view of Tocqueville, asserting that a careful analysis of the 
aristocrat’s works finds it to be unsustainable.1048   
Such claims suggest the existence of a conservatism in Tocqueville’s thought that does not sit 
easily with his endorsement of American democracy.  Tzvetan Todorov concluded that 
Tocqueville was primarily a conservative and, although he never gave way to such an urge, he 
was ‘tempted by the return to aristocratic society’.1049  Bruce Frohnen arrived at a very similar 
conclusion.1050  These were the claims against which Mill defended Tocqueville in his review 
of the second volume of the Démocractie.  Phrases such as the ‘tyranny of the majority’ had 
been adapted to the ‘Conservative dialect,’ Mill told his readers, ‘and trumpeted by Sir Robert 
Peel in his Tamworth oration’, in which he had urged the perusal of Tocqueville’s book.1051  
But, Mill was in no doubt.  Tocqueville’s theories were ‘of an impartiality without example’ 
and, what is more, his ‘practical conclusions lean towards Radicalism’.1052  This was Mill’s 
assessment and it has been reinforced by modern analysts like Hugh Brogan, who has 
asserted Tocqueville’s status as the prophet of democracy.1053   
In the opinion of the present author, Tocqueville’s political thought has been most 
persuasively understood by Philippe Nemo.  Recently, Nemo placed Tocqueville in a similar 
                                                          
1047 S.S. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life (Princeton, 2001), 
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1052 Ibid.   
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320 
 
bracket to that which Kahan had earlier situated him: aristocratic liberalism.1054  However, 
Nemo drew different conclusions to Kahan about the implications of this location for 
Tocqueville’s overall political position, which, in my view, are supported by what has been set 
out above regarding Tocqueville’s views on democracy.  Nemo perceived in Tocqueville’s 
aristocratic liberalism a current of thought that was fundamentally deleterious to democracy.  
When considered in the context of Tocqueville’s opinion of the scale of the challenges 
presented by democracy and the solutions he offered to these problems, Nemo’s view has 
considerable force.  Democracy was a new form of leviathan in Tocqueville’s view, not a 
release from it.   
In the final analysis, Tocqueville struggled to outgrow the influences of his youth, which I set 
out in the Introduction above.  These influences were long-lasting and gave him a natural 
disdain for democracy that became more pronounced as the experience of his American 
journey gradually receded from memory.  What remained was a conservatism that feared 
democracy and its consequences for a still revolutionary France allied to a liberal 
endorsement of the sanctity of the law, the necessity of popular consent, religious toleration 
and limited government.  In the most reductive terms, Tocqueville’s liberal conservatism was 
the product of a clash between his aristocratic heritage and the democratic bequest of the 
French Revolution.   
Mill’s political thought and its reputation has been the subject of equally contentious 
treatment.  Catherine Audard recently asked a pressing question: ‘Pourquoi lire John Stuart 
Mill aujourd’hui?’1055  Indeed, this question originated in the immediate aftermath of Mill’s 
                                                          
1054 P. Nemo, Histoire des idées politiques aux temps modernes et contemporains (Paris, 2013), pp.1105-1152.  
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death.  Despite widespread recognition as a towering presence at the centre of mid-Victorian 
intellectual life, post-mortem, it seemed as if Mill’s time, along with his opinions, had 
passed.1056  This neglect continued throughout much of the twentieth century, in which Mill 
seemed irrelevant.  His ideas were obscured by the ideological struggle between Western 
models of capitalism and Eastern state socialism.1057   
However, his re-emergence in the latter part of the twentieth-century was emphatic.  As with 
Tocqueville the context was all-important.  As the East/West divide collapsed issues 
associated with democratic capitalism came into view.  Renewed interest in Mill led to diverse 
opinions about his political philosophy.  Some claimed him for liberalism tout court whilst 
others presented an image of his work that bordered on totalitarianism.1058  Still other 
commentators have seen in his ideas an Athenian turn that pointed in the direction of liberal 
democracy.1059   
Skorupski saw in Mill’s work a liberal naturalism.1060  Jonathan Riley decried those scholars 
who perceived in Mill’s writings a justification of oligarchy, elitism or utopianism.1061  But, was 
he, as Gregory Claeys thinks, a paternalist?1062  Ryan rejected the idea out of hand.1063  Many, 
like Reeves, have made great claims for his irrepressible democratic radicalism.1064  In fact, at 
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one time or another, Mill has been claimed by representatives of ideologies as far apart as 
ethical socialism and laissez-faire libertarianism, not to mention every major British political 
party.1065  Few accepted Mill’s opinion that he remained a utilitarian, if in a different form.1066   
Mill shared with Tocqueville a number of important liberal concerns that mark him out, in the 
view of the present author, as a nineteenth-century liberal.  Like Tocqueville, Mill was 
fundamentally committed to principally liberal ends: limited government; the rule of law; 
toleration, religious or otherwise; popular consent of government; and individual liberty.1067  
However, the question remains: what shade of liberalism were Mill’s political ideas coloured 
by?  In this, his early influences were crucial.  Mill embraced equality of conditions where 
Tocqueville only recognized their onset; Mill campaigned for democracy where Tocqueville 
merely charted its rise and enunciated its consequences; and Mill attempted to endow 
democracy with a political culture that enhanced it where Tocqueville attempted little more 
than to chart a course that would enable his contemporaries to contain democracy’s 
undesirable effects.  This contrast is crucial to our understanding of Mill’s wider ideological 
position.  Mill’s liberalism was democratic where Tocqueville’s was aristocratic and this owed 
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much to the influence of his youthful Utilitarianism, which continued to frame his thought – 
even in later life.   
Where Tocqueville and Mill presented scholars with classificatory challenges, Carlyle offered 
a nightmare of this sort.  The ambiguity surrounding the Scotsman’s ideas on politics has 
resulted in a number of competing interpretations with regard to his ideological outlook.  He 
has been accorded a variety of different, often contradictory labels, none of which adequately 
describe his thought.   
An anonymous obituary written in the Saturday Review, for example, claimed that Carlyle had 
for a long time been a communist, though his political sympathies had ‘become less and less 
revolutionary as he grew older.’1068  Modern scholars, such as Claeys and Ryan, restated 
Carlyle’s socialist leanings, labelling him – along with John Ruskin – an example of nineteenth-
century feudal socialism.1069  E.G.M. Hamilton ascribed to Carlyle the origins of the welfare 
state whilst Victor Basch claimed Carlyle was in favour of democratic liberty.1070  An unknown 
reviewer of Carlyle’s tract on Chartism argued that ‘Mr. Carlyle’s dogmas and opinions…seem 
those of a philosophic Ultra-Radical of a new type’.  According to this reviewer, Carlyle was ‘a 
Tory-Radical’ who promoted ‘a kind of Utopian Toryism’.1071   
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324 
 
H.J.C. Grierson thought Carlyle a ‘sansculotist’1072 whilst D.B. Coffer understood him as having 
been a bourgeois revolutionary.1073  Eric Bentley attributes to Carlyle the position of 
aristocratic radicalism.1074  Some thought Carlyle a bastion of traditional conservatism whilst 
others attributed to him a Romantic conservative inclination.1075  H.S. Jones highlighted the 
problematic nature of claiming Carlyle for conservatism at all and suggested that he could be 
best understood as a one of two ‘philosophical idealists’ in contemporary Britain, the other 
being Samuel Taylor Coleridge.1076  After all, Chris Vanden Bossche noted, Carlyle was a man 
who sympathized with the Puritans of the English Revolution of 1640 and the French 
revolutionaries of 1789, both of whom ‘committed regicide, the symbolic destruction of 
monarchy and the established order.’1077  He was also the man who proposed a litany of 
heroes the vast majority of whom had either challenged established authority overtly or 
criticized it covertly.1078  Hardly the credentials of an unabashed conservative.   
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1078 Indeed, Carlyle’s Oh Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History offers the reader heroic men such as 
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These men were hardly conservative stalwarts.  Carlyle’s admiration of heroic radicals reached a crescendo in 
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The comparative neglect of Carlyle’s political thought in recent years is related less to its 
inconsistency or plasticity and more to the totalitarian implications many modern 
commentators have found latent in it.  Jonathan Mendilow suggested Carlyle’s political 
thought was a unique example of ‘catch-all extremism’.1079  Hugh Trevor-Roper referred to 
Carlyle’s Nazi pedigree.1080  Bertrand Russell situated him in an intellectual trajectory running 
from Fichte, through Byron, to Nietzsche and into Hitler.1081  This association continued the 
process of reputational assassination of Carlyle that Simon Heffer identified in his biography 
of the Scotsman.1082  John Rosenberg asserted that such a perception of Carlyle’s thought 
represents nothing other than ‘guilt by a-historical association.’1083  Ernst Cassirer maintained 
that this charge against Carlyle amounted to the utter destruction of ‘all the rules of historical 
objectivity.’1084  Michael Goldberg agreed with Cassirer’s sentiments.1085  Recently, the Nazi 
stain on Carlyle’s writings has been challenged by Jonathan McCollum, who claimed that 
though the Nazis attempted to assert the existence of a relationship between the Scotsman’s 
thought and their own they ultimately failed and this failure was recognized by Nazi 
intellectuals.1086   
The neglect that Carlyle’s works have laboured under as a result of the Nazi association is 
unwarranted.  He had much to say on the politics of his day and a very real contribution to 
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make to the political thought of his era.  Recent works by Morrow, Paul E. Kerry, and Marylu 
Hill have begun to redress the balance with regard to Carlyle’s political thought, and have 
yielded some interesting results.1087  Morrow, in his recent biography, alluded to Carlyle’s 
‘progressive and radical inclinations’.1088  Kerry and Hill contended that we can only begin to 
understand Carlyle’s political pronouncements properly if we appreciate what he valued.  ‘His 
concern,’ in their view, was ‘not to create a blueprint for a fully articulated system of 
government, but instead to ask what is the best way to bring people together.’1089   
In the view of the present author, Carlyle’s was a conservative voice in the contemporary 
period, but a conservative voice full of radicalism.  Boyd Hilton describes contemporary British 
conservatism in dualistic terms.  High Tories, Hilton claims, required constant government 
interference in the management of society and supported legislative measures to control 
particular industries or other concerns.1090  Liberal Tories, on the other hand, wanted the state 
to operate neutrally but, nonetheless, supported a certain variety of moral paternalism, with, 
for example, legislation to encourage church-building and discourage vagrancy.1091  Carlyle 
could not have supported the sort of state-led moral activism championed by Liberal Tories, 
nor could he have condoned a broadly neutral state.  Could Carlyle be described as having 
been a High Tory?  High Tories were too inflexible, too committed to the contemporary social 
and political order to be attractive to Carlyle’s reforming temperament.  Certainly, the 
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Scotsman would have supported the High Tories’ legislative activism, but not their desire to 
maintain society in its contemporary mould.   
Carlyle’s conservatism was radical and abrogating as much as it was preservative.  This seems 
contradictory.  Morrow resolved this apparent incongruity in a recent contribution on 
Carlyle’s thought.  Carlyle’s focus on the institutions and values of the past, Morrow claimed, 
‘was not a symptom of nostalgia, far less of reaction’.  Rather, he continued, ‘it reﬂected 
Carlyle’s search for images from the past that were both inspiring and salutary because they 
gave vivid expression to universally signiﬁcant ideas that were of particular importance in light 
of the social, political and spiritual crisis facing his contemporaries.’1092   
This is reflected in his views on modern democracy.  Carlyle accepted the modern world as it 
was; in fact, as I have shown, he took great pains to understand how democracy had arisen 
and this led him to conclude that it was inexorable.  For this reason, he did not desire a return 
to a lost past.  However, Carlyle tempered his acceptance of the modern democratic world 
with an attempt to create a political culture that emphasised order, hierarchy, religiosity and 
rationality, which were universal to any political or social system in his view.  Like Tocqueville 
and Mill, Carlyle’s perspective owed much to his youthful influences.  The contradictions in 
his political outlook, as Vanden Bossche recognized, resulted from the fact that the Scotsman 
was the heir to two traditions of reform – that of Protestantism and that of Scottish 
scepticism, which led him in contrary directions.1093   
The various lenses through which Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle have been interpreted – 
except, I would suggest, Carlyle’s Nazi association – have uncovered aspects of their political 
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thought and personal disposition that are important to a comprehensive understanding of 
their analysis of the modern democratic world.  Some are particularly valuable inasmuch as 
they demonstrate the competing influences that weighed on the ideas these three men 
advocated.   
Studies like those of Kahan, Rosen and Vanden Bossche showed readers a framework of 
competing ideas that percolated through the minds of Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle and 
settled, finally, into a multi-layered, though still porous, sedimentary bedrock.  Others, like 
those of Wolin, Cowling and Grierson revealed leanings in the works of Tocqueville, Mill and 
Carlyle, but did not offer, in the view of the present author, persuasive explanations of their 
thought in all its diversity.   
The present study of the understandings of democracy offered by Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle 
is more in line with those of Kahan, Rosen and Vanden Bossche than it is with those of Wolin, 
Cowling and Grierson.  I have attempted throughout this thesis to widen the aperture of the 
lens applied by the former triumvirate and, in so doing, restrict the tendency present in the 
latter to understand Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle through a narrow political intention or 
perspective.   
 
TOCQUEVILLE, MILL AND CARLYLE AND BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT     
In this final section of the conclusion, I want to address what I believe the comparison 
between Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle tells us about contemporary British political discourse 
in relation to democracy.  Clearly, it demonstrates that two of the most significant British 
political and social commentators benefitted from an engagement with European intellectual 
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currents.  These currents helped to shape their understanding of democracy, which was 
subsequently shared with contemporaries through the many works Mill and Carlyle wrote.   
The engagement of Mill and Carlyle with the political ideas of European thinkers, such as 
Tocqueville, was indicative of a wider trend.  Other British political thinkers, subsequent to 
Mill and Carlyle, engaged with European political thought on the subject of democracy.  The 
notions of democracy generated by political commentators throughout the course of the 
Victorian era were not shaped substantially by ‘local circumstances’, as Innes and Philp 
recently claimed, but by an expansive engagement with wider European discourses, which 
were very often accessed through the work of Tocqueville.1094  Two examples of later political 
thinkers show how limited the impact of local events, like the Reform Act or Chartism, were 
in the promulgation of democratic thought in mid- to late-nineteenth century liberal and 
conservative circles.   
James Bryce and Matthew Arnold were born a generation after Tocqueville, Mill and Carlyle 
and held different views about democracy, the democratic state and democratic man.  And 
yet, their views on democracy bear the hallmarks of the sort of sophistication that European 
analysts like Tocqueville introduced into the reflections of British political commentators like 
Mill and Carlyle.  The ideas of Bryce and Arnold on democracy do not, however, bear the 
imprint of local political events in any significant way.   
Bryce’s 1867 essay on The Historical Aspect of Democracy illustrates the primacy of 
continental European notions of democracy and its development.  The opening lines of the 
essay cite a passage from Tocqueville’s Démocratie.  The quotation is followed by effusive 
praise of the Frenchman: Tocqueville is described as ‘the founder of modern political 
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science’.1095  Bryce makes use of an historical analysis remarkably similar to Tocqueville’s in 
order to demonstrate the inapplicability of the examples of ancient Greece and Rome to 
modern conceptions of democracy.1096  He defends Tocqueville’s historical analysis of 
democracy from the charge of fatalism, a common criticism of the Frenchman’s views.1097  
Bryce utilizes Tocqueville’s teachings on the democratic history of France.  He notes that 
‘France is a memorable and terrible example of political ruin.  But the moral which her history 
teaches is, as De Tocqueville has so convincingly proved, not the evils of democracy, but the 
evils of a democratic state of society without a democratic government’.1098  Bryce goes even 
further in asserting that the history of democracy is but the history of Christianity extended 
into the political sphere – an idea that was prevalent amongst French intellectuals of 
Tocqueville’s era, including Tocqueville himself.1099  ‘Democracy in its true sense’, Bryce 
argues, ‘is the product of Christianity, whose principle, asserted from the first and asserted 
until now, has been the spiritual equality of all men before God.’1100   
In his essay, Bryce presents a clear argument for democratic reform – the failure to enact 
which was becoming dangerous.  He states that ‘If there be anything which history declares 
to be dangerous, it is the failure to recognise a new phase of political growth’.1101  Democracy 
was that new phase of political growth and, in his view, it required recognition.  Bryce’s 
understanding of democracy, its meaning, its history, its relation to Christianity and the signal 
event of the modern world – the French Revolution – was mediated through Tocqueville and, 
by extension, continental European political thought on democracy.  Local British events 
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counted for little in Bryce’s understanding of what it meant to be democratic in the modern 
world.1102   
Liberal Anglicans, like Matthew Arnold, were more ambivalent than Bryce about democracy 
and the prospects of a democratic world.  And yet, in an 1861 essay on Democracy Arnold 
accepted the continental European historical trajectory that had been bequeathed to British 
political commentators by theorists like Tocqueville.  Arnold argued that ‘Ever since Europe 
emerged from barbarism, ever since the condition of the common people began a little to 
improve, ever since their minds began to stir, this effort of democracy has been gaining 
strength; and the more their condition improves, the more strength this effort gains.’1103   
In fact, Arnold’s notion of democracy itself bears the hallmark of continental, particularly 
French, influence.  ‘Social freedom, – equality, – that is rather the field of the conquests of 
democracy.’1104  Democracy in the modern world was not, for Arnold, political in essence, but 
social.  It was grounded on the idea of social equality.  It is no surprise, then, that over the 
course of the essay he cites Tocqueville on various occasions, labelling the Frenchman ‘a 
philosophic observer’.1105  Tocqueville, as I have outlined above, believed democracy to be 
social, principally, and concerned, fundamentally, with social equality.   
The examples of Bryce and Arnold indicate something significant about the development of 
British political thought on democracy in the wake of the early influence of continental 
European thinkers on commentators like Mill and Carlyle.  More than local conditions, the 
cross-fertilization of ideas facilitated by intellectual transfers from continental European 
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thinkers, like Tocqueville, to British theorists, like Mill and Carlyle, decisively shaped British 
political discourse on the subject of democracy.  This can be traced through other prominent 
mid- to late-Victorian writers, such as Walter Bagehot and Sir Henry Maine.1106   
Mill and Carlyle may not have been the only British benefactors of continental European 
innovations in the field of democratic political thought.  However, they were perhaps the first 
British thinkers to incorporate such ideas into their respective political outlooks.  They were, 
therefore, important in the process of change that shifted contemporary British political 
thought on democracy, its meaning and its problems away from the expectations of 
characteristically eighteenth century thinkers, whose notion of these things was unspecific 
and rested on a mixture of classical associations and dogmatic ideas about the American and 
French Revolutions.   
Mill and Carlyle, like Tocqueville and other European thinkers, were significant in as much as 
they gave the idea of modern democracy a richer content that was grounded on a 
comprehensive understanding of democracy’s historical foundations, its political and social 
complexity, the challenges inherent within it and the possible solutions available to such 
difficulties in the modern democratic era.  Mill and Carlyle were important figures in as much 
as their reflections on these themes – alongside Tocqueville’s – wove a new ethical complexity 
into the fabric of British political thinking on democracy across the ideological spectrum.  In 
future, British thinkers who favoured or feared democracy, be they from whatever ideological 
camp, operated within the context of this new and refined democratic idiom.  The distinctive 
contribution of Mill and Carlyle in the British context was to change the democratic idiom 
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definitively through their interaction with and reflection on European ideas about democracy.  
Heretofore, this important legacy has not been properly appreciated and, yet, it was 
significant to the development ideas about democracy in the British context by future 
theorists, such as Bryce and Arnold.   
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